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Abstract
I argue in this thesis that the topic of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is an
epistemology of metaphysics. This has important consequences for how the
argumentative structure of the work should be understood.
While the Critique constitutes an indispensable part of Kant’s philosophy in general
and his ethics in particular, it is doubtful whether it is fully successful as it stands. In a
footnote to his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant hints at an alternative
argumentative strategy to establish the claims of the Critique, but he seems not to have
developed this in the subsequent 2nd edition of the Critique. In this thesis I present a
critical reconstruction of this alternative argumentative strategy applied to the central
topics of the Transcendental Analytic. I claim that it is the aim of the Transcendental
Analytic as a whole to provide a justification for the claim that pure concepts –
Categories – are validly applied to objects of experience. Following Kant’s hint in the
footnote to the Foundations, I argue that this can be established directly from an analysis
of the forms of empirical judgements, and that claims about space and time as forms of
intuition and considerations about the nature of human sensibility, are redundant.
This reconstruction offers a profoundly Kantian, yet robustly realist way of resolving
important philosophical problems.
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C h a p t e r 1 – I n t r o d u c t i o n 
This thesis is concerned with Immanuel Kant’s philosophy as expressed in his Critique of
Pure Reason.1 I am sympathetic to the broad lines of Kant’s arguments, and the kinds of
aims and motivations that seem to have guided the writing of his “Critical” philosophy,
though I have found myself in disagreement with a large number of the details of his
arguments. I shall argue that Kant is correct in pointing out many epistemic phenomena
that stand in need of an explanation, but that the actual explanations he offers are
frequently mistaken. Even if Kant sometimes argues from false premises, his conclusions
might nevertheless be true, and highly relevant to philosophical problems that are
interesting not only in an historical sense.
My aim in the present thesis is present a critical reconstruction of a central line of
argument in the Critique. The view that I shall be presenting is not one that is completely
and explicitly stated by Kant. Nevertheless – although I am in no position to prove this –
I believe that it is a view that must at least occasionally have been present in Kant’s mind;
this is a line of thought that he must have been on to even if he never stated it
completely. Further, I believe that this view allows the Critique to fulfil its intended role
in Kant’s overall philosophy.
I shall try to show how this view can be gleaned from Kant’s text in a number of
important passages, and that it affords a way to resolve a number of problems.
1.1 The purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason
There seems to be to two clear strands to Kant’s motivation for writing the Critique. One
is the work’s place in Kant’s philosophy at large, which he clearly regarded as an
integrated whole; the other is Kant’s more specific disenchantment with the state of the
then current metaphysics.
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a) The role of the first Critique in Kant’s critical philosophy
From the outset, Kant saw the first Critique of Pure Reason, and the subsequent Critique
of Practical Reason on morals and moral reasoning as parts of an integrated whole. This
is evident in a letter to his pupil, Marcus Herz, of 1772. Here he explains how he has
been thinking about a project with the aim of understanding the extent and limits of “the
whole of philosophy and the rest of knowledge”:
[I] was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have the title, The Limits of
Sensibility and Reason. I planned to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a
practical. The first part would have two sections, (1) general phenomenology and (2)
metaphysics, but this only with regard to its nature and method. The second part likewise
would have two sections, (1) the universal principles of feeling, taste and sensuous desire
and (2) the first principles of morality.2
These two parts correspond closely to what ended up as the two first Critiques, of pure
reason and of practical reason respectively.
One of Kant’s interests was to resolve the “Antinomy of Freedom”, the apparent
conflict between our beliefs in causal necessities on the one hand and in the freedom of
the human will on the other. The first Critique is necessary in order to evaluate the first
lemma: our belief in the causal determinacy of the world. The aim of the first Critique is
to establish the basis for and the proper limits of our knowledge of causal necessity, in
order to show that there is no real incompatibility between this and the possibility of a
free will. Then, in the second Critique, Kant will argue for the second lemma and claim
that the actuality of the free will is a necessary presupposition of the very idea of
morality. Thus practical reason – our actual use of moral concepts, our engaging in
moral practices – does not prove theoretically, but rather shows or demonstrates the
actuality of free will, or at least our inevitable assumption of and thus justified belief
therein. In the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason Kant sketches the status of the
assertion of freedom with respect to the two different aspects of reason. He here refers to
“speculative reason” and occasionally to “theoretical reason” as being opposed to
practical reason.3
With the pure practical faculty of reason, the reality of transcendental freedom is also
confirmed. Indeed, it is substantiated in the absolute sense needed by speculative reason in
                                                
2
 10:129-130. Unless otherwise indicated, emphases in quotations are always from the original.
3
 Presumably ‘speculative’ and ‘theoretical’ reason are just synonyms for ‘pure’ reason, which is the object of the first
Critique and hence here contrasted with practical reason.
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its use of the concept of causality, for this freedom is required if reason is to rescue itself
from the antinomy in which it is inevitably entangled when attempting to think the
unconditioned in a causal series. For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was
problematic but not impossible; that is to say, speculative reason could think of freedom
without contradiction, but it could not assure any objective reality to it. Reason showed
freedom to be conceivable only in order that its supposed impossibility might not
endanger reason’s very being and plunge it into an abyss of skepticism.4
In the preface to the 2nd edition of the first Critique, Kant gives an instructive sketch of
his position regarding the relation between the ideas of natural laws (“mechanisms of
nature”), freedom and morality, and stresses the importance of showing that the idea of
freedom is not contradicted by speculative reason, even though speculative reason could
never prove its existence:
Now suppose that morality necessarily presupposed freedom (in the strictest sense) as a
property of our will … yet that speculative reason had proved that freedom cannot be
thought at all, then that presupposition, namely the moral one, would necessarily have to
yield to the other one, whose opposite contains an obvious contradiction; consequently
freedom and with it morality … would have to give way to the mechanism of
nature.5
That is to say: if the idea of freedom contradicts – is inconsistent with – the verdicts of
speculative reason, then the belief in freedom and with it the belief in the validity of
morals would have to be given up, since in Kant’s view there is no logical necessity to the
validity of morals. However, since we already presuppose the validity of morals in our
everyday practices, all that is required is that the idea of freedom is not inconsistent with
speculative reason and our knowledge of natural laws
…for morality I need nothing more than that freedom should not contradict itself, that it
should at least be thinkable that it should place no hindrance in the way of the
mechanism of nature.6
This suggests that the results of the first Critique are essential for the tenability of the
second Critique. Kant’s moral philosophy is logically dependent on premises that are
supposed to be established in his epistemology of metaphysics; namely the claim that
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5
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freedom is consistent with the causal principle necessarily employed in experience.
Without this premise, Kant’s moral philosophy is unsupported. Therefore, if, as I believe,
the first Critique does not succeed as it stands, it is a worthwhile task to see whether it is
possible to reconstruct an argument for the same purposes, to the same effects and along
the same general lines as that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Even though Kant may
have drawn invalid or unsupported inferences, or occasionally have argued from false
premises, that does not entail that his conclusions were false. Especially not if, as I shall
claim, he is arguing by way of inference to best explanation. In such cases, the
conclusions are often in a sense given and the arguments are intended to shore up or
secure principles that are already being employed; to remove any doubts as to the
correctness of assumptions we cannot but make.
b) The disenchantment with metaphysics
Kant was educated in the Wolff-Leibnizian rationalist metaphysics, but came in due
course to regard it as lacking both foundations and a proper method. Kant regarded
metaphysics as the topic par excellence for philosophy, while at the same time seeing a
crisis in the way metaphysical studies had so far been undertaken. He reports famously
that he was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by reading David Hume’s An Enquiry
concerning Human Understanding.7
Hume ends his work by recommending that all of metaphysics be rejected as
meaningless:
When we run over libraries, persuaded by these principles, what havoc must we make? If we
take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask,
Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit
it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.8
Since metaphysics cannot, in Kant’s terms, be either analytic (“abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or number”) or empirical (“experimental reasoning…”), this
means that if Hume’s claims were to be accepted, then all of metaphysics would have to
be committed to the flames. Now Kant could not accept this conclusion, in large part
because he thought that by the same argument, all of mathematics, geometry, the
                                                
7
 Proleg. 4:260. However, Guyer and Wood cast doubt on the historical accuracy of this claim in their introduction to the
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8
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foundations of natural science and even the possibility of any systematic empirical
knowledge would have to be denied too. He did however accept Hume’s premises,
insofar as granting that if metaphysical knowledge is supposed to be grounded in or
justified by the same principles as either analytic judgements of judgements of
experience, then metaphysics would indeed be impossible. So, we stand in need of an
explanation of how metaphysical knowledge, how “metaphysics as a science”, could be
possible. Without a correct epistemology of metaphysics, it has proved impossible to
develop a good methodology of metaphysics.
Metaphysics […] has up to now not been so favored by fate as to have been able to
enter upon the secure course of a science, even though it is older than all other sciences,
and would remain even if all the others were swallowed up by an all-consuming barbarism.
For in it reason continuously gets stuck […] and it is so far from reaching unanimity in the
assertions of its adherents that it is rather a battlefield, and indeed one that appears to be
especially determined for testing one’s powers in mock combat; on this battlefield no
combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground, nor has any been able to base any
lasting possession on his victory. Hence there is no doubt that up to now the procedure
has been a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts.9
In the context of Kant’s critical philosophy there are then three interrelated demands that
must be met by a critique of pure reason: (1) It must provide a correct epistemology of
metaphysics. That is to say that it must demonstrate that we are in possession of
metaphysical cognitions which are employed in experience, analyse how these differ
from ordinary empirical cognitions and explain how we come to possess and validly to
employ such metaphysical concepts and principles. (2) It must use this to provide or at
least point the way to a viable methodology for metaphysics as a science, and (3) it must
show by way of these that speculative reason at least does  not, and preferably that it could
not disprove the possibility of freedom. I aim  in this thesis to present a way of meeting
the first two of these demands, and to pave the way for eventually meeting the third
demand.
1.2 Reading the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant’s Critique is by any account an excessively complex work. Partly this is because
Kant attempted in many ways to steer a middle course between the rationalism
represented by the Wolff-Leibnizian metaphysical tradition and the empiricism
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represented in particular by Berkeley, Locke and Hume, thus having to argue as it were
on two fronts; partly because Kant’s views seem to have been developing through the
period in which the two versions of the Critique were written. This complexity has been
noted by many commentators:
– Guyer and Wood in their Introduction to the Cambridge edition of the Critique:
This complex program led to the enormous complexity of the structure and argument of the
Critique of Pure Reason. To many readers, the elaborate structure or “architectonic” of the
Critique has been a barrier to understanding it.10
– Strawson in The Bounds of Sense :
I […] have read and re-read the work with a commingled sense of great insights and great
mystification.11
– Paton in Kant's Metaphysics of Experience:
The crossing of the Great Arabian Desert can scarcely be a more exhausting task than is the
attempt to master the windings and twistings of the Transcendental Deduction.12
As it is not obvious from the Critique itself how it should be understood, it would seem
reasonable to look at any hints and clues Kant himself gives us as to how to understand
the broad structure of the work. In the following three sections, we shall to this end
investigate certain key passages where Kant comments on his own project.
1.3 The Epistemology of Metaphysics
Kant published two editions of the Critique, one in 1781 and a revised edition in 1787.
Both in the introductions to these editions and in various writings from the same period,
we find several clues of how to understand Kant’s argumentative strategy.
 In the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Come Forward
as Science, published in 1783, Kant presents his Critique of metaphysics in the form of
four progressive parts of “the Main Transcendental Question”. The end point is what he
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12
 Paton 1936, p. 547
Introduction 1.3 The Epistemology of Metaphysics
– 13 –
terms “The General Question of the Prolegomena”, namely “How is Metaphysics
Possible as Science?”,13 and to provide an answer to this question, Kant finds it necessary
first to answer three progressive questions:
 How is pure mathematics possible?
 How is pure natural science possible?
 How is metaphysics in general possible?
A similar line of thought runs through the introduction to the second edition of the
Critique. This too ends in the same question as the Prolegomena: “How is metaphysics
possible as science?”14
Indeed, this kind of question: How is this or that possible? underlie large parts of
Kant’s thoughts, and I think this is important in understanding what sort of
argumentative structure one should expect to find in the Critique. I take it that to ask how
something is possible is to ask for an explanation of the phenomenon, and when that
explanation is sufficiently systematic and integrated with other explanations it forms part
of a theory. A natural way to present this kind of argument is first to present or point out
observable actual phenomena, show that these phenomena are puzzling, interesting or for
some reason stand in need of explanation, and then to argue for the best explanation of
them. Once we have good grounds for accepting a certain explanation – a theory – we
may then be able to draw logical conclusions from the theoretical assumptions. The
introduction to the second edition of the Critique shows this structure exceptionally
clearly. Kant here presents a short series of factual premises and explanatory tasks:
[Premise:] We are in possession of certain a priori cognitions, and even the common
understanding is never without them.15
[Task:] Philosophy needs a science that determines the possibility, the principles, and the
domain of all cognitions a priori.16
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[Premise:] Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical
sciences of reason.
1. Mathematical judgements are all synthetic […]
2. Natural science (Physica) contains within itself synthetic a priori judgments as
principles […]
3. In metaphysics […] synthetic a priori cognitions are supposed to be contained.17
 
[Task:] How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? […]
How is pure mathematics possible? […]
How is pure natural science possible? […]
How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible? […]
How is metaphysics possible as science?18
 
Unfortunately, it is easy to lose sight of this structure in the complex arguments of the
Critique proper. One of my aims in this thesis is to show that reading the Critique as
conforming to this argumentative structure makes a lot of sense with regards to many
passages that otherwise become very difficult to understand.
Kant thus presents his critical project as the posing and answering of
“transcendental” questions, of which the main one is “How is metaphysics possible as
science?”.
In the letter to Herz, Kant talks of how he is planning the Critique, and here he gives
a more precise formulation of the question of how metaphysics is possible:
As I thought through the theoretical part [of the coming Critique of Pure Reason]… I
noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical
studies I, as well as others, had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to
the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself. I asked myself this
question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to
the object?19
Since the fundamental question of how metaphysical representations are related to their
objects – i.e. how metaphysical concepts refer and how metaphysical judgements are
justified – has not been answered, no fruitful metaphysical method has been developed. I
shall refer to this problem as the Key to Metaphysics. Kant, then sees the Key to
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Metaphysics as an explanation of the relation of intentionality or “aboutness”. How is it
that we are able to think  about the world, judge about states of affairs, perceive objects?
What is the relation between our representations – thoughts, concepts, judgements,
perceptions – and the world? This is the subject matter of epistemology – the theory of
knowledge. Metaphysics as a science, would, if true, represent a body of knowledge, so to
ask epistemic questions with regards to metaphysics in particular is to ask for an
epistemology of metaphysics.
This question of how our representations relate to objects is indeed present
throughout the Critique. We should note however, that Kant only sees this relation as
problematic and deserving of explanation within the domain of metaphysical knowledge.
With regards to empirical cognitions, Kant believes that we have an easy, natural
explanation by way of a causal theory of perception:
If a representation comprises only the manner in which the subject is affected by the
object, then it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect
accords with its cause, and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can
represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations
have an understandable relationship to objects…20
This means that, at least at this stage, Kant takes empirical knowledge for granted, and
indeed we shall see that the nature of our ordinary empirical knowledge are frequently
used as premises for Kant’s arguments. This acceptance of empirical cognition as
unproblematic is re-iterated in the introduction to the Transcendental Deduction in the
Critique:
We make use of a multitude of empirical concepts without objection from anyone, and take
ourselves to be justified in granting them a sense and a supposed signification even
without any deduction, because we always have experience ready at hand to prove their
objective reality.21
In the introduction to the 2nd edition of the Critique Kant introduces the idea of a
“special science under the name of a critique of pure reason”. One of the exegetical
theses that I shall defend is that a critique of pure reason just is an epistemology of
metaphysics. Kant presents the idea of this special science termed a critique of pure
reason as what would be needed to answer the series of questions he has posed earlier in
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the introduction, which questions correspond to the parts of the “Main Transcendental
Question” from the Prolegomena. This science is explained as being a subset of what
should be called “Transcendental Philosophy”.22 Kant explains this term in the
following way:
I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with
our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.23
Now, this phrase is puzzling: What is it for a cognition to be occupied “not so much with
objects, but rather with our mode of cognition of objects”? It would seem that normal,
empirical cognitions are cognitions of objects simpliciter, so cognitions that are occupied
with our mode of cognition of objects, must be cognitions whose object are again simple
empirical cognitions, or more precisely the form or nature of such simple cognitions of
objects, i.e. “our mode of cognitions of objects”. So transcendental cognition is a
second-order or reflective knowledge. It is knowledge about first-order, empirical
knowledge. In a word: epistemology. When it is further specified as being concerned
with cognition “insofar as this is to be possible a priori”, this must mean that
transcendental philosophy just is the epistemology of a priori knowledge. Now,
according to Kant, a priori knowledge, comprises more than just metaphysics and
includes all knowledge that is independent of experience; i.e. logic, mathematics and
metaphysics. Hence the epistemology of metaphysics is a particular part of the
epistemology of a priori knowledge, so if “the critique of pure reason” just is the
epistemology of metaphysics, it should be described as a proper part of transcendental
philosophy. This is exactly what Kant goes on to do:
I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with
our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori. A system of
such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy. But this is again too
much for the beginning. For since such a science would have to contain completely both
the analytic as well as the synthetic a priori cognition, it is, so far as our aim is
concerned, too broad in scope, since we need to take the analysis only as far as is
indispensably necessary in order to provide insight into the principles of a priori
synthesis in their entire scope, which is our only concern.24
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Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure
reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically … That this critique is not itself
already called transcendental philosophy rests solely on the fact that in order to be a
complete system it would also have to contain an exhaustive analysis of all human
cognition a priori.25
The critique of pure reason as a “science” in general and Kant’s book by that name in
particular is thus an epistemology of metaphysics.
Michael Friedman comes to similar conclusions in his recent article “Kantian
Themes in Contemporary Philosophy”:
Transcendental philosophy is thus a meta-discipline, as it were, whose distinctive task is
to investigate the nature and conditions of possibility of first-level scientific
knowledge.26
Friedman is clearly right about the transcendental philosophy being a meta-discipline,
but he overlooks, it seems to me, that the object of transcendental philosophy is
exclusively a priori knowledge, which according to Kant includes mathematics, broadly
logical truths and metaphysics. Metaphysics in turn is supposed to constitute the pure
part of natural science. So transcendental philosophy investigates rather the nature and
conditions of a priori knowledge, which in turn are necessary conditions for empirical
knowledge, and eo ipso for the empirical part of natural science.
 It is important to note that this means that the Critique is not a work of metaphysics,
in the same sense that a book about the methodology of physics is not a work of physics.
Kant’s works of metaphysics proper are his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science (“Foundations”) and The Metaphysics of Morals. In the Critique, Kant is not
propounding or arguing for specific metaphysical theses, but merely laying bare those
metaphysical principles which are always already employed in empirical knowledge, and
explaining how it is possible that we validly employ such principles. In short, he is giving
an epistemology of metaphysics. He is explaining how metaphysics is possible – giving a
theory of metaphysical knowledge, and then using this theory to devise a suitable
methodology for metaphysics as a science, and this methodology is then employed in his
two works of metaphysics proper. The Critique of Pure Reason provides the necessary
foundations for being able to claim in his works in moral philosophy that there is no
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incompatibility between the metaphysical principle of causality which grounds the
scientific presupposition of causal determinacy, and the moral assumption of human
freedom of will.
Note that in claiming that the Critique of Pure Reason is an epistemology of metaphysics,
I am in direct contradiction with as influential a commentator as Heidegger, who states
outright “The Critique of Pure Reason has nothing to do with a ‘theory of
knowledge’”.27 I shall however try to make the case that reading the Critique precisely as
an epistemology of metaphysics makes excellent sense of the actual arguments and
assertions of the work.
1.4 The overall argumentative structure of the Critique
Since metaphysics by definition is non-empirical, independent of empirical investi-
gations, Kant uses the term ‘pure’ for metaphysical elements of our knowledge. He thus
talks of pure concepts and pure principles – pure  in the sense that they are non-
empirical. Their content goes beyond what could be grounded by experience. We may,
and Kant thinks we do, have good models for explaining how empirical concepts refer
and how empirical judgements are justified, but these models cannot account for
cognitions that go beyond experience, hence the need for an epistemology of
metaphysics. Now, Kant’s fundamental thesis is that an analysis of the form of empirical
knowledge (abstracted away form any particular content) will yield the elements needed
to explain the existence and applicability of pure concepts and principles. Kant also
holds that there are pure intuitions, and that our knowledge of time and space is
essentially based on such pure intuitions. I am largely going to bypass this discussion in
the present thesis. Partly this is because I think that Kant’s views on the knowledge of
time and space are ultimately untenable, and partly because the considerations regarding
time and space are unnecessary in order to explain our knowledge of causal facts.
a) The form of empirical knowledge
In the introduction to the chapter on Transcendental Logic, Kant explains how he thinks
that pure concepts “contain” only the form of empirical knowledge.
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Both [intuition and concepts] are either pure or empirical. Empirical, if sensation
(which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but pure if no
sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible
cognition. Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is
intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general. Only pure
intuitions or concepts alone are possible a priori, empirical ones only a posteriori.28
Giving a correct analysis of the form of empirical knowledge, and then drawing
conclusions from there, is an important aspect of Kant’s argumentation. I shall look at
the particulars of how this is done in the following more detailed discussions of the
various stages of the argument in the Critique.
A cornerstone of the Critique is the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts
of the Understanding”. Here Kant is trying to answer the question of how pure concepts
make experience – empirical knowledge – possible. This question is a close relative of
what, in the letter to Herz was termed “the key to the whole secret of metaphysics”,
namely the relation between representation and object. If a representation is to count as a
cognition of an object, there must be some kind of correspondence between the object
and the representation. If the representation changes while the object stays the same or
vice versa, that representation no longer correctly represents the object. So, the question
then is what sort of relation could constitute such a correspondence between
representation and object. In the introduction to the Transcendental Deduction, Kant
claims that there are only two possible explanations for such a correspondence of
representations and objects.
There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can
come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if
the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes
the object possible. If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical, and the
representation is never possible a priori. And this is the case with appearance in respect of
that which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then since representation in itself
… does not produce its object as far as existence is concerned, the representation is still
determinant of the object a priori if it is possible through it alone to cognize
something as an object.29
I shall look closer at this claim that a correspondence could only be constituted by either
the object making the representation possible or vice versa in section 3.1. Note that Kant
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does not claim that the pure concepts create their objects, “does not produce its object as
far as existence is concerned”. Rather the claim is that the representations makes possible
the cognition of something as an object. So the pure concepts make possible the
experience of objects as objects, they make possible the experience of objects in general.
If this could be established – that a correspondence between pure concepts and
objects could only be explained by the concepts making the experience of the objects
possible – then explaining how this happens is clearly the completion of the question of
how pure concepts are related to objects, and hence the central importance of the
Transcendental Deduction.
Unfortunately this central passage of the Critique is far from clear, and its correct
interpretation remains a much debated topic of Kant-scholarship. To add to the
difficulty, Kant wrote two completely different versions of the Deduction for the two
editions of the Critique. In a footnote to the preface to Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science, Kant’s first Critical work of metaphysics proper, published in between
the two editions of the first Critique, Kant responds to a criticism of the Critique. Here he
concedes the obscurity of the first edition of the Deduction. But, he promises, he now
sees that the problem of how experience is possible only by means of the pure concepts
can be solved with “great facility”
…inasmuch as it can be solved almost by a single conclusion from the precisely
determined definition of a judgment in general.30
 So, Kant’s claim is that the explanation of how pure concepts make experience
possible and thus are able to correspond to objects can be made by a conclusion from
the definition of judgement in general. Now, Kant makes an important distinction
between analytic and synthetic definitions, the latter is applicable to made concepts and
the former to given concepts. This will be examined in greater detail in section 2.1 below,
where I shall argue that the concept of “judgement in general” must be regarded as a
given concept, and as such to be the appropriate object of an analytic definition. If this is
correct, it would seem fair to read Kant’s “precisely determined definition of a judgment
in general” as referring to an analysis of the forms of our judgements. The structure of
the argument, then, should be something like the following.
The premise is: We make judgements. By analysis of our actual practice of judging,
we find that the judgements we make are all of certain forms. From the fact that we are
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able to make judgements of these specific forms, we can draw conclusions regarding the
role of pure concepts in making experience by way of judgements possible. I shall refer
to this supposed analysis of the forms of the judgements we in fact make as the Analytic
Premise.
In the same footnote, conceding the obscurity of the 1st edition Transcendental
Deduction, Kant promises to remedy it:
I shall take the earliest opportunity to make up this defect (which concerns only the
manner of the presentation and not the ground of explanation, which is already given
correctly there).31
“The earliest opportunity” must have been the 2nd edition of the Critique, so we might
expect there to find arguments going from the specific forms of judgement – “the
precisely determined definition of a judgment in general” – to conclusions about pure
concepts and the possibility of experience of objects.
Unfortunately we find very little of the sort. Instead the 2nd edition argues mainly
from the “necessary unity of consciousness” and from claims about the forms of and
necessary conditions for the possibility of intuitions, to conclusions that all intuitions
stand under the pure concepts, because the pure concepts are conditions for how “the
manifold of intuition” can come together in one consciousness. This in turn is explained
by reference to pure forms of sensibility.32 Neither in the Transcendental Deduction
itself, nor in the ensuing treatment of “synthetic principles of pure understanding” is
there much trace of arguments going from a premise that we make judgements of certain
forms, to conclusions about pure concepts making experience (of objects) possible.
b) “Making experience possible” – subjective and objective conditions
The idea that pure concepts make experience possible plays a fundamental role in Kant’s
discussion of the Key to Metaphysics. Throughout both versions of the Transcendental
Deduction and all through the Critique runs the thought that the validity of pure
elements of experience can be explained by the claim that they make ordinary empirical
experience possible.
I take it that to “to make something possible” just is to meet necessary conditions
for it. (Meeting sufficient conditions for something, would be to make it actual). So my
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strategy in the following discussion will be to take as a substantive, observable premise
that we make ordinary empirical judgements such as
(1) That apple is green
Making that judgement constitutes having the experience that the apple is green.
Now, one could try to find both necessary and sufficient conditions for having such
experience, and thereby give a complete theoretical account of our empirical cognitive
capacities, but my aim here will be more modest. In line with the idea that pure concepts
make experience possible I am merely going to investigate such necessary conditions for
experience as are required to give an explanation of the Key to Metaphysics.
So, take (1) as an example – can we identify some necessary conditions for having
this kind of experience? Firstly it seems obvious that in order for me to have the veridical
experience of an apple being green, there must in fact be a green apple present to me. So
there are clearly necessary conditions on the world for our particular experience to be
possible. These could naturally be termed objective conditions.
However, there are also necessary conditions on our cognitive capacities. For instance,
to be able to recognise general properties, such as greenness, it seems plausible that we
must possess general concepts of these properties. Such conditions would naturally be
termed subjective conditions.
This thesis, as is the case with the Critique, is concerned with the necessary subjective
conditions for having the kind of experience that we do have. It is a moot and interesting
question whether and to what extent the objective and subjective conditions for
experience are inter-dependent or inter-definable, but that is not a question that needs to
be answered here. There can be little doubt that there are necessary subjective conditions
for experience, and these will provide the premises for drawing the desired conclusions
regarding pure concepts and principles.
1.5 The aims of this thesis
I disagree with Kant about whether forms of sensibility need to be invoked in order to
explain our possession of pure concepts and principles, and this is the main point at
which I depart from a purely “Kantian” philosophy. My aim in the following discussion
will be to show that the possibility of metaphysics, our possession of metaphysical
cognitions, can be explained without assumptions about sensibility, but rather solely by
an analysis of the form of our ordinary, empirical judgements. I thus aim to give a
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critical reconstruction of the kind of argument that Kant hints at in his footnote to the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science – namely the claim that the validity of the
Categories could be shown to follow from “the precisely determined definition of a
judgment in general”.33 This appears to be a radically different strategy to the one
employed in the 1st edition of the Transcendental Deduction – and we should expect to
find it employed in the subsequent 2nd edition version. But as mentioned (on p. 21), these
expectations are not fulfilled.
Whatever Kant’s reasons might have been for abandoning it, I take it that Kant must
have had an argumentative strategy in mind when he wrote this footnote. In the following
chapters I shall try to reconstruct in detail how such a strategy could be developed. In so
doing, I shall show that Kant had all the necessary elements for developing such a
strategy, and that much of the required argumentative structure can already be found in
the Critique. This reconstruction will fill chapters 4 through 9.
Chapter 2 is devoted to presenting some key methodological principles I believe to
be applied in the Critique, and which I will apply in my reconstruction.
Kant’s arguments for the validity of metaphysical knowledge rests on a largely
unstated abstractionist theory of empirical concepts. In chapter 3 I give details to such an
abstractionist theory.
My aim is to present a new approach to finding the Key to Metaphysics, retaining those
general features of Kant’s philosophy that I think are correct whilst presenting
alternatives for those parts that I find untenable. I shall try in each case to give reasons
for why some more specific parts should be rejected whilst other more general features
should be retained. I shall not however aspire to argue conclusively against every Kantian
view that I want to reject. Rather, I shall try to argue positively for my way of finding the
Key to Metaphysics. One of the theses I shall defend is that the structure of what Kant
terms ‘transcendental arguments’ is abductive reasoning – inference to the best
explanation. If this is true of Kant’s arguments and they are appropriate to the task to
which they are put, then it will not always be possible to give conclusive arguments
against  a particular view. Rather, the competing explanations must be set out as clearly as
possible and then be given an overall comparison.
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C h a p t e r 2 – M e t h o d o l o g y 
Kant is a long-winded writer, and the arguments of the Critique are often intricate and
complicated, so in order to understand Kant’s position and his arguments properly, it is
necessary to understand his methodology. Unfortunately the methodology is not always
transparently evident from the Critique itself, especially not to a late 20 th century reader.34
We may, however, find quite a number of helpful clues from Kant’s Logic and from the
much-neglected final section of the Critique, the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”.
Kant uses a system of analysis and synthesis:35 First, analyse and isolate the elements
of the phenomenon under scrutiny (in this case: human knowledge), then draw
conclusions from these analytic (arrived-at-by-analysis) elements. This means that we
find both analytic and synthetic arguments in the Critique. The synthetic arguments are
most often explicitly stated, but Kant quite often merely presents the results of his
analyses. There are reasons for this, as we shall see in the next section, but it is one of the
things that make the Critique hard to understand and assess.
I have found it useful and illuminating to read Kant as tacitly employing two closely
related analytic methods, namely conceptual analysis  and explication. Neither the nature
of these methods nor the occasions of their use are clearly specified by Kant, but it is my
contention that their assumption contribute greatly to making sense of his assertions.
2.1 Conceptual analysis
As I shall be basing the reconstruction of Kant’s project on his clues about it being
deducible from a “precise definition of judgment in general”, we should look closely at
what Kant says about definition in his Logic, where 10 paragraphs (§§99–109) are
devoted to the topic of definitions.
Kant draws an important distinction between analytic and synthetic  definitions. “The
former are definitions of a given, the latter of a made concept.”36 Since concepts are the
objects of definition, this distinction between two kinds of concepts is important. Kant
states this distinction in the very first section of the Logic:
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§4. Given (a priori or a posteriori) and Made Concepts
All concepts, as to their matter, are either given (conceptus dati) or made (conceptus
factitii). The former are given either a priori or a posteriori.37
Made concepts are typically theoretical terms, concepts which are introduced and
explicitly defined in the course of formulating a theory, elaborating a science. In the
introduction to the Logic , Kant describes this process. He gives mathematics and physics
(‘philosophy of nature’) as examples of disciplines where concepts are made in this way:
For when I make a distinct concept, I begin with the parts and proceed form these to the
whole. There are no characteristics present here; I obtain them first by synthesis. From
this synthetic procedure then results synthetic distinctness, which actually expands my
concept as to content by what is added as a characteristic over and above the concept in
intuition (pure or empirical). This synthetic procedure in making distinct concepts is
employed by the mathematician and also by the philosopher of nature. For all distinctness
of mathematical as well as of experiential cognition rests on expansion through synthesis
of characteristics.38
Since these terms are explicitly introduced, the definition legislates their use, and we can
know with certainty that this synthetic definition is precisely and exhaustively what is
“contained” in the made concept. So, synthetic definitions can be both precise and
certain. However, to give a synthetic definition, one would obviously need to use pre-
existing concepts, so not all concepts can be made. Some concepts must be given. These
are concepts that we find ourselves using without having recourse to or need for an
explicit definition. Indeed most of our concepts are of this kind, the ordinary empirical
concepts like ‘apple’, ‘horse’ or ‘table’ among them. But even if recourse to an explicit
definition is no prerequisite for using the concept correctly, we are often able to get at
least part of the way towards a definition also of given, empirical concepts. However,
since the actual use of the concept precedes the definition, the definition has to be
derived from an analysis  of the given use of the concept. We have to base the analysis on
the actual use of the concept, and try to extract the implicit conditions of its use on the
available data.
Now, before we go on to examine how exactly this analytic definition is to be derived,
we should try to determine whether Kant’s “definition of judgement in general” should
be synthetic or analytic, i.e. whether the concept of judgement is a made or a given
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concept. As Kant is interested in human knowledge such as it is, not just how it might be
given some arbitrary theoretical definition, it would seem safe to assume that his
“definition of judgment in general” must be an analytic definition. The phenomenon
of making judgements is clearly an observable fact of human behaviour, and surely it is
possible to recognise this practice and hence use the concept of judgement or judging
without having recourse to an explicit exhaustive definition of the term.
Of course, there is nothing to stop Kant from introducing ‘judgement’ as a
theoretical term, and give it whatever definition he wants. If he does this, however, there
will always be a further question whether any conclusions he draws concerning the
referent of this technical term also pertains to what we normally refer to as ‘judgement’.
If ‘judgement’ is introduced as a made concept, then we are still left with the task of
showing how this term relates to the observable phenomenon picked out by the given
concept ‘judgement’. So, we would still need the analytic definition.
But what exactly is this process of analysis, by which we can derive the definition of
‘judgement’? What sort of arguments could be employed to establish these analytic
claims? Kant’s account of how this is supposed to be carried out is very sketchy, but I
think it is possible to flesh it out into an understandable method, and the following
paragraphs contain my suggestion of how this should be done.
By an analytic definition we hope to make clearer the content – the meaning – of
some concept. Now, there is no mechanical process whereby we can start with the given
concept and at the end of which we are guaranteed to have the complete definition of it.
We find ourselves able to apply concepts, with no recourse to nor need for explicit rules,
verification methods, lists of elementary contents or what have you. There is no way
simply to read off the content of a concept from the usage, either from a 1st person or a
3rd person perspective.
There are, however, ways of ruling out  putative meaning claims – namely by testing
them against uncontested judgements. Suppose we wonder whether the meaning of ‘cat’
might be ‘furry creature’. If that were true there could and would be no furry creature
that were not also cats, hence the judgement ‘All furry creatures are cats’ would be true.
But, since any rational and competent user of English would agree that there are indeed
furry creatures which are not cats, e.g. dogs, the meaning of ‘cat’ cannot be ‘furry
creature’. So one obvious way of conducting the process of conceptual analysis, is by
testing of hypotheses. We have a large stock of uncontested judgements against which we
can test meaning-hypotheses. If the judgement against which we want to test a meaning
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hypothesis is itself contested, then of course it cannot be used as a datum for conceptual
analysis.
Now, testing of hypotheses against the vast data set of uncontested judgements can
get us quite far in uncovering the meaning of concepts, but it has one serious shortfall:
When we find counter examples to a meaning hypothesis, e.g. ‘All furry creatures are
cats’, we know that this hypothesis is false; but if we find no counter examples, and we
are satisfied that no counter examples exist, we do not yet know whether this is because
the meaning of ‘cat’ is ‘furry creature’ or whether purely as a matter of empirical fact
there are no furry creatures that are not cats in the actual world, but that it is logically
possible that there be such in another possible world. Kant notes this problem when
stating the “Main Requirements of Definitions”
…as to modality, the characteristics must be  necessary and thus not be such as accede
through experience.39
‘Characteristic’ is Kant’s technical term for the constituents of meaning, and in saying
that these must be necessary, Kant is just making the point that the acceptance of any
characteristic as part of the meaning of a concept must be done on the basis of the lack
of any possible counter example, rather than just an absence of actual counter examples.
Since we have an ability to apply concepts correctly, we clearly have at least an implicit
knowledge of their meaning – a certain practical competence. We do it, and in the vast
majority of cases we agree on how it should be done. Otherwise we could hardly
communicate. So, the information is there, somehow, in us, and we can utilise this fact in
our search for meanings, by testing our hypotheses against our linguistic intuitions. This,
I will claim, can be done in two ways, directly and indirectly.
Testing a meaning hypothesis directly against our linguistic intuitions presupposes an
ability to recognise an intensional analysis as correct. I find it highly plausible to assume
that in favourable cases we have such an ability, and I shall try to illustrate this with an
analogy: Consider our ability to recognise faces – to know what someone looks like. This
knowledge can take two forms: It can be reconstructive, as when an artist is able to draw
someone’s face from memory, or it can be recognitional as when I am frequently able to
recognise my friends in the streets. When it comes to faces most of us have some, but not
much of the reconstructive abilities, in that we can conjure up a more or less precise
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mental image of the faces of those we know best, but we would be hard pressed to
produce anything like an accurate sketch; whereas we have quite good recognitional
abilities, in that we recognise a vast number of people on sight. In an analogous fashion I
find it plausible to think that sometimes we are able to recognise a correct meaning
analysis as such , even if we have no way of generating the analysis.
Indirectly testing against linguistic intuition involves the use of thought experiments.
By conceiving of and describing various counter-factual situations and considering what
we would say in such situations, we can search not only for actual counter examples but
also for possible counter examples. Consider the possible world where there are four-
legged, soft-pawed, nimble, hairless creatures with pointed ears, tails and whiskers that
chase mice and go “meow”. Would we call such creatures ‘cats’? If we are satisfied that
not only are there no actual counter examples to a meaning hypothesis, there are also no
possible counter examples, then we have strong reasons for holding the meaning
hypothesis to be correct.
On this model, the method of conceptual analysis has a lot in common with the
hypothetico-deductive method of empirical science. Analytic meaning claims – analytic
definitions – should be regarded as theories, that are supported by the data of
uncontested judgements and the verdicts of our linguistic intuitions. The status of
analytic definitions will therefore share many features with the status of empirical
theories. If it is true that all theories are underdetermined by their data, then analytic
definitions are also underdetermined, so they can never reach the level of deductive
certainty. Independent of the certainty of the correctness of an analytic definition, there
will also always be an uncertainty as to their completeness. This has to do with what it is
that is actually tested against the linguistic data. Consider the example of the cat: suppose
we are satisfied that all possible cats are furry. We can then conclude that furriness is an
essential characteristic of cats – the simpler concept ‘furry’ is part of the content of the
more complex content ‘cat’.40 We have thus singled out – analysed – one of the
intensional constituents of the complex concept ‘cat’. In similar fashion we could go on
to analyse more constituents, but there is no way to determine whether we have isolated
all of the constituents – we never have a guarantee of the completeness of an analytic
definition.
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If we assume this account of the method of derivation of analytic definitions, we find
that many of Kant’s comments in the Logic  make good sense. First, he explains why
empirical concepts cannot be synthetically defined:
§103. Impossibility of Empirically Synthetic Definitions
Since the synthesis of empirical concepts is not arbitrary but empirical and as such can
never be complete (for in experience ever new characteristics of the concept can be
discovered), empirical concepts cannot be [synthetically] defined. 41
Then he notes the uncertainty of the completeness of any analytic definition:
§104. Analytic Definitions by Analysis of a priori or a posteriori
Given Concepts
All given concepts, be they given a priori or a posteriori, can only be defined through
analysis. For given concepts can only be made distinct by making their characteristics
successively clear. If all characteristics of a given concept are made clear, the concept
becomes completely distinct; and if it does not contain too many characteristics, it is at
the same time precise, and from this springs a definition of the concept.
Note. Since one cannot become certain by any proof whether all characteristics
of a given concept have been exhausted by complete analysis, all analytic definitions
must be held to be uncertain.42
Kant also says explicitly that the method for deriving analytic definitions has to be by
testing hypotheses. In §108 he gives “Rules for testing of Definitions”, and then he goes
on to “Rules for Preparing Definitions” where he states: “The very same acts that
belong to the testing of definitions are to be carried out also in their making.” That is:
the testing procedure is the very procedure by which definitions are “made”.
To that end, therefore, seek (1) true propositions, (2) such propositions as do not already
presuppose the concept of the thing in their predicate, (3) collect several of them and
compare each of them with the concept of the matter itself to see whether it is adequate, and
lastly, (4) see whether one characteristic does not lie in another or is not subordinate to it.
 Note 1. As is probably understood without a reminder, these rules are valid
only of analytic definitions. Since here one can never be certain whether analysis has
been complete, one may set up the definition on trial only and avail oneself of it only
as if it were not a definition. Under this restriction one may yet use it as a distinct and
true concept and draw corollaries from the characteristics of this concept. I am
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permitted to say: If the concept of the definitum appertains to  something, the
definition also appertains to it; but not conversely, since the definition does not
exhaust the entire definitum.43
 
Given that these three ways of testing hypotheses constitute the method of conceptual
analysis, we can begin to see why Kant would simply present the result of his analyses.
The grounding of a conceptual analysis would have to be either a citing of a number of
tests against uncontested judgements, i.e. failed falsifications of the intensional
hypothesis, or an appeal to the readers linguistic intuitions: indirectly  by claiming that we
would say thus and so in such and such a situation or directly by saying that such a
simpler concept must be contained is this or that complex concept; in any case there is
little to offer as explicit support. Either we agree in our intuitions or we don’t, and even
several pages of failed falsification cuts little ice. Rather, in the face of analytic claims, the
onus is on the opposition to provide counter examples. So we can, I suggest, perhaps
excuse Kant for presenting his famous table of judgements without a shred of argument:
If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of
the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under
four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments.44
One might however be entitled to expect such analytic claims to be clearly flagged, and
possible counter examples to be welcomed. On this score I shall make no excuses for
Kant, as indeed I think he falls well short of the ideal. Instead I shall try to flag clearly
any analytic claims made in this thesis, and also try to separate clearly the different kinds
of arguments used in those parts of the Critique that I wish to draw on.
2.2 Explication
Just as we have an implicit grasp of the content of concepts, we must have an ability to
apply them in actual situations. We show a degree of competence in concept application,
and it seems reasonable to suppose that this competence could at least partly be regarded
as implicit knowledge of application criteria and principles.45 If so, we should be able to
make some of this implicit knowledge explicit by the same kind of methods that we use
to isolate the meanings of concepts, namely by testing against our actual observable
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practices and against our linguistic intuitions, only that in this case the analysans differs
in that we are not after the intensional relations of concepts, but rather the actual criteria
we employ in applying the concepts in judgements. In the following section I shall give
reasons for holding separate meaning and application criteria. I shall also try to show
how treating this as a tacit assumption for Kant, makes sense of a number of issues: Why
the metaphysical principles are synthetic, rather than analytic (hence, that the analogies
of experience are not conceptual truths) and why there is a need for schemata to connect
categories and objects of experience.
2.3 Meaning and application criteria
It may seem tempting to read some sort of verificationism into Kant’s arguments when
these are construed as providing a refutation of external world-scepticism. Barry Stroud,
in his “Transcendental Arguments” claims that Strawson’s neo-Kantianism relies
essentially on such a principle:
If [the verification principle] is not true Strawson’s argument is unsound.46
I think it is mistaken to think that Kant is committed to any form of verificationism, and
that much more sense can be made out of his views, if we assume him to be committed
instead to a form of “reliability principle”. I shall not go into the debate about the
merits of verificationism, but merely try to give more details to what I think that a tacit
Kantian reliability principle must entail, then I shall try to show how it makes sense of
certain of Kant’s claims when these claims are discussed in the main part of the thesis.
I have claimed that by systematically testing hypotheses we can derive two distinct
analytic procedures: Conceptual analysis  to yield meanings, and explication to yield
application criteria – i.e. “empirical criteria”. It will prove important to realise the
difference between meaning and application criteria. I assume that given the world,
intension determines extension – meaning determines reference. However, knowing the
meaning of a concept does not necessarily give us a way of knowing how to apply the
concept in all situations. Our actual application criteria, might well fall short of guaran-
teeing that we always get at the correct reference of a concept – our conceptual
competence may well be less than perfect. This is not in itself intended to be any very
interesting thesis, but rather a reminder of a rather trivial fact, which is perhaps best
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illustrated by an example. Take the concept of authenticity in art. We know perfectly well
what this means: that a particular work of art was actually made by the artist to whom it is
attributed. But this knowledge gives us no way to determine in a particular case whether a
work of art is in fact authentic. Which is not to say that we have no way whatsoever to
apply the concept. We have of course a lot of methods of telling whether, say, a painting
is authentic that are sufficiently reliable. –Is the style of the painting consistent with other
works by the same painter? –Does the painting show signs of ageing consistent with its
alleged date? –Is the work mentioned in reliable sources? and so on and so forth. While
we cannot be guaranteed to be right in every case, we have methods that give us a high
degree of reliability. The occasional mistake is no great catastrophe, and it surely is no
threat to the meaningfulness of the concept. Of course, if there was no general agreement
about any cases of attribution of the concept, it would literally be useless, but so long as
there is a high degree of general agreement about a reasonably large cases of judgements
involving the concept – about application of the concept, it is not threat to the concept’s
meaningfulness and applicability that there be undecidable cases, nor that there be a
degree of uncertainty about any particular attribution of the concept.
Now, this does not prove that for every concept there has to be a gap between
meaning and application criteria. However, it does show that all that is needed for
communication, hence all that can be deduced from the observable practice of our using
a particular concept is that there are sufficiently reliable application criteria associated
with that concept. It therefore seems fair to expect independent arguments for any case
of guaranteed reference of a concept, any kind of certainty of concept application. The
reliability principle suggests that there is at least a logical gap between meaning and
application criteria, even if it might be argued that as a matter of fact in particular cases
this gap might be closed, i.e. that for some concepts meaning and application criteria
might come together.
I shall discuss this in more depth below, but I think that Kant’s insistence on the need
for schemata to link pure categories with empirical judgements, and the synthetic nature
of the metaphysical principles shows that he is committed to the existence of a meaning
gap.
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C h a p t e r 3 – R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d o b j e c t s 
As mentioned, (p. 14) in a letter to Marcus Herz, Kant sees the Key to Metaphysics as the
question of how representations are related to objects. We shall see that the Transcen-
dental Analytic is concerned precisely with providing an answer to this question. It is
however easy to misunderstand the focus of Kant’s concern here, and think that he is
interested in the relation between objects and representations in general, hence that he is
presenting a general epistemology, and then draws conclusions about metaphysics from
that. On this view, the Transcendental Deduction would be read as explaining how we can
justify the notion of an object of representations in general, and of how ordinary
empirical concepts relate to objects.
Such a reading would represent a serious misunderstanding of Kant’s concerns. As is
evident from the passages quoted on p. 15, Kant thinks we have a good common-sense
model of how empirical representations are related to their objects. However, he does
little more than allude to this explanation. In this chapter I shall try flesh out what this
common-sense explanation is. I shall not try to give conclusive arguments for the
correctness of this view, but rather to present it more fully than Kant does. Later on, I
shall try to show that the presupposition of such a view is necessary to make sense of
Kant’s project in the Critique.
It seems clear at least that Kant holds to a causal theory of perception and an
abstractionist view of empirical concepts. After first discussing the notion of a relation of
representations to objects, I shall try to bring out what the Kantian versions of these two
views must contain.
To find clues to Kant’s position on these topics we need to look chiefly to his Logic,
which was published in 1800, subsequent to the publication of both editions of the
Critique, but whose thoughts clearly underlie the Critique. Quite often the Critique
contains dense passages which are little else than brief summaries of points that are made
more extensively in the Logic.
3.1 The ground of representance
I shall use the term ‘representance’ for the relation between representation and object. I
apologise for this ugly word, but it is useful to be able to refer unambiguously to the
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relation of representation to object, which neither ‘representation’ nor ‘representing’
enables. Representance is thus that relation between a representation and its object in
virtue of which that representation represents the object. The representation and the
represented are then the relata of an instance of representance.
The question of the nature of representance has obvious relevance to debates about
realism vs. idealism. If no account can be given for the relation between a particular
representation and its purported object, then that may serve as justification for asserting
the ideality and denying the reality of that which the representation in question purports
to represent. Hence, the way in which the nature of representance is viewed will very
likely have consequences for claims about the reality of purported objects or properties.
Let us go back to Kant’s letter to Herz and the Key to Metaphysics. Kant enquires
“What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the
object?”47 Note that Kant is asking about the “ground” of the relation of representance.
For his “single conclusion” Kant averted to the need for a completely determined
definition of judgement in general,48 but here is asking merely for the “ground of the
relation”. It is not obvious what is being asked for here, but it seems at least that Kant is
asking for less than a complete and exhaustive definition of representance. I take it that
Kant is to some extent asking for a partial, but not exhaustive analysis of the notion of
representance, and to some extent asking an epistemological question: What is it in us or
about us that sustains representance between our internal states and the external world –
what sort of mechanism delivers representational states in us?
It is important in this context to understand what Kant is trying to explain and what he is
offering as explanations. Kant thinks that in the case of sensations, perceptions and
“empirical concepts”, their representance-properties are readily understandable, and in
case someone should come to entertain sceptical doubts about the existence of the
purported objects, “we always have experience ready at hand to prove their objective
reality”.49 And Kant does not say much more about the ground of the representance of
these kinds of representations, so it seems clear that this cannot be the target of Kant’s
explanations. Kant is not trying to provide any substantial theory to explain how
sensations can come to represent things in the world – rather he is assuming that they do
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so, and using this fact as part of an explanation of how perceptions and empirical
concepts – general representations – come to have representance-properties. This
commits Kant to the view that although we might not yet have a full explanation – a
complete theory – of the representance of sensations, we have at least a partial
understanding of it. We know a great deal of what is involved in the phenomenon of
sensation, and causation and physical facts concerning our sense organs are going to
figure essentially in that theory. We do not yet have a complete understanding of
everything involved in sensation, but we have good reasons to believe that in due course
we may come to have it. Further, since he claims that experience can always provide
examples to demonstrate the objective validity of empirical representations – he is
committed at least to the view that so far, there is nothing about what we know of
sensation that gives us grounds for any sceptical doubts concerning empirical
representations.
This way of understanding Kant’s views makes good sense in terms of bringing out the
tacit premises of the arguments of the Critique. However, it is of course also relevant
whether, in holding these views, Kant is actually correct, and if recent developments in
these areas give us reason to modify our hopes and expectations of these phenomena
being ultimately understandable.
In the following I shall give some independent arguments in support of Kant’s views.
In doing this I shall by no means try to get anywhere near a complete theory of sensation
and perception. My aim is purely to show that we have quite a good idea of some of the
vital ingredients of such a theory, and to make it plausible that a complete understanding
of these facts is not in principle beyond us.
In doing so I am not trying to answer any of the “hard” questions about awareness,
consciousness and the like, but merely try to investigate some of what would be required
in terms of natural – broadly physical50 – relations between internal and external states
for those states to stand in a relation of representance. Thus, we will at best find some
necessary, but certainly not sufficient conditions for representance. The aim is the rather
more modest one of showing that at least there is no reason to believe that our
representations would fail to meet any of the necessary conditions for representance that
we can deduce. I go on to sketch how Kant’s writings outlines and hints at how a theory
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of the representance of empirical concepts can be given, assuming the representance of
sensations. Given the actuality of the representance of sensations we can explain the
representance of concepts, roughly as being inherited from the sensations from which
they are abstracted.
The hope of finding the Key to Metaphysics, then, is that when we understand the
ground of representance of ordinary empirical representations, we shall also be able to
understand the ground of representance of metaphysical representations. That is, we shall
be able to understand and explain how pure concepts and principles are related to their
objects.
 
We should note that Kant writes against the backdrop of an imagist view of representance,
in a tradition which includes at least Augustine and Hume. Mental states represent in
virtue of resembling their objects. Jerry Fodor, who has written about this topic in the
modern guise of “psychosemantics” notes in a recent article that this view is
fundamentally flawed:
One could say, more or less in the spirit of Hume, that what relates a mental representation
to its truth condition is that the former pictures the latter…51
Well, we all  know what’s wrong with Hume’s theory of meaning; it’s precisely that there is
no way of defining ‘pictures’ (or ‘resembles’ or any of that group of notions) which makes
it come out that mental representations do picture only their truth conditions.52
Kant might well have been aware of this. He wrote the Critique partly as an answer to
Hume, and his insisting that the ground of representance is the very Key to Metaphysics
and is something that both he and others “had failed to consider” suggests that he was
aware of the shortcomings of the imagist theory of representance. At any rate Kant is
certainly not committed to an imagist view of representance, and I shall attempt to show
that that we can glimpse the outline of a much more promising view, which is fully
consistent with the remarks Kant makes.
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a) Kant’s background assumptions
Before we start investigating into grounds of the relation of representance, we should
clarify Kant’s terminology of representations, as it diverges considerably from modern
usage. First we should note that Kant defines perception as representations with
consciousness.53 This means that my occurrent recollection of the taste and texture of
ripe strawberries on a hot summer afternoon counts as a perception in Kantian
terminology, even when the time of writing is a rather chilly winter morning, and there is
not a single strawberry anywhere in sight. To avoid confusion, I shall refer to Kantian
“perceptions” as ‘conscious representations’.
Conversely, the Kantian term that comes closest to a modern understanding of
perception is ‘intuition’. Intuition is defined as one of the two species of cognition. A
cognition is an objective conscious representation, and an intuition is a cognition that is
singular and immediately related to its object. Where intuitions perhaps differ from
perceptions in the modern sense is that Kant claims that there are also pure and a priori
intuitions. Whatever that means (and that is an extremely interesting question in its own
right), it seems hard to make sense of perceptions being pure or a priori. Fortunately,
pure and a priori intuitions need not concern us in the context of this thesis, so I shall use
‘intuition’ and ‘perception’ interchangeably. I prefer ‘perception’, as that will be closest
to ordinary usage, but sometimes, as when quoting or commenting directly on Kant’s
texts, it is natural to use ‘intuition’.
b) The variety of representations
It is clear from Kant’s writings that the class of things described as representations54 is
quite heterogeneous. Perceptions, sensations, cognitions, concepts and intuitions are all
defined explicitly as representations,55 and it is clear by implication that judgements are
also thought to be representations.
Given the wide diversity of things that have representational properties, it would seem
highly unlikely that they all bear the same kind of natural relation to their object. For
one thing, the number of relata are clearly different between cases of particular and
general representations respectively: There are by Kantian definition two kinds of
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“objective representations”, perceptions and concepts.56 Since a perception is related to
a particular object or set of objects while a concept is general and related to a non-
denumerated class of objects, it would be safe to assume that the relation sustaining the
representance of perceptions is simpler than that of concepts.57
3.2 Receptivity and sensation
I take it that in every perception there must be an element of sensation. The senses
provide our only means of acquiring information about our immediate environment, and
Kant holds that all human cognition must be in some way related to sensibility. Let us
try, therefore, to bring out some of what is required of sensory states, for them to be able
to represent the environment to the creature whose sensory states they are.
a) Sensation and environment
It seems clear that for us, as indeed for all sensate animals, – behaviour – is not simply an
immediate effect of environmental causes, but mediated in some way by the animal’s
internal states. This seems to be an integral part of the very idea of being sensate, that
some internal states of the animal serve to govern the animal’s behaviour. When talking
about internal states in the context of this discussion I shall restrict that to meaning those
internal states which play an immediate role in governing the behaviour of the animal.
Thus, the animal’s body temperature, while in one sense an internal state, is not  an
example of what I have in mind here, whereas sensations, feelings and emotions are.
Sensations are clearly a species of these more narrowly construed internal states, and we
shall pursue our inquiry into how sensory states can be able to represent the
environment.
 If the animal is to survive and flourish in its environment, its behaviour must clearly
be appropriate to the various states of its environment. This means that for animals that
have internal states governing their behaviour, there must be some kind of functional link
between internal states and behaviour, to produce the right kind of “output”; and also
some kind of functional link between states of the environment and the internal states,
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constituting the proper “input”. It is this second link we are interested in here, the link
between states of the environment and the narrowly construed internal states: What must
be the case with regards to those internal states, for the animal to be able to successfully
interact with its environment? To bring this out in its barest essentials, let us imagine a
very simple animal whose behavioural repertoire consists of a very limited set of
sequences of instinctive motions. In the presence of food, the animal tries to eat it, in the
presence of excess heat or cold, it moves away, in the presence of an individual of the
opposite sex of the same species it tries to mate and so on. Now, if this animal is to
survive in its environment its behaviour must clearly be “in tune” with it – it must show
the appropriate response to different environmental situations. It must not try to eat its
mate, move away from food etc. And if that is to be possible, then the internal states
governing its behaviour must first themselves be in tune with the environment – the
internal state must track the environment. The behaviour-governing internal states had
better be regularly updated such that they can govern behaviour appropriate to the
changing state of the environment. If there is no more food, then the animal had better
stop trying to eat. Another way of saying this is that there must be a correspondence
between internal states of the animal and external states of the environment. Now, what
sort of mechanism, what sort of natural relation could sustain a correspondence between
internal state and environment? This is asking for the ground of the relation of sensation
and object in such a simple animal.
It is clear that in order to survive, the animal would need the correspondence to be
sustained by a reliable mechanism. A perfectly reliable mechanism would be one that
ensured that every change in the environment was matched by a corresponding change in
the sensory state, and that no change occurred in the sensory state unless there had been
a corresponding change in the environment. Such a perfectly reliable mechanism would
probably be useful for the animal, but it is clear that it is not necessary. If the animal
sometimes displays eating-behaviour in the absence of food, it will probably not have
any fatal consequences. Nor will its occasional failure to attempt to mate even in the
presence of a suitable candidate be a bar to its survival. All that is required is a sufficiently
reliable mechanism, ensuring that the animal got it right enough of the time. Besides, it is
very hard to imagine how a perfectly reliable mechanism – one which would never
malfunction – could work. Hence, we should do better in looking for a sufficiently
reliable mechanism. But again, what sort of mechanism would that be?
That clearly depends on the kind of environment in question. If the animal is living
in a very simple environment displaying only regular predictable changes, then the
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animal could in principle be running a “program”. Its internal state could change
regularly, influenced by nothing but internal causes, following a sequence that matched
the changes in the external environment.58 Such a mechanism would however be
extremely vulnerable. Any unpredicted change in the environment, or any slight
malfunctioning might easily bring it irreparably “out of synch”. It is also very hard to
envisage how such a mechanism could be set up: how the initial synchronisation with the
environment would take place, not to mention how the sequence would be determined. In
any case, our environment – this world – is clearly not an environment for which such a
mechanism would be suitable. We need a mechanism that is sensitive to unpredictable
changes in the environment. Thus, the obvious candidate for a sufficiently reliable
mechanism is that there be a causal relation between the environment and the animal’s
sensory state. Of course, as a matter of fact we do find just such a causal mechanism in all
earthly animals, namely in the form of sense organs. The sense organs could properly be
described as causal updaters of the relevant internal states. And the sensory states are just
those internal states that are directly updated by the sense organs. These might of course
in turn effect further changes of other internal states: the sight of a mate might occasion
a state of arousal, the sight of a predator might occasion a state of fright and so on.
A simple, causal relation between environment and sensory state would ensure that
there was no change in sensory state without a corresponding change in the environment,
though there would be no guarantee conversely that every change in the environment
resulted in a corresponding change of sensory state. The causal relation is such that the
same kind of cause (change in environmental state) always has the same kind of effect
(change in sensory state), but not that a particular change in sensory state is always
caused by the same kind of change in environmental state. Thus we should expect that an
animal sometimes behaves inappropriately, e.g. tries to eat what is not food. As long as
this does not happen too often, it will not be a bar to that animal’s survival.
There is thus a very interesting parallel between what we can infer about the relation
of representance between sensations and environment and the relation between meaning
and application criteria of concepts that was discussed in section 2.3,59 namely that we are
not entitled to infer from the fact that a simple sensate animal successfully interacts with
its environment that there is a perfect correspondence between its sensory states and the
environment, only that there is a sufficiently reliable correspondence. Again, comparative
reliability is the most that we can reasonably infer from the observable facts. Given the
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additional premises that (a) a causal relation could deliver a sufficiently reliable
correspondence in a moderately regular environment and (b) that sensate animals do
indeed have causal mechanisms that occasion internal changes as an effect of external
changes, the hypothesis that a causal relation involving sense organs is a vital part of the
ground of representance of sensation in simple animals, is a very strongly supported
hypothesis.
Note that we are not justified in claiming that this causal relation just is the ground of
representance. For one thing it is clearly not sufficient for uniquely identifying cases of
representance. It is possible, for instance, that the magnetic polarity of some weak
electrical currents in my body are affected by strong electromagnetic fields in my
environment. While this electrical state of my body could in a weak sense be said to
represent my environment, it is clearly not an internal state in the more narrow construal
that I am enquiring into.60 The electrical state is not a conscious state, and so is clearly
not a conscious representation61 which is what we are after.
What is indicated by the above arguments is that a necessary condition for
representance is a sufficiently reliable correspondence, and the most likely candidate for
a mechanism to deliver sufficient reliability is a causal one.
However, it seems to me that this would be making the task more difficult than is
necessary. In noting that the causal relation was not sufficient to identify what internal
states of an animal count as representations, we allowed ourselves no assumption about
what representations are, and no prior means of identifying them. But this is unduly
harsh. Though we might not have a theory of how we do this, surely we know our own
representations when we have them. My having a visual impression as of a green apple is
something I can readily identify when I have it, and it is the relation of this to the actual
green apple that I am concerned with. I can identify and individuate representational
states, and I am asking for the ground of their relation to their objects.
Of course, one could be asking about the nature of representational states and try to
formulate theories specifying necessary and sufficient criteria for an internal state of an
animal being a representational state, and this would no doubt be a worthwhile and
extremely interesting task, but it is not the one I am trying to perform here.
Given this assumption, that even in possible lieu of a theory, we are able at least to a
considerable extent to identify and individuate the representational states in our own case
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– that we do know human representations, we can start to make headway in an account of
representance that will encompass more than just mere sensations.
b) Human sensibility and sensation
Even if the rather simplistic model of the animal with a causal sensory mechanism is
accepted, there is still quite a long way to go before we have anything even remotely
approaching an account that can accommodate the full richness of human experience.
My aim here shall be rather more modest, though – to ask simply if this way of thinking
about the rather narrow case of sensory representance is fruitful also in the human case.
One important shortcoming is that if we imagine an animal’s internal states to consist
exclusively of sensations, its entire internal “life” would be passive. Given the state of
the environment, the animal’s internal states would be given, and there could be no
change in the internal states without it being occasioned by a change in the environment.
In contrast, our human consciousness is to a large degree active: We can choose to think
about the future, to ignore our current pangs of hunger, to think hard about a
philosophical problem etc. Obviously, none of this can be explained by a simple causal
story about sensations. That, however, is not to say that the causal story could not be an
adequate explanation of part of our representational states. If, as indeed seems to be the
case, part of our consciousness is passive, then there is so far no reason why this element
could not be explained along the lines of a causal sensory mechanism. And our
sensations do indeed seem to be passive. If there is a green apple in front of me, the
lighting conditions are favourable, my eyes are functioning normally and so on, it seems
that I will inevitably have a sensation as of a green apple, and there is nothing I can do to
change that, except to manipulate my environment and remove the apple. The notion of
a passive faculty62 of sensibility is a central assumption for Kant, and this plays an
important role as a premise in his discussions about pure concepts and the like.63
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Let us first return again to Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz, which was mentioned in the
introduction,64 where Kant reports on his preparations for writing the Critique. Here, it is
explicitly clear that Kant thinks that sensations (“passive or sensuous representations”)
are related to objects as effects to causes, and that this gives a perfectly good explanation
of the ground of the relation of representance for sensations:
What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the
object? If a representation comprises only the manner in which the subject is affected by
the object, then it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely,    as     an
effect    accords      with     its     cause   , and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can
represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations
have an understandable relationship to objects, and the principles that are derived from the
nature of our soul have an understandable validity for all things insofar as those things are
supposed to be objects of the senses.65
It is also evident that Kant held on to this view of sensation throughout his writing of the
Critique. Note that in the quoted passage Kant talks about the subject being affected by
the object as being equivalent to having sensory states that are effects of external causes.
The same language is used in the introduction to the Critique, where sensation is defined
as “the effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected
by it”.66 The characterisation of sensibility as a passive faculty (in contrast to the active
faculty of understanding) is also pervasive in his description of sensibility as receptivity
in contrast with the spontaneity of understanding.67
Note that in claiming that sensibility is passive – receptive – I am not committed to
the view that sensibility – sensory states – are affected only by external causes – changes
in the environment. Indeed it seems plausible in the human case that our sensory states
might well be affected also by internal causes; think of hallucinogenic drugs, extreme
tiredness etc. under which conditions we may well suffer from hallucinations and
illusions. It may well be debated, of course, whether hallucinations and illusions are due
to inappropriate sensory states or to improper understanding – most likely there will be
elements of both, I presume – but there is at least no reason not to think that in some
cases there might be an element of sensory states that do not correspond to reality. This,
of course, does not weaken the case for thinking that sensibility is essentially a passive
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faculty. I can no more choose not to be the subject of a drug-induced hallucination68
than I can choose not to have a sensation as of a green apple when there is one in front
of my open eyes.
3.3 Concepts and spontaneity
As we have seen, sensations comprise at best only some of our representations. While
sensations presuppose the actual presence of their particular object,69 we also have a
capacity for representing properties and classes of things in general, by way of empirical
concepts. Now, we need also to examine the relation of representance of concepts in
general to their objects if we are to be prepared for the ultimate aim of understanding
how metaphysical representations, i.e. pure concepts, relate to their purported objects. So,
we need some kind of a theory of concepts.
Elaborating a theory of concepts may be either of two quite different investigations.
One alternative is to enquire what it is to possess and apply a concept. What are the
necessary and sufficient criteria for being regarded as a concept-possessor? This will in
effect be to try to determine the meaning of the concept of ‘concept’, and is an analytic
enquiry – a search for a definition. The other alternative is to take the meaning of
concept as given (if not exhaustively defined) and to enquire into what sort of
mechanisms and capacities an animal must have if it is to be able actually to apply
concepts. It should be clear by now that it is the latter, epistemological, task that is
interesting in the context of the Critique and indeed of the present thesis.
The part of the Critique where Kant is tackling the question of the Key to
Metaphysics is the “Transcendental Logic”. Now, it seems clear that what Kant termed
‘Logic’ is closer to what would currently be classified as epistemology, than to the
essentially synthetic enterprise of current formal logic. He defines “General logic” as a
critique of cognition.70 Recall that critique of pure reason71 is epistemology of
metaphysics. A critique of cognition in general must then be closely related to
epistemology in general. Accordingly, one of the topics for general logic is the question
of how concepts can represent objects. So, we are concerned neither with defining the
concept of concept, nor with giving a full theory of how conceptual faculties arise or
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develop in humans, merely with explaining the relation of representance that concepts
bear to objects.
[I]t is not for general logic to investigate the source of concepts, not how concepts as
representations arise, but solely how given representations become concepts in thinking
[…]72
Again, the aim is not to give a complete and exhaustive theory of human conceptual
capacities. I take it to be an observable fact that we do use concepts, so we clearly do not
need to prove that we are able to do so. The aim is the much more modest one of taking
as a premise that we are able to and do use concepts and make some limited inferences as
to some necessary features of our cognitive capacities.
Let us proceed, therefore, with investigating what sort of theory of the representance
of concepts that might be implicit in Kant’s writings.
a) The facts about concepts
We shall start with listing some the observable facts of our use of concepts which a theory
should be able to explain. As in Kant’s theses, these will serve as factual premises. They
are among the explananda of a general theory of the representance of concepts, from
which conclusions might be drawn as regards any possible valid representance of pure –
metaphysical – concepts.
Note again that Kant thinks that the representance of ordinary empirical concepts is
uncontroversial, and that it is only in the case of pure concepts that substantially new
theorising is required:
The empirical concept springs from the senses through comparison of the objects of
experience and receives, through the understanding, merely the form of generality. The
reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which they have been extracted
as to their content. Whether there are pure concepts of the understanding (conceptus puri)
which, as such, spring solely form the understanding, independent of any experience, must
be investigated by metaphysics.73
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But this is to anticipate the discussion somewhat. Let us return to what must be explained
by a theory of the representance of concepts.
We should note that any explanation of the representance of concepts will need to be
significantly more complex than the explanation we have just seen of the representance
of sensations. In the case of sensations we could assume that a particular sensory state
represents a particular environmental state, that there is an immediate, one-to-one relation
of cause-and-effect. This will clearly not be available in the case of concepts, since a
fundamental feature of a concept is that it is general – it represents not a particular
object, but a general property or an “open-ended” class of things. The relation of
representance of concepts to their object is consequently considerably more complex
than that of sensations. We shall look at some of the facts of this relation, in the first
instance with regard to ordinary empirical concepts.74
I shall claim that a theory of representance of empirical concepts should
accommodate at least four facts:
1. Concepts have extensions
2. Concepts have intensions
2. Concepts are knowably extensionally related
4. Concepts are knowably intensionally related
I think it is quite clear that Kant too holds these four claims to be observable facts about
concepts and our use of them. Partially, this is explicitly stated in his Logic , which should
be regarded as an analysis of the observable employment of our reasoning faculties;75
partially it is implicit in claims he makes in the Critique. Below I shall try to give
independent support for each of these claims, and also give some references to passages
in Kant’s work which suggest that these correspond to views held by Kant.
1. Concepts have extensions
Fundamental to our use of empirical concepts is that we apply them to the world. My
having the concept ‘green’ entails that I am able to say correctly of at least of some
objects that they are green and to say correctly of at least some objects that they are not
green. We say that certain parts of the world fall under a concept. That which falls under
a concept is termed its ‘extension’. So the extension of the concept ‘green’ is the
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collection of green things insofar as they are green. 76 Kant, uses the term ‘sphere’, which
he treats as synonymous with ‘extension’. In the early passages of the Logic, we find:
§8. Magnitude of the Extension of Concepts
The more things stand under a concept and can be thought through it, the larger its
extension or sphere …
The more things that can be represented by a concept, the greater its sphere.
2. Concepts have intensions
With the idea of the application of a concept comes the notion of correctness. In
accounting properly for the application of a concept to objects, it is not enough to state
the complex fact that the concept is actually applied to such and such a class of objects.
Integral to the notion of a concept is that there is something in virtue of which it ought to
be applied to some objects and not to others. From the fact that somebody actually
applies a concept to a particular object on a particular occasion, it does not follow that
the concept is correctly so applied. Giving a causal story about a concept detailing how
that concept actually comes to be applied by different persons on different occasions
would necessarily leave something out, namely whether the concept is correctly so
applied on each occasion. It would seem that there are irreducibly normative facts
concerning concepts. These normative facts which specify to what objects a given
concept ought to be applied are termed intensional facts or simply intensions.
That concepts have intensions also partially explains why we have an indefinite ability
to apply concepts in ever new kinds of situations. My ability to apply the concept
‘green’ correctly outstrips the number of green objects I have so far been acquainted
with, and I will in most cases be able to judge correctly of a hitherto-unknown object
whether it is green or not. This suggests again that there are normative facts about how a
concept should be applied, that there is some form of principle, rule or norm determining
whether or not a concept should be applied to any given object; that there is some
criterion or criteria by which I judge the greenness of things, and that I have at least some
implicit grasp of this criterion or criteria. This is of course not to claim that these criteria
allow of being spelled out in any kind of explicit “test procedure” or “rule” beyond
the obvious platitude that I judge green things to be green in virtue of their greenness. It
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is however to claim that there is some general property77 of green things that enable us to
judge of them that they are green and that we have some corresponding ability or
capacity that enable us to judge of green things that they are green. To say that we have
an ability to apply the concept ‘green’ correctly just is to say that we know the intension
of the concept ‘green’ whether this knowledge be explicit (“knowing-that”) or merely
implicit (“knowing-how”).
Kant’s talk of concepts as containing “characteristics”, which will be further dis-
cussed below, reflects a commitment to concepts as having intensions that determine
extensions:
§7. Intension and Extension of Concepts
Every concept, as a partial concept, is contained in the representation of things; as a
ground of cognition, i.e. as a characteristic, it has these things contained under it. In the
former regard, every concept has an intension [content];78 in the later, it has an extension.
A cognition is a representation of an object. Kant talks of “characteristics” as
constituting intensions of concepts, and as grounds of cognition. I take this to imply that
the intension of a concept is that which determines its extension. What is contained “in”
the concept determines what is contained “under” it.
3. Concepts are knowably extensionally related
The extensions of empirical concepts are not discrete, but typically “overlap”. Some
things are both green and round, some are red and round, some are green and square
and so on. Since we are able to judge of particular things their simultaneous
subsumability under different concepts, we have some knowledge of the extensional
relations of concepts. To deny that we have some knowledge of extensional relations of
concepts would amount to claiming that we can never attribute more than one concept to
an object. Any judgement to the effect that some objects falls under more than one
concept amounts to some knowledge of the relation of the extension of those concepts.
4. Concepts are knowably intensionally related
We know of the co-applicability or not in the actual world of some concepts, so we have
some knowledge of the extensional relations of concepts. We know that some objects are
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both A and B, both green and round, say. If we also know of some concepts ‘A’ and ‘B’
e.g. that no object could possibly be both A and B, that there is no possible world in
which an object is both triangular and square for instance, then that could only
reasonably be explained by our having also some knowledge of intensional relations of
concepts, since intension determines extension.
In chapter 7 I shall give arguments to show that we must have some such knowledge.
Here I shall merely point out that we trivially seem to know many such relations. Nothing
could be a stallion and fail to be a horse, for instance. Even though there is plenty of
empirical confirmation to be found for this claim, that is not what we rely on in asserting
the necessity of this claim. We know that we are not going to find a stallion which is not a
horse no matter how hard we look, and that we would not find one, no matter what the
world might be like.
Now, Kant defines the difference between analytic and synthetic judgements in
intensional terms, namely that analytic judgements are those where the predicate concept
is “contained in” the subject concept, synthetic judgements those where it isn’t.79 Any
knowledge of whether a judgement is in fact analytic or synthetic thus amounts to some
knowledge of intensional relations of concepts, and since many of Kant’s arguments rely
on claims of some judgement or other being analytic or synthetic he is clearly committed
to our having some knowledge of intensional relations of concepts.
b) The representance of concepts
These factual premises are in general not stated explicitly in the Critique, but they form
much of the tacit premises for inter alia claims about analytic and synthetic judgements.
However, we do find many of these premises clearly stated in the Logic, where we also
find a comparatively full account of Kant’s explanation of the valid representance of
empirical concepts. The basic idea is that concepts are derived from sensations by a
process of comparison, reflection and abstraction
Let us first return to the passage quoted at the beginning of this section. Here Kant
states that “the empirical concept springs from the senses through comparison of the
objects of experience … The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from
which they have been extracted as to their content.”80 The representance of an empirical
concept is determined by its “content” which is said to be extracted from actual
experience. The basic idea seems to be that concepts stand in relations to kinds of
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sensations, and inherit their representational properties from sensations. The specific
relation a particular concept has to kinds of sensations constitutes its empirical content.
Further, these relations can be regarded as being established by a process of
comparison, reflection and abstraction:
§6. Logical Acts of Comparison, Reflection and Abstraction
The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are:
1) comparison, i.e. the likening of representations to one another in relation to the unity
of consciousness;
2) reflection, i.e. the going back over different representations,81 how they can be
comprehended in one consciousness
3) abstraction or segregation of everything else by which given representations differ. 82
It is unclear what Kant means by a “logical act” here. If he is committed to the view that
these are acts we consciously and deliberately perform, there would seem to be a price to
pay in terms of plausibility; but it is not necessary to assume that these are actual
generative acts which occur as temporal processes, nor that Kant thinks they are. ‘Logical
Acts’ can charitably be read simply as a sort of explanatory metaphor. We can regard
concepts as if they were generated by conscious, deliberate acts of this kind, but the
importance is the relations  being established by these supposed acts, not the acts
themselves. Maybe that is what is meant by calling them logical acts.
Following the passage quoted above, Kant gives one of his sadly all too rare concrete
examples. Here he uses the idiom of consciously comparing, reflecting on and so forth,
but I think it is safe to read this non-committally. It is the relations  being determined by
these acts and our ability to apprehend such relations that do the explanatory work, not
the actuality of the acts themselves.
Note 1. In order to make our representations into concepts, one must thus be able to
compare, reflect and abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are
the essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example, I
see a fir, a willow, and a linden. In firstly comparing these objects, I notice that they are
different from one another in respect of trunk, branches, leaves, and the like; further,
however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves
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themselves, and abstract from their size, shape and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a
tree.83
Crucial here is the notions of difference and resemblance. Difference and resemblance
entail degrees by which and respects in which things differ and resemble each other. For
instance the strawberry and the tomato resemble each other with respect to their red
colour, but differ with respect to their surface texture; the green apple and the tomato
resemble each other with respect to their smooth texture but differ with respect to their
colour. Now, Kant claimed that “empirical concepts springs from the senses through
comparison of the objects of experience”, and in comparing objects of experience, we
determine precisely the ways in which they differ and resemble each other, so such
sensible respects in which objects can differ or resemble each other, clearly play an
important role in any explanation of the representance of concepts. Concepts, after all,
are general representations; they represent a collection of objects in virtue of something
all of the objects have in common, i.e. a respect in which they resemble each other. This
is not made fully explicit in Kant, but it seems to be the best way of understanding the
thought behind Kant’s terms ‘characteristic’ or ‘mark’84 and ‘determination’.
We are clearly able simply to recognise a vast number of ways in which objects may
differ or resemble each other – we immediately recognise sameness of colour of the
tomato and the strawberry, or the sameness of shape of the wheel and the plate. This is to
say that there are sensibly discernible ways in which objects may differ or resemble each
other – and I shall refer to these as basic sensible properties.
For some of these, like colour and surface texture, we can assume that there is a quite
simple and straightforward correspondence between properties of objects and kinds of
sensory states. Red objects may be supposed typically to cause a visual sensory state as of
redness present, smooth objects may be supposed typically to cause a tactile sensory state
as of smoothness present and so on.
But we are also able simply to recognise properties that require a much more
sophisticated mechanism in order to be reliably detected. Prime among these are shapes.
Without much effort, we are able in favourable conditions simply to recognise objects as
spherical, cubic, rhomboid, rectangular, disc-shaped, flat, bulging and what have you. But
to devise a mechanism for this (and by the same token, to explain how our sensory-
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cognitive faculties are able to achieve it) is exceedingly complicated. One major
challenge is the fact that a physical object of a particular shape will present a vast number
of different aspects to an observer – a cylinder looks very different from the side than
from the end; and objects of very different shapes may have identical aspects – there is
not much difference between a cube and a pyramid if all you see are their bases. This
means that for a mechanism reliably to detect shapes (and for us to recognise them) it is
not enough for instance simply to react to specific patterns of retinal stimulation – since
these don’t map onto shape-properties of seen objects in any simple way. This means
that in our perception of shape-properties there is clearly a high degree of very complex
information processing going on. This processing must among other things take as input
temporal variation in the sensory stimulus (shapes with identical aspects can be
distinguished by how their aspects vary over time when the objects are in motion relative
to the observer. For instance, the pea and the pencil seen from the end might look very
similar in poor light, but as soon as you move your head to the side, you will easily see
which is which.)85
Now, precisely how we are able to recognise such aspect-variant properties, what
organs and mechanisms are involved in the information processing and how this
processing takes place – whether some or all of it is innate or whether it needs to be
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learned or otherwise acquired – is clearly a topic for cognitive science, and there is every
reason to believe that we shall continue to gain an increasing knowledge of the details of
this. But however our sensory-cognitive systems help to achieve this, we are clearly able
simply to recognise objects as having specific shape-properties. The most natural way to
think of this is that a sensory state being a result of sensory stimulus and information
processing presents objects to us as having spatial and other properties. I am going to
refer to this feature of sensory states as their presentational content. This is really saying
little more than what was argued in section 3.2a) that there must be a correspondence
between sensory states and environmental states (see p. 42) and taking into account that
the relevant environmental states must be specified in terms of properties that are aspect-
variable. Again, we are not here going to go into the details of how it can be possible that
sensory states have presentational content, we are merely noting that this seems to be a
necessary condition for the possibility of recognising aspect-variable properties like
physical shape. Since we are able to recognise shapes, we can conclude that sensory
states, whatever other properties they might have, they do have presentational content. Of
course the relation of a specific sensory state to the relevant state of the environment is
no less causal for the fact that some form of information processing is required. The
causal link, and the mechanism needed to maintain it is just more complicated.
Note here the interdependence of these notions of basic sensible properties of objects
and of the presentational content of sensory states: We can only specify and individuate
basic sensible properties of objects in terms of resemblance- and difference-relations
between them that we are able sensibly to discern. On the other hand, we can specify the
presentational content of sensory states only by reference to basic sensible properties of
objects: a sensory state is described and individuated as being e.g. as of a green apple.
Thus, the individuation both of sensory states and of basic sensible properties are both
derived from the same phenomenon – our ability simply to recognise resemblance- and
difference-relations between objects. It is this that trivially secures the correspondence
between sensory states and environmental states.
Though these two sets of features – the features of the objects and the presentational
features of the sensations – cannot be defined except by mutual reference to each other,
they are clearly two distinct sets of properties: a set of properties of sensations, and a
corresponding set of properties of objects. Because of the trivial correspondence between
these two sets of features, we can legitimately speak of sensations as representing the
environment and as having presentational content without needing recourse to any claims
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about similarity between sensations and their objects. Similarity is indeed important in the
explanation of the representance of sensations, but the similarity is only asserted as
holding between objects themselves, not between representations and objects.
It is important to note that Kant uses the term ‘Merkmal’ or ‘characteristic’ to denote
a property of representations: A characteristic for Kant belongs to the intensional realm,
not to the corresponding realm of basic sensible properties of objects. A characteristic is
a presentational feature of a sensory state, and it corresponds to a basic sensible property
of objects.
Now we can begin to formulate Kant’s theory of the representance of empirical
concepts:
Suppose that empirical concepts were somehow able to contain and retain one or
more characteristics of sensations. Since each sensation having those characteristics
would represent states of the environment having the corresponding sensible properties, it
is easy to see that that concept could represent the objects of those sensations by virtue of
containing those very characteristics. A concept would then represent an undetermined
collection of objects, since it contains a characteristic that can be shared by any number
of sensations and by the same token represent any number of objects. The characteristics
contained in a particular concept would then be that in virtue of which the concept
represents the collection of objects that it does. Kant captures this notion by describing a
characteristic as a ground of cognition:86
Every concept, as a partial concept, is contained in the representation of things; as a
ground        of       cogn         i    tion,     i.e.       as        a      characteristic,   it has these things contained under it. In the
former regard, every concept has an intension [content]87; in the latter, it has an
extension.88
The simplest empirical concept possible would be one that contained only one
characteristic, and indeed, characteristics can be viewed as basic, fundamental concepts.
This, I think, is what Kant means by saying that partial concepts are contained in the
representations of things. Such a single-characteristic concept, and the concept red might
be an example, would of course tend to be very general and thus to represent very many
things – to have a large extension. An object’s having the property of redness would be
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the condition for having the concept red correctly applied to it. Now, the more
characteristics a concept contains, the more conditions an object would have to satisfy in
order to fall under the concept, and consequently fewer objects would be likely to satisfy
all the conditions, and the concept’s extension would tend to be smaller. The content of a
concept then is the collection of characteristics it consists in, and this is termed its
intension. The more characteristics there are in the intension of a concept, the more
conditions an object will have to satisfy to fall under a concept, and the smaller the
extension will tend to be.
Intension and extension of a concept have an inverse relation to each other. The more a
concept contains under it, the less it contains in it.89
The abstractionist view of the representance of concepts
So, this is pretty much Kant’s theory of the representance of empirical concepts:
Sensations represent objects directly in virtue of having characteristics corresponding to
basic sensible properties of objects. Concepts have such characteristics as contents and
represent objects in virtue of these characteristics. This is particularly clear in Kant’s
Latin definition of concept in the first paragraph of the Logic, where a concept is
described as a “representation through common characteristics”90 and “a representation
of what is common to several objects”.91 I shall refer to this view as the abstractionist
view of the representance of empirical concepts.
Now that we have got a fairly clear picture of what Kant’s theory of the representance
of empirical concepts is, we should examine how this theory fares with respect to
accomodating the four facts about concepts that I alleged at the beginning of this
section92 and also of how plausible the theory is given other facts about human beings
and our world.
The adequacy of the abstractionist view
The first two facts, that concepts have extensions and intensions follow directly from what
has been said about characteristics, see above.
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If a characteristic corresponds to a particular way in which an object can sensibly
resemble or differ from other objects, then it follows that an object may be represented
by more than one characteristic, since it can sensibly resemble or differ from other
objects in more than one way. Since a concept may in principle contain any combination
of characteristics, any object will be subsumable under a number of different concepts
and non-subsumable under a number of others. As we apply concepts to objects, we have
some knowledge of which combination of concepts an object falls under, and some
knowledge of which collection of objects fall under a concept, and we thus have
knowledge of some relations of the extensions of concepts. If we know that there is an
object that falls under both red and round then we know that these two concepts are at
least partially co-extensional. So, it looks like the abstractionist view will be able to
accommodate our knowledge of extensional relations of concepts.
What then about our knowledge of intensional relations? This too can be readily
accommodated. If we assume, as the abstractionist view has it, that the content of a
concept is constituted by a set of characteristics; and we further assume that we can at
least in some cases come to know what characteristics are contained in a particular
concept, then we are in a position in some cases to know whether some concepts share
characteristics or not, hence to know something of their intensional relations. An
example should make this clear. Take the colour mustard . I take it that the colour
mustard just is a dark brownish yellow colour. Knowing that, I know that the simpler
concept yellow is contained in the more complex concept mustard coloured, and by
knowing that  I also know that nothing could be mustard coloured and fail to be yellow.
By coming to know what characteristics are contained in a concept I can come to know
how that concept is intensionally related to other concepts. This is the aim of conceptual
analysis as was elaborated in section 2.1.
The plausibility of the abstractionist view
It is all very well to think that if empirical concepts are representations that have as
content sensible characteristics, this can explain important facts about our use of
concepts; but if we have no idea of how we can come to have such representations, then
the explanation remains completely ad hoc. Let us see therefore if we can find at least
some necessary if not sufficient conditions for the ability to generate and employ such
representations and to see whether our having such an ability is credible.
Characteristics are supposed to be ways in which sensations can presentationally
differ or resemble each other corresponding to basic sensible properties of objects – or
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in other words: what is presentationally common to several sensations, corresponding to
what is common to several objects.
Now, if we are to be able to determine and represent what is presentationally common
to several sensations, we shall have to be able presentationally to compare sensations
across times, abstract away from what is different and retain some representation of what
is common. This is roughly Kant’s “Logical Acts of Comparison, Reflection and
Abstraction” (see p. 51). To do this, it seems that as a minimum requirement we should
be able somehow to recall past sensations, to make comparisons between them and to
associate them with present sensations. Maybe we also need to be able to imagine future
and possible situations in order to complete abstractions away from relevant differences.
But all of these are abilities that we know we possess, quite apart from any
epistemological considerations about concepts. Upon hearing my sister’s voice I can
immediately recognise it as such even if she is uttering a sentence I’ve never heard
before; I can associate a fragrance with past fragrances from my childhood and I can
imagine sometime in the future once again seeing the rugged landscapes of my
homeland and in so doing compare them with my immediate surroundings.
Of course, we are still very far from a complete theory of concepts: What they are,
how they are generated and precisely how they are realised as internal states of a person.
But our aim was the much more modest one of trying to understand Kant’s Key to
Metaphysics – what we take as ground of the relation of representance. And in the case
of empirical concepts it seems that we are able to understand this; we can tell a story of
how concepts come to represent objects. No doubt the story can be refined and extended,
but at least it seems that the representance of concepts is no mystery – we do not seem to
need to make any theoretical assumptions beyond what we either already knew or what is
observably the case. The final story of how concepts arise in consciousness might involve
some mystery, but their representance does not.
The sufficiency of the abstractionist view
Even if the abstractionist view is adequate for an explanation of the four explananda that
I noted on p. 46, it is not clear that it is sufficient to explain all of our ways of using
empirical concepts. I am here thinking of our use of theoretical terms and concepts of
unobservable entities, such as ‘electron’, ‘electromagnetic field’, ‘the subconscious’ and
‘mean kinetic energy’. It is obvious that the content and applicability of these concepts
cannot be adequately explained in terms of a collection of sensible characteristics.
Nevertheless it is clear that the use of this kind of concept is in some way dependent on
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the use of simpler, directly observational concepts. In some way, the use of theoretical
terms is derived from our use of sensible and empirical concepts, and the explanation of
their representance, will have to be derived from the representance of directly sensible
concepts. The investigations into how theoretical terms refer to their objects is a vast and
interesting field, but we should not pursue it any further here. Suffice it to say that
Kant’s distinction between given and made concepts, where made concepts are those
which are explicitly introduced and defined in the course of scientific enquiry, might
well prove a valuable insight.
The reality of characteristics and basic sensible properties
Some objections and worries can be raised against Kant’s view of concepts as collections
of characteristics.
One is to claim that there is no such thing as a characteristic in the sense that this term
has been defined: simple presentational aspects of sensations corresponding to basic
sensible properties of objects. The objection would be that it is impossible to specify a
definite class of predicates that answer to this definition.
A simple predicate would have to be such that it is possible to acquire a competence
in applying it independently of knowing how to apply any other predicates. Now, it
certainly seems plausible that some predicates can be and are learned and subsequently
applied in that way. Let us suppose that there is a characteristic corresponding to redness
– that the concept ‘red’ contains just one characteristic. Now, imagine a child learning to
use the word “red”, which we can take to express the concept red.93 The child is
presented with a number of red objects, and hears the word “red”. When it starts uttering
the word “red” itself upon being presented with objects, non-red objects are brought in,
correct utterances of “red” is rewarded and incorrect ones discouraged. It seems quite
reasonable to assume that eventually the child would catch on and start to use the word
“red” correctly, hence to have acquired the ability to apply the concept red. A similar
story could be told for aspect-variant properties like shapes. Show the child a number of
differently shaped objects, reward utterances of “cube” in the presence of cubes, and
discourage it in the presence of other shapes. Maybe the acquisition of such concepts of
aspect-variant properties requires interaction with the objects beyond mere passive
observation, but the essentials would seem to be the same.
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Disregarding any stories of concept-acquisition, I am observably able simply to
recognise something as red, without considering any other features of it and without
having recourse to any sort of analysis or definition of what it is to be red nor to have
recourse to any sort of method or procedure for determining something as red. I simply
recognise it as being red. Similarly for cubes, though I may be less reliable for shape-
properties than for colour-properties. Both on the concept-acquisition story and by
argument from my ability simply to recognise it would seem that red and cube
respectively qualify as a concepts containing just one characteristic and that being red
and being cube-shaped are basic sensible properties. The problem is that which concepts
that can properly be regarded as simple might well vary from person to person or indeed
vary over time for one and the same person. Consider: I might well learn to apply the
concept purple simply by becoming able to recognise that particular colour. But I might
also learn about the colour purple as being a mixture of red and blue, that any object
which is both reddish and bluish is purple. So I might start out with using ‘purple’ as a
complex concept and then after a while start using it as a simple one as I gradually
acquire a familiarity with it and become able simply to recognise purple things as such.
So then, the objection goes, there is no stable, definite class of simple concepts, hence
there is no such things as characteristics.
This objection fails to appreciate that unlike the notion of a concept, the notion of a
characteristic is a technical term in epistemology. The notion of a characteristic is in
many respect an idealisation. Even though there is nothing answering exactly to the
definition, the notion may still play an important explanatory role in a theory. This is the
case with many theoretical idealisations: there is in reality no such thing as a frictionless
plane, a point-mass or an average man, but these notions are still useful in explaining
phenomena. All that is really claimed by the theory of characteristics is that we are
sensitive to presentational ways in which sensations can vary, and that the representance
of concepts is explainable in terms of this.
The second objection is to deny that there are any basic sensible properties. What I
present as basic sensible properties are defined in terms of what we can sensibly
recognise. However, the particular nature of our sensory modalities and our powers of
sensory discrimination is surely a contingent matter – different cognitive beings might
well have different sensory faculties and hence recognise very different properties of
things. Which sensible properties that are regarded as basic is thus contingent and merely
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relative to human sensibility – there is no ontological distinction between basic and non-
basic properties.
This objection relies on an inference from the premise that properties are basic only
relative to contingent facts about human sensibility to the conclusion that there are no
basic sensible properties. While I accept the premise, I can see no reason to accept the
conclusion. The fact that the properties we are able simply to recognise are basic only
relative to us, does surely not entail that they are not real properties. The abstractionist
view can happily accept the notion of basic sensible properties relative to human
sensibility.
This also ties in with the third possible objection, which is that the notion of a
characteristic might in the end be non-explanatory and resting ultimately on a circular
definition. The thought is that we define concepts in terms of characteristics and
characteristics in terms of sensible similarity relations. But it seems impossible to find any
objective, non-circular definition of similarity relations. Things resemble each other in
any number of ways, and it seems always possible to find some spurious similarity
among the most diverse of objects. What we are after are the similarities that are relevant
to us, and this relevance can only be defined again in terms of the concepts and
predicates we actually employ; hence the circle is closed.
There are, I believe, two reasons why this objection fails. Firstly, we are not trying to
give a definition of the concept of a concept. We are, to repeat, merely trying to explain
how concepts can come to stand in relations of representance to objects, and in doing so
we are clearly entitled to use any concepts already in our possession. Besides, we have
seen that the correspondence between characteristics and basic empirical properties is in
an important sense trivial. It is, and must be, the very same concepts that are used in
specifying and individuating both characteristics and basic sensible properties. The
individuations of these are inter-dependent, they are really no more than two sides of the
same coin. Therefore, there surely is a circularity here, but a virtuous and trivial one –
much like the inter-definability of the universal and the existential quantifier.94
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c) Perception and particulars
So far, we have developed a Kantian story about how different sensory states can come to
represent different environmental states, how general features of the environment can
correspond to general features of the sensory states and how concepts can come to
represent aspects of the environment in general by being abstracted from kinds of
sensations. What we haven’t explained so far is how concepts get applied to particular
instances of the concepts in question. We have not explained how we come to have
representations of particulars. Arguably our experiencing particulars as such, cannot be
cashed out merely in terms of our sensitivity to sensible aspects of the environment or
our conceptual ability to represent general features in general.
 This is a large topic, and some of it will be touched upon in the following chapters,
so the present discussion is going to be rather brief, and is intended only to show that
some theory of perception as distinguished from mere sensation is needed in order to
account for our experiencing the world as containing particulars.
We are able on occasion to cognise, say, a particular horse. How can we explain that: the
representance between my particular cognition and the particular horse?
The notion of a particular entails more than there being general and identifiable
features of the environment that are represented by the internal states of the subjects.
Considerations that are meaningless with regard to mere general features, make perfect
sense as regards particulars: For instance, it makes sense of particulars to ask how many
of them there are on given occasions.
In a vast range of normal circumstances I can ask how many branches there are on a
tree, how many apples there are in a basket or how many stars there are in the sky. We
might not always be able to answer, but at least these questions make sense. But of course,
it makes no sense if I for example were to ask you out of the blue “How many are there
in England?” Your response would most likely be “How many what?” Only relative to
some sort of description or classification, some sortal concept, does it make sense to ask
“how many?”. Now, if all we have are sensory states that passively represent the states of
                                                                                                                                         
temperatures are relevant in a way that say their difference in micro-structure is not? It is thus in a sense the
relevance, not the existence of the objective similarities that is in question.
The answer must be that the relevance of one set of similarities out of the vast set of possible similarities is
constituted by our propensity to be sensitive to them. All that is needed for communication is that we have similar
propensities to be sensitive to certain similarities and not to others. And since communication is possible we can take
that fact as evidence that we do in fact have such similar propensities. Since we are creatures evolved in a specific
environment, the assumption that we have some sort of innate relevance-matrix seems defensible on other grounds
as well. Quine propounds similar considerations in Quine 1969, pp.114-138.
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the environment, then there is nothing to account for our ability to ask, understand and
indeed sometimes answer questions about “how many?”. For that we need concepts, to
specify the “what” – to say what it is that we are counting. We have already given an
account of concepts of course, so that’s fine. But concepts are only general
representations. The concept ‘horse’ only represents horses in general – any and every
horse, not that one, over there, which I am cognising this very minute. How do we get to
cognitions of particulars – of particular instances of concepts?
Another important fact about particulars is that they can have any number of
properties simultaneously; a particular instance of roundness may also be a particular
instance of redness, and still be one and the same particular. Concepts enable us to
represent different universals – qualitative difference; but we are also able to represent a
mere numerical difference. Several particulars might well instantiate the very same
universals and yet be numerically different. Kant makes this point in “On the amphiboly
of concepts of reflection”:
[I]n the case of two drops of water one can completely abstract from all inner difference (of
quality and quantity), and it is enough that they be [perceived]95 in different places at the
same time in order for them to be held to be numerically different.96
Even if the drops of water should be molecule-for-molecule identical twins, it seems that
we would be able to cognise them as distinct. Now, our conceptual faculties, and the
representance of concepts in general is not by itself sufficient to explain this. The
representance of concepts relates concepts to a general class, and two qualitatively
identical drops of water would bear exactly the same relation to the concept of a drop of
                                                
95
 The original has ‘intuited’
96
 A263/B319
There are also important metaphysical conclusions to be drawn from this. Kant uses this as an attack on Leibniz’
principle of the identity of indiscernibles. The two drops of water share all properties and are hence indiscernible in
Leibniz’ terms, and yet in virtue of being in different locations at the same time, they are clearly distinct. An obvious
way of countering this attack is to say that spatial location is just another property, hence the two drops of water are
discernible in the right sense after all. There are two problems with this: One is the problem of incongruent
counterparts, which I shall not go into here, the other is that on this view the distinction between universal and
particular – between a general concept and its instances seems to break down. If spatial location is part of what
specifies the nature of, say, a general feature of the environment – how can we make sense of the notion that the very
same feature can be encountered at many different places? How can we distinguish between a general kind and its
instances?
This, however, is beyond the scope of the present concern, which is not metaphysical, but epistemological: We
represent, think of, cognise, things as particular instances of universals. What are the necessary subjective conditions
for doing so?
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water. Nevertheless we are able to represent them as different. Conceptual abilities can
explain our representing particulars as instances of specific universals, but not as distinct
instances of the same universal, i.e. numerically different even if qualitatively identical.
Sensations, however, stand in immediate causal relations to their objects, so two distinct
perceived drops of water, could well give rise to two distinct sensory states, by being
presented as distinctly spatially located. On the other hand, while sensibility can explain
our representing particulars as numerically different, it cannot explain how we represent
particulars as instances of specific universals since that  entails synchronic and diachronic
relations between  sensations.
Both sensation and conceptual faculties are clearly essential aspects of how we
represent particulars, so it would be natural to assume that that an account of our ability
to cognise particulars would have to make reference both to sensibility and to conceptual
faculties. And I shall claim that what we call perception involves precisely such references
both to sensibility and conceptual abilities. By ‘perception’ I mean such occurrences as
seeing a horse, hearing the word ‘table’, smelling the smell of coffee and so on, and
thereby being able to describe the occurrence in those terms. The point is that when I
perceive a horse, I’m not merely passively having a sensory state corresponding in
various ways to the presence of an actual horse – I am also perceiving it as a horse. And
the same holds mutatis mutandis for the other examples. With perception comes also the
possibility of misperception. I might find myself momentarily startled by what I take to
be a large, hairy spider on the kitchen floor until I realise that it was nothing but a
wayward bunch of loose straw – evidently being misperceived as a spider. We may
suppose that nothing about my sensory state have changed between my reacting with fear
to what I thought was a spider and my subsequent relieved realisation that it was nothing
but a bunch of straw. Yet something changed, and it would seem that a reasonable
explanation is that a different concept was applied to the sensed environmental state.
I shall not pursue these considerations further here. It is a vast topic. For the present
purposes it suffices to note that we are able immediately to apply concepts to sensible
particulars, as evidenced in the example of the straw/spider and I take it that this happens
in perception. This offers us a way of explaining cognition of particular objects. The
conceptual faculties give us ways of representing the universals of which the particulars
are instances and sensibility gives us the immediate link to the particular instances.
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“Weighty” properties of objects
It is clear that our cognitive abilities go further still than what has been sketched so far. In
addition to general features and particular instances of concepts, we are also able to
cognise much more “weighty” properties of objects. Objects are not only identifiable
and countable – properties the cognition of which we can explain by reference to
concepts being abstracted from sensations – they are also re-identifiable; they have
essential and contingent properties, they persist through time and they can survive
changes. Our ability simply to recognise basic sensible properties is not sufficient to
explain our cognition of these properties. This again, is just the problem of the
representance of the pure concepts. We shall see later, that it is precisely in order to
explain these and related features of our epistemic abilities that we need to rely on Kant’s
analysis of Pure Concepts and Principles.
d) Abstractionism and current debate
These topics, which I have referred to as the question of “the ground of representance”
remain hotly debated in current research in philosophy, linguistics and cognitive science.
In the above passages I have tried merely to bring out what seems to be Kant’s
underlying view on these matters – I am not in a position to hold an opinion of the
extent to which this view will pass muster in light of current findings.97 It may well be that
the abstractionist view needs to be modified, revised or even ultimately rejected. Be that
as it may, it is of no great consequence to Kant’s main concern, which after all is to
explain the representance of pure representations, not of empirical ones. What is needed
from the discussion of empirical representations is the truth of two premises:
1) Empirical concepts represent sensible objects
2) There are some knowable intensional relations between concepts
To deny the first of these premises one would have to claim that in general our empirical
concepts have no valid application to objects, while to deny the second would be to say
that all the relations between a particular concept and its extension are primitive – there is
no knowable systematicity to the way a concept relates to its extension. Neither claim
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seems particularly plausible, no matter what the correct theory of mental referring might
turn out to be.
What is important to Kant’s arguments about the representance of pure
representations is the truth of these two premises, not their justification. He may well have
been wrong in his (largely implicit) explanation of why these two premises hold, but that
does not entail that they don’t.
3.4 Pure representations
Having brought out how the ground of the representance of empirical representations is
supposed to be readily explainable and uncontroversial, we can now begin to turn to the
proper topic of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely pure representations – pure
concepts and principles. These were the foci of Kant’s interest. His seminal insight, the
expression of which in the letter to Marcus Herz I have repeatedly quoted, was that in
order to make any progress in metaphysics we need to explain or determine how pure
concepts may be related to their objects. And the important point is that the concepts
central to metaphysics, such as ‘self, ‘substance’ and ‘cause – effect’ are not amenable
to the same kind of representance theory as the empirical concepts were.
By definition, metaphysical concepts purport to go beyond experience – they are, in
important ways, non-sensible. In the case of empirical concepts, their representance could
be explained by their being abstracted from sensible experience. If the validity – i.e. the
actual applicability – of an empirical concept is questioned, all that is needed to validate
the concept is to produce or point out some instances of it. An empirical concept
“carves” the world up in parts that either do or don’t fall under the concept, and its
validity can always be demonstrated by examples. Kant makes this point in the
introduction to the Transcendental Deduction, where the validity of pure concepts is at
issue:
We make use of a multitude of empirical concepts without objection from anyone, and take
ourselves to be justified in granting them a sense and a supposed signification even
without any deduction, because we always have experience ready at hand to prove their
objective reality.98
Demonstrating the validity of an empirical concept should in Kantian terms be called an
Empirical Deduction, “which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and
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reflection on it…”99 But this is not available for pure concepts. We do not divide the
sensible objects in the world into those that are substances and those that are not.
Similarly nothing is a cause or an effect simpliciter. Rather, every event is both a cause
and an effect – effect of prior events and cause of posterior events. Thus it will not be
possible to validate the concept of cause and effect by as it were running through a series
of events and saying this event is a cause, that’s  an effect and this event is neither cause
nor effect. And this is not just because the notion of cause and effect is fundamentally
relational, such that we need both relata in order to identify and instance of causality, for
there is nothing sensible in virtue of which events related as cause to effect are to be
distinguished from events not so related.
To seek an empirical deduction of [the categories] would be entirely futile work, for what is
distinctive in their nature is precisely that they are related to their objects without having
borrowed anything from experience for their representation.100
Perhaps the most famous and certainly the most relevant statement of the claim that the
notion of causality cannot be derived from experience, is Hume’s dissection of the
notion of causality in A Treatise of Human Nature.
Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, which we call cause and effect, and turn
them on all sides, in order to find that impression, which produces an idea of such a
prodigious consequence. At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for it in any of the
particular qualities of the objects; since which-ever of these qualities I pitch on, I find
some object, that is not possest of it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause or
effect. And indeed there is nothing existent … which is not to be consider’d either as a
cause or an effect; tho’ ’tis plain there is no one quality, which universally belongs to all
beings, and gives them a title to that denomination.101
The main point of this seems to be that there is no perceptible criterion by which to
separate causes from non-causes; effects from non-effects. Causality, then, should be
regarded as a certain complex relation. Hume then goes on to analyse this relation and
finds that it has three components: “contiguity”, “priority of time in the cause before the
effect”, and the most important one: “necessary connexion”102 (We could say that the
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relational concept of causation contains three relational characteristics). Hume accepts
that contiguity and temporal priority is sensible – perceptible – and hence straight-
forwardly derivable from experience. The problem lies with the idea of a necessary
connection. Hume held that all ideas must be derived from impressions – roughly
perceptual representations – and his contention is that no impression could adequately
ground the idea of a necessary connection. Instead he claims that we are habituated to
associate a sequence of events with previously observed sequences resembling it.
The several instances or resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of power and
necessity. These instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other, and have no
union but in the mind, which observes them, and collects their ideas. Necessity, then, is
the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind… 103
Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the
thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their
experience’d union.104
 
So there is no necessity in reality – necessity is not real. And since necessity is an
essential characteristic of causality, causality is not real. In Kantian terms, the Humean
epistemological project has failed to provide a proper grounding for the relation of the
concept of causality and its purported objects. Hence the question of this grounding is
the Key to Metaphysics.
 Now, Kant accepted Hume’s arguments to the effect that the notion of causality is
not derived from experience
…no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could … be intuited through the
senses and is contained in the appearance…105
but he certainly did not accept that it should therefore be “committed to the flames”.106
Indeed Kant puts his own nice little twist to Hume’s pyro-imagery in the preface to the
Prolegomena:
…nothing has ever happened which could have been more decisive to [metaphysics’] fate
than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on this kind of knowledge;
but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained, had it caught
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some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire been carefully nursed and
developed.107
So, Kant’s task, and ours, is to show that even if not derived from experience, the notion
of causality and the other pure concepts can have a valid relation of representance to
their objects whilst yet being independent of experience; thus to steer clear of the
accusation of “sophistry and illusion”.
My proposal for solving this task – my interpretation of Kant’s Critique is that pure
concepts are second-order concepts. They apply to objects only mediately, by means of
reference to formal aspects of human cognition.
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C h a p t e r 4 – T h e f o r m a l a n a l y s i s o f e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e 
Before we tackle Kant’s analysis of the form of empirical knowledge, it will again be
appropriate to clarify some terminological issues. Though Kant makes frequent
reference to empirical representations, i.e. empirical concepts, empirical intuitions and
empirical judgements, he rarely refers explicitly to empirical knowledge. Instead he
refers frequently and consistently to experience. Now, ‘experience’ in English translates
two different terms in German whose meanings are clearly distinct, namely ‘Erlebnis’
and ‘Erfahrung’. Erlebnis is that kind of experience you can only have by personally
“living through” that experience. You can only have Erlebnis of a broken heart by
actually having one, or else having extraordinary powers of imagination and empathy.
‘Erlebnis’ could fairly appropriately be translated as ‘subjective experience’. Current
interest in subjective experience often include a focus on “phenomenal character” and
“qualia”.
‘Erfahrung’ on the other hand, whilst overlapping in meaning with ‘Erlebnis’, could
also be used to signify that kind of experience which can be exhaustively communicated
by words. We could call this ‘expressible experience’. Significantly, Kant exclusively
and consistently uses ‘Erfahrung’, never ‘Erlebnis’. In my opinion, Kant is not at all
concerned with any mere subjective aspects of experience. Since Kant also holds that
experience is a product of understanding108 and that understanding consists of making
judgements,109 it would seem evident that the kind of experience that Kant intends is
expressible experience – which in my opinion, at least for the purposes of this thesis,
could equally well simply be called ‘empirical knowledge’. As this term is free of the
ambiguity of ‘experience’ I have used it when giving my own arguments and shall
continue to do so. When commenting on Kant’s text it will sometimes be more helpful to
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use ‘experience’ – this should do little harm as long as it is kept in mind that in these
cases we are never concerned with subjective experience.110
4.1 Empirical knowledge consists of judgements
It is a tacit assumption throughout Kant’s transcendental philosophy that empirical
knowledge consists of, or at least is expressible in, judgements.111 The idea is essentially
that all experience is propositional – experience for Kant is experience that… (Erfahrung
daß…) As far as I can see, this assumption seems sensible enough, but there is little or no
argument for it. It might be that this assumption could be challenged and that there
might be non-judgemental elements of empirical knowledge. I cannot envisage what
such elements could be: Anything expressible and at all empirically significant, would be
expressible as some kind of judgement, I take it; so non-judgemental empirical
knowledge would not be expressible, hence not specifiable. So clearly any such elements
would in practise be impossible to discuss. Anyway, it makes little difference whether
there in fact be such elements. All that is needed for the critical arguments is the
existence of judgmental empirical knowledge. The arguments then proceed by showing
that there are necessary conditions for the existence of certain forms of judgmental
empirical knowledge, and that these conditions give rise to certain principles that are
universally valid throughout judgmental empirical knowledge. Whatever might be the
case with any possible non-judgemental empirical knowledge may be kept open. At
worst the conclusions drawn would be incomplete, but not false. It is surely an observable
fact that we do have empirical knowledge which is expressible in judgements, and we
shall let that knowledge be the object of our studies.
Note that this is not to claim that all of our cognitive relations to objects consist in
judgements. In addition to our knowledge of objects through empirical judgements as
instantiated in my knowing, say that a particular apple is ripe; we also have a more
immediate cognition of objects in perception, as in correctly seeing an object as a horse.
Whether mere perception should be classified as a kind of knowledge or not is largely a
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terminological issue. In a Kantian context the term ‘knowledge’ should be reserved for
cognitions that have a certain structural complexity corresponding to forms of
judgement. This will be discussed more fully in the following sections.
a) Judgements and intuition – the simple view
Now we are finally in a position to start examining Kant’s Analytic Premise, (see p.21),
the formal analysis of human judgements. The first issue should be Kant’s conception of
judgement in general, before we go on to investigate his account of the various forms of
judgements. To get clear about Kant’s conception of judgement we need to examine
carefully the relation and distinction between judgement and intuition, as the way this
distinction is presented in the Critique is frequently quite confusing, and has in my
opinion led several highly competent commentators into unfruitful lines of investigation.
I have argued that in order to explain our ability to cognise particular objects we
needed to assume a faculty of perception which had to involve both sensibility and
conceptual abilities. I shall argue below (in section 4.1c) that such a faculty is needed
also to explain our ability to make empirical judgements and that this is the most
plausible and fruitful understanding of Kant’s notion of intuition.112
 
In order to uncover Kant’s conception of judgement in general, we need to unravel quite
a number of related terms. First, we should note two fundamental dichotomies that Kant
makes: One between sensibility and understanding and one between intuitions and
concepts.
[T]here are two stems of human cognition … namely sensibility and understanding,
through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are
thought.113
Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that
neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition
without concepts can yield a cognition.114
All cognitions, that is, all representations consciously referred to an object, are either
intuitions or concepts. Intuition is a singular representation (repraesentatio singularis),
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the concept is a general (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected representation
(repraesentatio discursiva).
Cognition through concepts is called thinking (cognitio discursiva).
Note 1. Concept is opposed to intuition, for it is a general representation or a
representation of what is common to several objects, a representation, therefore, so
far as it may be contained in different objects.115
Further it seems that thinking, understanding and judging all come to the same thing:
[T]he cognition of every … understanding is a cognition through concepts.116
Cognition through concepts is called thinking.117
[T]he understanding can make no other use of … concepts than that of judging by means of
them.118
These and similar passages seem to suggest a fairly clean and simple view. In terms of
faculties, we draw a distinction between the active faculty of understanding, and the
passive faculty of sensibility. This same distinction can be drawn at the level of the
“products” – the representations – of both faculties, namely between concepts and
intuitions. Concepts and intuitions form irreducible components of knowledge, the co-
operation of the two faculties in judgings results in combinations of concepts and
intuitions which constitute cognitions or knowledge. This also affords a very simple view
of judgement: It is any application of a concept or concepts to objects of intuition. And
since this is the only thing to which concepts can be applied, judgement just is the
application of concepts.
W.H. Walsh clearly holds this view, as is evidenced in passing when he discusses
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction:
That judgment requires not merely the application of concepts (which is what it
essentially is), but of concepts formed on the basis of a priori rules…119
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Strawson holds essentially the same view about judgements:
What is now to engage our attention is what is involved in the recognition of objects as
falling under concepts, the “bringing of them under concepts”. This is identical with
making judgements about objects. “The only use which the understanding can make … of
concepts is to judge by means of them.” (A68/B93) To bring an object under a concept
involves thinking that a certain proposition is true of the object or is objectively valid.
Empirical knowledge, like all knowledge, is essentially expressible in propositions.120
b) Problems with the simple view
This simple view faces several difficulties, some of which are commonly noted and dealt
with by commentators, while others seem to be largely overlooked.
The conceptual element of intuitions
The fairly obvious problem lies with the claim that while intuitions on this view are
purely sensible they are yet said to represent objects. W.H. Walsh gives a succinct account
of this difficulty:
The process of intuiting, for Kant, is the process by which we become aware of particulars;
the process of thought that by which we ‘think’ and so comprehend such particulars under a
certain description.121
The difficulty here concerns the suggestion that intuition results in the grasping of an
object, for if it does, it would seem to be not just a component in knowledge, but a form of
knowledge on its own.122
What then is the status of the contents of sensation? I have myself spoken of them as
‘particulars’ but the term ‘particular is itself a correlate of ‘universal’: a particular is an
instance of a universal. According to the theory stated above, intuitions need to be
brought under concepts in order to be comprehended; if they are particulars they already
stand under concepts. The only way I can see out of this difficulty is to say that sensation
is not strictly a form of awareness, since it has no true objects, but a mode of experience
which is sui generis; without it experience of particulars would be impossible, though it is
false to describe it as presenting particulars for description. Sensory content –
‘intuitions’, as Kant calls them – are not objects of any sort, public or private.123
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[Intuition] can be described as awareness of particulars only proleptically…124
Henry Allison, in his Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, endorses Walsh’ diagnosis of the
problem and his resolution of it:
[A] tension, if not outright contradiction, has often been noted between the official
definition of ‘intuition’ as a “singular representation” and the account of sensible
intuition. The problem is that, according to Kant’s theory of sensibility, sensible
intuition provides the mind with only the raw data for conceptualization, not with the
determinate knowledge of objects. Such knowledge requires not only that the data be given
in intuition, but also that it be taken under some general description or “recognized in a
concept.” Only then can we speak of the “representation of an object”. Kant gives clear
expression to this central tenet of his epistemology in the famous formula, “[Intuition and
concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts
without intu ition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can
yield a cognition.]” (A50/B74)125
The key to the resolution of this tension is well expressed by W. H. Walsh, who
remarks that a Kantian sensible intuition is only “proleptically” the awareness of a
particular. The point here is simply that, although intuitions do not in fact represent or
refer to objects apart from being “brought under concepts” in a judgement, they can be
brought under concepts, and when they are they do represent particular objects126.
While these commentators are indisputably right in pointing out a tension in the simple
view of intuitions and concepts, it seems to me that their resolution to the problem creates
a number of new problems. One is that on their view there is no intrinsic difference
between sensations and intuitions. The only difference is that for intuitions there are
concepts under which they can be subsumed, but for (mere) sensations there are no such
concepts. On this model it seems strange that Kant should need a separate technical term
for intuitions. He already has terms for sensations and sensibility127 and ‘cognition’ to
cover the combination of sensation and concept into an objective representation. If this
was all there was to the notion of intuition, it would seem much more natural for Kant to
talk about pure sensation than of pure intuition.128 But he doesn’t. Another major
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problem is that Kant is quite explicit about intuitions being full-blown, rather than just
“proleptic” representations of objects. He even defines intuition as one species of
cognition, a cognition that is immediately related to its object, thus in the Logic :
All cognitions, that is, all representations consciously referred to an object, are either
intuitions or concepts. Intuition is a singular representation (repraesentatio singularis),
the concept is a general (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected representation
(repraesentatio discursiva).129
And in the Critique, empirical intuition is defined as “that intuition which is related to
the object through sensation”.130
Claiming that intuition is related to the object through sensation clearly suggests that
intuition is something over and above mere sensation, not just a sub-class of sensations
that happen to be subsumable under concepts. Note that intuitions are supposed to be
related to objects through sensation (Empfindung), not through mere sensibility
(Sinnlichkeit). Sensation, moreover, is classified as a purely passive faculty – a purely
causal phenomenon:
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it,
is sensation.131
Guyer & Wood also avert to a very interesting note that is added in Kant’s own copy of
the Critique:
Intuition is related to the object, sensation merely to the subject.132
From this it seems indisputable to me that Kant held a) that intuitions fully represent
objects – concrete particulars, and b) that they do so in virtue of something over and
above mere sensation. The obvious candidate for that component in virtue of which
intuitions can fully represent objects is concepts. And in a Kantian context this is
certainly the case, as he is explicit in claiming that concepts are needed even for the bare
representation of a particular: In the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction he
states that “All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may
                                                
129
 Log. §1
130
 A20/B34
131 Ibid.
132 Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge ed. 1998, p. 155 note d.
Kant and the Epistemology of Metaphysics Eilert Sundt-Ohlsen
– 76 –
be…”.133 Intuition is one of the two species of cognition; the other is concept itself, and it
would hardly be illuminating to be told that concepts require concepts, so the point of
the remark must be that even intuitions require concepts. Now, concepts are by definition
the work of understanding, so if intuitions have a conceptual constitutive component, we
can make good sense of a remark Kant makes in his “Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
Concepts of the Understanding”.
The    same   function   that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also
gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which,
expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding.    The     same     understanding   ,
therefore, and indeed by means of    the      very      same     actions   through which it brings the
logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a
transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the
manifold of intuition in general…134
This passage has the characteristic denseness of much of Kant’s writing, but the main
point here is that the same function of understanding can be found in an intuition as in a
judgement; which makes perfect sense if both involve essentially the application of
concepts.
On this revised view where intuitions involve both sensibility and conceptual abilities,
the dichotomies of understanding vs. sensibility and concepts vs. intuition do not run
along the same fault lines. This means that the dichotomy between concepts and
intuitions is more complicated than that between sensibility and understanding, so I shall
return to discuss this, and to develop further this dual-faculty view of intuitions. But
before that, I want to focus on another problem.
Although none of the commentators seem to have been alert to this, the simple view
of judgement that is a corollary of the simple view of intuition is fundamentally
irreconcilable to the view of judgement that is implicitly necessary in order to make sense
of Kant’s inferences from the forms of judgements. On the simple view any application
of a single concept counts as a judgement, whereas Kant’s table of forms of judgements
invariably requires a judgement to consist in a combination of at least two concepts.
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The complex nature of judgement
As mentioned above, the simple view of intuition and judgement has it that any
application of a concept or concepts amounts to a judgement. This would entail that the
mere recognition of something as being of a certain kind – as falling under some
specific concept – has to count as a judgement. My mere recognition of a horse as such,
is an instance of judging – a judgement. Of course, initially this makes sense, since it is
also assumed that an intuition is purely sensible and has no conceptual component. It is
only “proleptically the representation of a particular”. By being subsumed under a
concept, the intuition finally becomes a full-blown cognition and the act of subsumption
amounts to a judgement. This also seems to make sense of the dichotomy between
intuitions and concepts – they are jointly necessary, mutually irreducible components in
judgements.
The problem with this view is that it allows of judgements that involve no more than
one concept. Simply recognising a horse as a horse, is a perfect example of a judgement
– maybe even a paradigmatic one. However, as we shall see, for Kant any and every
judgement has to involve at least two different concepts; a claim for which I believe there
is conclusive textual evidence:
In every single example Kant gives of a judgement, either in the Critique or in the
Logic, at least two concepts are involved: minimally a subject concept and a predicate
concept. The very possibility of distinguishing between a subject and a predicate clearly
requires the presence of a corresponding number of concepts. In one of his Reflexionen,
(R4634) Kant states that a judgement consists in the comparison of two predicates:
Every judgment, therefore, contains two predicates which we compare with one another.
One of these which constitutes the given knowledge of the object, is called the logical
subject; the other, which is compared with it, is called the predicate.135
Also Kant’s definition of analytic and synthetic judgements indisputably entails that a
judgement must contain at least two concepts. The analyticity or syntheticity of a
judgement is defined in terms of the intensional relations between the subject concept
and the predicate concept: Analytic judgements are those where the predicate concept is
“contained in” the subject concept; synthetic judgements those where it isn’t.136 Now,
since synthetic judgements are defined only negatively as not being analytic, the
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analytic/synthetic distinction is clearly a dichotomy, so that these two alternatives are
mutually exclusive. If they are also jointly exhaustive, then it follows that any judgement
must involve at least two concepts. Now, Kant is not completely explicit on this point. Just
prior to defining the analytic/synthetic distinction, Kant says:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought … this
relation is possible in two different ways.137
This leaves it open whether there might also be judgements in which the relation of a
subject to a predicate is not thought, so that these might possibly for instance have only a
subject concept. This need not concern us here however, as Kant goes on to say that
“Judgements of experience, as such, are all synthetic”.138 Synthetic judgements are
synthetic in virtue of the relation of the subject concept to the predicate concepts, hence
judgements of experience must contain at least two concepts. And the object of our
enquiry is precisely judgements of experience and any conditions for making such
judgements. And these must by definition involve at least two concepts.
This is of course not to deny that there may be – indeed are – cognitive episodes in
which a single concept is applied to an empirical object; but these episodes are not
classified as judgements in Kantian terms. We shall look closer at the justification for this
taxonomy in the next section.
c) A fuller view of judgements and intuition
I have argued that in order to make sense of Kant’s terminology we should regard
intuitions as having a conceptual element and judgements as always involving at least two
different concepts. In this section I shall develop this view in some more detail and also
try to give philosophical and epistemological arguments for holding this view.
Dual-Faculty intuitions
The view of intuitions that I advocate is one that is instructively worked out by John
McDowell in his article “Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality”
where he comments on Wilfrid Sellars’ understanding of some fundamental Kantian
notions. I shall refer to this view as “the Dual-Faculty View of intuitions”.
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Given the Dual-Faculty View, and the definition of intuition as being immediately related
to its object,139 then if we are able to intuit, we should assume that we have a capacity for
immediately140 apprehending objects as such – as particulars falling under concepts.
There would be little point in elaborating a precise definition of some cognitive capacity
and drawing conclusions therefrom if in fact we do not possess such a capacity.
But this capacity, I claim, is precisely what we display in perception. When being
presented with a big, hairy spider on the kitchen floor, I immediately and inevitably
perceive it as such. On seeing the “Exit” sign, I cannot but see it precisely as that, and
when someone shouts ‘Duck!’ in a sufficiently urgent tone of voice I cannot help
putting my head down. This immediate response to a sensibly apprehended object, I
suggest, can only reasonably be explained by my immediately and automatically having
somehow understood, having already conceptualised it. I immediately subsume the
object under some concept.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between this and judging, between
perception and the proper exercise of judgement.
We should note that on the Dual-Faculty View, intuiting bridges the gap between the
free exercise of conceptual powers in judging and the passive affective state of mere
sensing; and hence, whilst having elements of both, is significantly different from either.
McDowell gives a good account of the element of Kantian responsible freedom in the
very notion of judging:
[J]udging, making up our minds what to think, is something for which we are, in
principle, responsible – something we freely do, as opposed to something that merely
happens in our lives. Of course, a belief is not always, or even typically, a result of our
exercising this freedom to decide what to think. But even when a belief is not freely
adopted, it is an actualization of capacities of a kind, the conceptual, whose paradigmatic
mode of actualization is the exercise of freedom that judging is. This freedom, exemplified
in responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of being answerable to criticism in
light of rationally relevant considerations.141
This is evidently the case; in showing poor judgement we are appropriately liable to
rational criticism, and we can be blamed for not having shown good judgement. Not so
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in the case of mere perception. I cannot help but see the spider as such – taking it to be a
spider. That, of course is not to say that I cannot mis-take it; as in the case where I take a
bundle of straw to be a spider. But in either case there is initially nothing I can do about
it, I just happen to see it as a spider, or not as the case may be. Of course, I can
subsequently come to form a judgement of whether my initial perception was correct or
not, and that  judgement will be liable to rational criticism, but in perceiving – intuiting –
I have no choice.
Again, McDowell expresses this fact well:
[P]erceptual belief acquisition is not a matter of judging, of actively exercising control
over one’s cognitive life, at all. Unless there are grounds for suspicion, such as odd
lighting conditions, having it  look to one as if things are a certain way – ostensibly
seeing things to be that way – becomes accepting that things are that way by a sort of
default, involving no exercise of the freedom that figures in a Kantian conception of
judgement.142
It does not take cognitive work for objects to come into view for us. Mere synthesis just
happens; it is not our doing, unlike making judgements.143
But these essential differences between freely judging and happening to perceive do not
preclude us from taking the very same conceptual capacities to be actualised in both
cases:
[C]onceptual capacities are essentially exercisable in judging. [But] judging is not the
only mode of actualization of conceptual capacities.144
McDowell further discusses a claim of Sellars’ that visual experiences “make” or
“contain” claims in virtue of being conceptual episodes. This is basically just the claim
that intuitions have a conceptual element. We can understand the conceptual contents of
a perceiving by analogy roughly with how that perceiving would be reported verbally.
While the actualisation of the conceptual capacities is involuntary in the case of
perceiving, we can still understand it as involving exactly the same conceptual capacities
that are paradigmatically exercised in free responsible judgings.145
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They would differ only in the way in which the relevant conceptual capacities are
actualized. In the judgment, there would be a free responsible exercise of the conceptual
capacities; in the ostensible seeing [putative or real perception], they would be
involuntarily drawn into operation under ostensible necessitation from an ostensibly seen
object.146
On this view, intuitions are like sensations in that they are involuntary – not up to us.
Nevertheless they share the conceptual element with the active faculty of understanding. I
may have no choice about seeing the spider as a spider, but nevertheless it is not
conclusively determined by the world. Had my psychological, cultural or epistemic
history been different I might well not have seen the spider as a spider at all, but maybe
just as some animal. It is even possible, I suppose, that I could have perceived it (perish
the thought) simply as food.
This is precisely the point of the Dual-Faculty view of intuition, that it has
characteristics both of the spontaneity of understanding and the passivity of sensibility.
In an intuition on this interpretation of the term, sensibility and understanding are both
involved.147
Note that this Dual-Faculty view of intuitions dispels what could otherwise easily be seen
as a mystery, namely how the results of an essentially passive and affective sensibility can
stand in inferential relations with conceptually expressible beliefs, i.e. how beliefs can be
justified by sensation.
Bi-conceptual judgements
I have argued that any judgement in Kantian terms must involve at least two concepts – a
subject concept and a predicate concept. The most basic and simple form of an empirical
judgement would be to attribute some property to some identified object, such as to
judge of a perceived horse that it is white.
To make basic empirical judgements one must thus be able to identify objects and to
attribute further properties to such identified objects. If an empirical judgement is true at
all, it is true of an object. So the making of a judgement requires the prior identification
of an object. On the other hand the identification of an object does not require the
making of a judgement involving two distinct concepts. I may well perceive a horse as
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such – recognise a horse – and even give verbal expression to it, maybe by exclaiming
something like ‘Wow, a horse!’ without in any sense employing distinct subject and
predicate concepts.
This is just as we should expect, of course, for if the identification of an object itself
required the making of a judgement, we would obviously not be able to make any
judgements at all, because the conditions for doing so would involve an infinite regress.
Therefore, one condition for the possibility of making basic empirical judgements must
be that we are able to identify objects without making judgements.
Now, we should stop briefly at this point to examine a possible objection to my
account of the simple recognition of the horse as such, which I claimed could be
expressed by ‘Wow, a horse’. It could be claimed that the right way of analysing such an
occurrence should be something like ‘that four-legged largish figure is a horse’, or
perhaps just ‘that thing over there is a horse’. The claim would be that the ordinary
empirical concepts such as ‘horse’ entail a complexity far beyond what we directly
perceive, e.g. that horses are persisting objects, that they have more sides and aspects than
what is visually presented, that they form a natural kind standing in complicated causal
relations and so on; so the concept under which we immediately subsume the object in
perception, certainly cannot be the concept ‘horse’. Instead we have to assume that we
recognise objects as falling under simpler perceptual “proto-concepts” such as ‘four-
legged largish figure’ or ‘thing’. Whether this objection is true or not, it is largely
irrelevant to my claim. If the event reported by me as ‘Wow, a horse’ must be analysed
as applying the full-blown concept ‘horse’ to an object immediately recognised as
falling under some proto-concept, this does nothing to disprove the claim that the ability
to judge presupposes an ability to immediately recognise objects as falling under
concepts; it can only show that the concepts under which objects are immediately
recognised are simpler than the concepts normally applied as predicates in judgements.
That said, I am not persuaded that even this much is really established by the objection. It
may well be that the acquisition of the full-blown concept ‘horse’ requires more than
mere perception, but that does not entail that, once acquired, the concept couldn’t be
applied in mere perception. It seems to me that when I look up from my novel and out
of the train window to gaze at the peaceful sight of a grazing white stallion I simply and
immediately recognise it precisely as a horse. There is no kind of movement of thought
from seeing it as some whitish thing to realising that – “oh yes! that, I wager, must be a
horse.” But whichever way one wants to cut this cake, there remains the fact that a
condition for the possibility of making basic empirical judgements is an ability to
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identify objects without making judgements. And this ability is just what we display in
intuition – which is the ability simply to identify an object as falling under a concept –
thus of having a simple determinate representation of a particular object as being of a
certain kind – of having a particular representation.
A basic empirical judgement, in contrast, could be said to be a complex determinate
representation of an object, where the object is not only represented as falling under one
concept through which it is immediately cognised, but also as falling under a second
concept – that which is attributed of it. A concept on its own – considered in abstraction
from its use in judgement – could be termed an indeterminate or general representation
of some object, or rather: as a representation of what is common to many objects – a
general representation.
 Now we are beginning to make sense of the Kantian terminology: Understanding and
sensibility combine to endow us with a cognitive capacity – a faculty of cognition –
whereby we can represent objects in abstracto by concepts, and in concreto by intuitions.
Now judgings consists in conscious relations, “holdings-together” of cognitions. In
expression of a basic empirical judgement, the subject clause represents an intuition, and
the predicate concept represents a property being attributed to the intuited object. Note
how well this fits with what Kant has to say about the relation of judgements, concepts
and intuitions in his “Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”:
[T]he understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means
of them. Since no representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition
alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to
some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept).
Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a
representation of it. In every judgement there is a concept that holds of many, and that
among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related
immediately to the object.148
We can also make sense of Kant’s dichotomy between intuitions and concepts:
Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that
neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition
without concepts can yield a cognition.149
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.150
                                                
148
 A68/B93
149
 A50/B74
Kant and the Epistemology of Metaphysics Eilert Sundt-Ohlsen
– 84 –
The superficial reading of this, which inspired the simple view, was that neither concepts
nor intuitions can yield cognition by themselves, but only in combination. But this, as we
have seen, failed to make sense of Kant’s definition of concepts and intuition as different
species of the genus cognition. To make sense of it, we need to read the quoted passage
carefully: Note that the claims made for intuitions and concepts respectively are not
symmetrical. Rather, slightly different claims are made for each of them:
– Intuitions, it is claimed, cannot yield cognition without concepts, full stop.
– Concepts, on the other hand, cannot yield cognition without an intuition
corresponding to them in some way.
If the claim was that concepts and intuitions must always be joined to yield cognition,
one would expect Kant to say simply that neither intuitions without concepts nor
concepts without intuitions can yield cognition; but that is not what he does. He adds an
important qualification to the claim about concepts: “an intuition corresponding to them
in some way”.
Now, I have argued that a concept is a component part of any intuition. This
immediately explains why an intuition without a concept cannot yield a cognition,
because it then lacks a necessary ingredient – it is not a complete intuition – it is in
Kant’s terms blind. This entails that a concept could become part of an intuition if it is
added to the sensible part of intuition – the mere sensation. And then it would seem
plausible to read the claim that a concept must have an intuition corresponding to it in
some way or other simply as a requirement that it be in principle possible for a concept
to be added to sensation, to be applied to a sensible object, if that concept be capable of
yielding cognition. If there were some reason why a concept could not be applied to a
sensible object – which is to say that no intuition corresponded to it in any way – then
that concept would be incapable of yielding cognition – which is to say that it could not
represent objects. It would, in Kant’s terms be empty.  Thus, on the assumption that a
concept is always an ingredient in an intuition, we have a clear explanation of why
intuition without concepts cannot yield cognition, and a plausible explanation of why
concepts must have “an intuition corresponding to them in some way”.
– A concept must be applicable to some sensible object; otherwise it is empty.
– An intuition must comprise a concept (as well as a sensation of an object); otherwise it
is blind.
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d) Problems with the fuller view
In fairness, we should note that this fuller view of intuitions and judgements is itself not
completely free of tension with Kant’s text. For instance, in the footnote to Metaphysical
Foundations to Natural Science, quoted on p. 20, Kant implies that judgement is
required for cognitions of objects:
…the precisely determined definition of a judgement in general (an act by which given
representations first become cognitions of an object).151
One way of reading this is to suppose that “given representations” include intuitions,
and that only by being subsumed under a concept in a judgement do intuitions become
cognitions of objects. This would mean that an intuition by itself does not count as a
cognition and thus does not represent an object; and so this supports the simple view.
However, intuitions are defined as a species of cognition, which is irreconcilable with
the simple view. Taken at face value, the quotation seems to commit Kant to holding that
judgement is required even for simple intuitions. But this again, conflicts with the bi-
conceptual view of judgements which in turn is necessary to make sense of the
fundamental analytic/synthetic distinction. We should note that the quotation is not from
the Critique itself, and although commenting on the Critique, it is written at a different
time and in a slightly different context, so it is perhaps not too surprising if there are
slight inconsistencies in the terminology.
One way of resolving this is to assume that Kant should have said experience or
knowledge rather than cognition, which would make the quoted passage state that while
intuitions represent objects, only in judgements do they serve to constitute knowledge of
those objects.
Another way of reading it is to assume that by “judgement” Kant is here thinking of
the contribution of understanding in all kinds of cognition, i.e. in the conceptual
elements in intuitions, and the logical functions of judgements. One way of
disambiguating this would be to distinguish between judging as any activity of the
understanding, and judgements as the results of deliberate exercises of such acts. The
tension implicit in the above quotation could then easily be resolved along the following
lines: Instances of judging are involved in all cases of cognition: freely and responsibly
where it results in explicit judgements, and passively and involuntary in the case of
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perceptions, whereas judgements are the expressible contents of free and responsible
judgings.
In any case, I shall claim that the fuller view of intuitions and judgements, such as I
have presented it here, provides for a much more fruitful reading of the Critique and for
carrying Kant’s project to a successful completion. I hope that the use to which I put the
fuller view in the following chapters will justify this claim.
e) Judgments, intuitions and sortals
On p. 83 I mentioned the idea of a basic empirical judgement, and defined it as the
attribution of some property to some identified object. The successful making of a
correct basic empirical judgement thus requires the correct performance of two distinct
tasks: first the identification of an object and then the further attribution of some
property to that object. A paradigmatic example of such a basic empirical judgement
would be:
(2) That apple is ripe
This distinction between identification and attribution in judging reflects a formal
structure of empirical judgements. To trace this distinction accurately, we need to specify
three separate levels at which an empirical judgement can be described. First there is the
level of representation, where we find such things as concepts and intuitions. Next
judgements are expressed by words – so there is an analysable linguistic level. Finally a
judgement is about things in the world – objects and properties, which are represented by
the things at the representational level. Inasmuch as words are used to express concepts,
we can legitimately talk of words also as representing things in the world in virtue of the
representance of the concepts they express.
The distinction between identification and attribution in a judgement can be traced
through all these three levels, and it will be useful to keep these apart by observing
consistent terminological distinctions between them:
In the world we find the particular object or collection of objects of which the
judgement is true if it is true, which I shall refer to as ‘the subject’152 of a judgement; and
we find the property which is attributed to the subject, which property I shall refer to as
‘the attribute’.
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 To avoid confusion, I shall always use the term ‘subject’ to refer to that object or objects in the world which a
judgement is about, i.e. the subject of  a judgement; never the “subject” making the judgement.
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In verbal expression a judgement will contain a subject clause  and a predicate clause .
A predicate clause typically involves simply the word for a predicate concept, such as
“white”, which I shall refer to simply as ‘a predicate’.
At the representational level we find the subject concept which is employed in the
intuition of the subject, and we find a predicate concept representing the attribute as a
property of the subject.
Since the verbal level expresses the judgement at the representational level, we should
be able to work towards an analysis of formal aspects of judgements by looking at
formal aspects of their linguistic expression. And from what we have discussed so far, we
can now indeed begin to generalise from (2) to an analysis of the form of a basic
empirical judgement. Let us symbolise the subject concept word by ‘S’ and the predicate
concept word by ‘P’, and then the first approximation towards the general form of a
basic empirical judgement can be written as
That S is P
Note that whereas the predicate concept – in the case of (2), ‘ripe’ – is sufficient to
specify the property attributed the subject concept alone does not suffice to determine
the subject of the judgement. The concept ‘apple’ represents any and every apple, and to
give your rational consent to my expressed judgement, you need to know which
particular apple I am on about. Hence, in the case of (2), the indicator ‘that’ (and
relevant facts about the context of utterance, such as the direction of my gaze, movement
of my hands etc.) in conjunction with the subject concept word will serve to determine
which particular object or collection of objects is the intended subject of the judgement.
If I were to say simply ‘apple is ripe’ I would fail to express a meaningful judgement at
all.
Other than the indicator ‘that’ I could use ‘this’ or else various quantifiers like ‘all’,
‘some’, ‘many’, ‘part of’ etc.153 Quantifiers and indicators serve to determine which
particular instance or instances of the general concept ‘S’ the judgement is about, i.e. to
determine in conjunction with the subject concept the actual subject of the judgement.
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 Note that the distinction between indicators and quantifiers is not sharp. Most indicators will have a quantifying
function by implying unique quantification: “That man” can be read e.g. as “the unique man being indicated”.
Correspondingly most quantifiers when used in judgements will rely on some degree of implied indications, such that
e.g. “All the apples are ripe” must normally be understood as “All the apples saliently present are ripe” or something
along those lines.
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Therefore I shall use the general term ‘determiner’ for any indicator or quantifier used
with the subject concept word in expressing a judgement. I shall refer to the determiner
together with the subject concept as ‘the subject clause’.
Let ‘Θ’ represent any determiner, and we can now specify the general form of a
basic empirical judgement as
 ΘS is P
In expressing to you my judgement that (2), the subject clause enables you to identify
the particular object of the kind S of which the predicate P is supposed to hold. The
subject clause thus performs the same function in expressing  a judgement as the intuition
does in making it. It would therefore seem reasonable to think that an intuition must
possess at least the same degree of logical structure that the subject clause of a basic
empirical judgement does – i.e. it must be analysable at least in terms of a determiner
and a concept.
Now, we may notice that not all concept words can meaningfully be combined with a
determiner to form a subject clause. Note the absurdity of
(3) *That ripe is tasty
(4) *Some rounds are yellow
Not all concept words are capable of being combined with determiners to form
meaningful subject clauses. The absurdity of certain concepts in subject position in a
judgement corresponds to an absurdity in trying to form questions of the form “How
many …”. It makes perfect sense on many occasions to ask, e.g. “How many apples are
there [in this basket]?”, but it is plainly nonsense to ask “How many ripes are there?”.
We can of course enquire how many ripe apples there are, but then we are using the
compound concept ripe apple, and it is the concept ‘apple’ that enables us to make
sense of the ‘How many’- question.
Those concepts whose concept words can successfully be combined with determiners
to make subject clauses and about which it also makes sense to ask ‘How many’-
questions are called sortal concepts. The crucial feature of sortal concepts is that they are
associated with identity criteria. For a sortal concept there is some empirical criterion or
criteria by which we can determine whether an instance of the concept is the same as an
instance cognised elsewhence – there is as it were some way of telling where one instance
The formal analysis of empirical knowledge 4.1 Empirical knowledge consists of judgements
– 89 –
stops and another one begins.154 This is precisely the idea of particular objects – instances
of universals of which it makes sense to assert or deny numerical identity. The sortal
concepts are, in other words, concepts of objects.155
This explains why there is the same kind of absurdity in trying to form both subject
clauses and ‘How many’-questions using words for non-sortal concepts. Remember that
the determiner is needed to specify which particular instance or instances of a concept is
supposed to be the subject of a judgement, and it only makes sense to determine the
particular instance of a concept if that concept is associated with some kind of identity
criteria.
This means that only sortal concepts can appear as subject concepts in judgements
and qualitative concepts can, at least on their own, only appear as predicates; but note that
the converse does not hold: both sortal and qualitative concepts can appear as predicates
of perfectly meaningful judgements, as for example in the following:
(5) That animal is tall
(6) That animal is a horse
This in turn entails that any intuition must have a logical structure analysable at least in
terms of a determiner and a sortal concept.
f) Towards an analysis of judgement
We have now come some way towards the “definition of a judgement in general” that
Kant claimed was the premise needed to explain the validity of the Categories (see p. 20).
The approximation we have achieved so far is to say that a basic empirical judgement can
be formalised as
ΘS is P
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 In the case of mere general features, the concepts of which we could call qualitative concepts there are no such clear
identity criteria; it does not make the same kind of determinate sense to ask how many shades of blue that exist, as it
does to ask how many branches there are on a particular tree.
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 Considerations of these kinds give rise to a whole interesting debate about the notion of ‘thing’ or ‘material object’
itself. The notion of ‘material object’ seem to contain the minimum requirements for the very idea of sortality – in the
sense that any sortal concept must contain the idea of a material object, yet the concept of a material object does not
seem to function as a fully operative sortal concept. There seems to be no clear, determinate answer to questions like
“How many material objects are there in this room?” Should the legs of a table count as individual objects or is it the
table as a whole that is an object?
This, however, is a debate that I shall not be able to enter into here.
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where ‘Θ’ symbolises the determiner; ‘S’ the subject concept, which is always a sortal
concept; and ‘P’ the predicate concept which can be either a sortal concept or a
qualitative concept. Any empirical judgement must have at least these three irreducible
components.156
 We shall now again pick up the discussion from the Critique, and see how Kant
elaborates his claims about the definition of a judgement in general and how he draws
further conclusions from there.
4.2 Kant’s table of Judgements
The main part of Kant’s Analytic Premise is that all forms of judgement “can be
brought under four titles, each of which contain under itself three moments.”157 These
four sets of moments constitute Kant’s famous table of judgements.
The idea behind the table of judgements must be that it is supposed to give the
minimal exhaustive classificatory scheme for empirical judgements, by which I mean that
all possible empirical judgements must be supposed to fit into the table, and none of the
terms used be reducible to other terms of the table. As I mentioned at the end of section
2.1, the table of judgements is introduced without a shred of justification or evidence,
beyond Kant’s saying that “the labors of the logicians were ready at hand”.158 A
minimal exhaustive classificatory scheme of judgements must properly be derived by a
process of analysis and induction from observation of the different judgements that we
do in fact make, and as I have argued in the above mentioned section, showing its
justification would consist in challenging the opposition for counter-examples rather
than giving direct proof of its correctness. Nevertheless, there must of course be some
reason for why Kant thinks that the table of judgements contains just the “moments” he
lists and no others. The point seems to be that he in essence lifted the table of judgements
from the received formal (in Kant’s terms: “general”) logic of his day and then made
the necessary adjustments for a transition from general logic to “transcendental logic”.
The major problem with this (and there are many minor ones) is that “the labors of the
logicians” seem in retrospect to have been left largely unfinished. Forms of judgement
and valid inference patterns that today are recognised and accounted for, were not
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included in the essentially monadic and syllogistic logic of Kant’s day. This makes it
seem highly implausible that Kant’s table of judgement is complete, which would entail
that his analysis of experience is at best a partial analysis. And even if we accept the table
of judgements as a merely partial analysis, doubts may still be raised about the
correctness of the table such as it is. I am not going to enter into this debate, though. It
seems to me that the important idea for Kant is the existence of a limited number of
forms of judgement – thus, the existence of a table of judgements as such, and while the
“divisions” and “classes” of the table are significant, the individual functions falling
under each of the classes are often less essential.
 
Before we proceed, we should list the table of judgements as Kant presents it:159
1. Quantity of Judgments
Universal
Particular
Singular
3. Relation
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive
2. Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite
4. Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodictic
 The table of judgements
The table is divided into four classes, in each of which there are three moments, making a
total of twelve moments. The first thing we should note is that the table of judgement
does not simply list twelve kinds of judgements. Rather, the moments are supposed to
represent “logical functions of judgements”160 – roughly formal aspects of judgements.
As should be the case in Kant, in this thesis the term ‘form of judgement’ should always
be taken as ‘formal aspect of judgement’, not as ‘kind of judgement’.
To specify a kind of judgement using the classificatory system of the table of
judgements, it would be necessary to mention four moments, one from each of the
classes. Any judgement is supposed to be characterisable by one of the moments from
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each of the classes, so that e.g. “That animal is a horse” would be a particular,
affirmative, categorical, assertoric judgement. This means that there should be a total of
eighty-one different irreducible kinds of judgements, each classifiable by one of a set of
three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive moments from four classes of formal
aspects of judgements. But the situation is in fact even more complicated, since some
judgements consist of combinations of simpler judgements. As Strawson notes:
A hypothetical proposition, for example, might have a universal antecedent and a singular
consequent. Is it then universal or singular?161
But this is really not a grave problem. The idea of a minimal exhaustive classificatory
scheme of judgements seems sound enough.
Since the soon-to-be announced table of categories has the same structure as the table
of judgements – four divisions, each with three sub-divisions – and is supposed to be
derived from it, one must suppose that the subsequent arguments from “forms of
judgements” to the validity of categories should properly go not from a kind of
judgement to a category, but from a formal aspect of a judgement to a category.
Unfortunately it is not always clear that this is the case in the actual arguments Kant puts
forward.
I shall not attempt to argue for the completeness or correctness of Kant’s table of
judgements – indeed I shall in the course of the following discussion suggest a number
of amendments and corrections to it. What I think is correct and important is the idea that
all empirical judgements can be classified by some minimal set of formal terms, and that
a number of the terms in Kant’s table are just such minimally specific terms of formal
aspects of judgements. I shall then try to show how from premises to the effect that we
make judgements of a specific form we can draw conclusions as to the validity of pure
concepts and of pure principles.
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C h a p t e r 5 – T h e K e y t o M e t a p h y s i c s 
As mentioned in the section on the overall argumentative strategy of the Critique,162 Kant
claimed prior to the publication of the 2nd edition that the explanation of how experience
is possible only by means of the pure concepts could be solved “almost by a single
conclusion from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general.”163 I take
it in turn that the claim that experience is possible only by means of the pure concepts is
a crucial step in solving the problem of the Key to Metaphysics,164 namely the question
of how pure concepts relate to their objects.
By this stage in the Critique, Kant has stated what I have referred to as The Analytic
Premise165 – the precisely determined definition of a judgement in general. This consists
in the implicit analysis of a judgement as consisting of the conscious combination of at
least two concepts as applying to a perceived object or collection of objects,166 and the
claim that empirical judgements can be classified in terms of the Table of Judgements.
We should now examine the “single conclusion” whereby Kant claims to be able to
show the validity of the categories. Unfortunately, it is hard to argue that Kant is not
guilty of being somewhat cavalier in claiming that no more than a single conclusion is
needed, especially since he, as I am going to claim, spends no less than 165 pages on
completing this argument. The Key to Metaphysics – the proof of the validity of the
categories is officially treated in “the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
Understanding”, but we shall see that the Transcendental Deduction really just presents a
preliminary outline of the arguments needed, and that these are completed in the
subsequent “Analytic of Principles”.
Nevertheless, there is quite a clear line of argument to be traced, and trace it we shall,
focusing on those elements needed to account for our knowledge of causal facts.
Since the claim that the validity of the categories can be shown to follow from a
formal analysis of judgements clearly pertains only to the revised 2nd edition version of
the Transcendental Deduction I shall here concentrate on this version of the arguments.
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5.1 Kant’s table of categories
The presentation of the table of judgements takes place in a section called “On the Clue
to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”.167 The first two sub-
sections of the Clue are devoted to presenting the table of judgements and explaining the
points at which one might be surprised to see divergence from a table produced by
general logic. Since it would seem that quite a lot of the table might be surprising and
since I shall not be arguing for the completeness or correctness of the table as a whole
anyway, we can safely leave aside these considerations here.
What is of interest is the third sub-section of the Clue. It is here that the Categories –
the Pure Concepts of the understanding – those of which we aim to explain their
representance – first make their appearance.
This is the list – the table of categories – as presented by Kant:168
1. Of quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
3. Of relation
Of Inherence and Subsistence – (substance and attribute)169
Of Causality and Dependence – (cause and effect)
Of Community – (reciprocity between agent and patient)
2. Of quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation
4. Modality
Possibility – Impossibility
Existence – Non-existence
Necessity – Contingency
 The table of categories
Precisely what the relation between the table of judgements and the table of categories is
supposed to be is quite a difficult question, both in general terms – how the latter table is
supposed to be derived from the former – and in the specific cases of the correspon-
dence of a particular category to a particular form of judgement, and Kant’s clue really
is that – no more than a clue. Further it is really no more than four pages of the Clue that
actually deal with this relation between the two tables170 – the rest are devoted to
discussing the finer specific points of the contents of each of the tables. And these four
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pages are by no means easy to make sense of. I shall not claim to be able to explain all
the details of Kant’s arguments but I do believe that there is a viable line of argument to
be conjectured from elements in the text.
The first important point to note is that there is supposed to be a strict one-to-one
correspondence between the two tables.
In such a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply
to objects of intuition in general a priori, as there were logical functions of all possible
judgments in the previous table…171
The table of categories must therefore be supposed to derive from the table of
judgements by some unitary principle applicable to each of the forms of judgement.
This unitary principle is what is referred to by the anaphoric “in such a way” of the
above quotation, and we shall return presently to just what this principle might be. But
first we should note that the categories – the pure concepts of understanding are said to
apply to objects of intuition in general a priori. They are concepts under which objects
of intuition – ordinary objects like horses, apples and men – fall. These concepts apply
to objects of intuition in general and a priori. I take this to mean that the categories
apply to each and every object of intuition (“in general”), and that the validity of this
application is not dependent on experience (“a priori”). Whether all the categories apply
to all objects of intuition or whether the claim is just that for all objects of intuition there
is some category or categories that apply to them, should as yet be left open. The
categories are concepts of ordinary objects, but their representance is not supposed to be
explainable by way of experience, hence the need for the Key to Metaphysics.
So categories are concepts that apply independently of experience to all objects of
intuition. Further each category can be derived from a corresponding form of judgement
by some common principle. But what exactly is this principle?
In the passages immediately preceding the above quotation, Kant links the way that
categories arise from the forms of judgement to the notion of “pure synthesis, generally
represented”.172 Now, this notion of pure synthesis is, even by Kantian standards, quite a
difficult one. Kant is still only giving a clue to the discovery of the categories, and the
notion of pure synthesis figures more heavily in the ensuing Transcendental Deduction. I
shall look more closely at it in that context, in section 5.2b) below. But to make sense of
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Kant’s clue, we need to summarise and anticipate somewhat the treatment of the notion
of synthesis in general:
Central to understanding the notion of synthesis is the important Kantian claim that while
the matter of empirical knowledge must always be given by the senses, its form is in
important respects contributed by understanding. Synthesis is the supposed process
whereby understanding forms the matter given by sensibility into cognitions and
judgements – the process in which the understanding as it were inserts its formal
contribution into experience. By arguing in various contexts that it is the same synthesis
that is operative at different levels, Kant is able to conclude that these different levels
display identical formal features. We shall see, however, that while the sharing of formal
structures can and does establish the claims that Kant needs, the claims of sameness of
synthesis is both poorly supported and largely irrelevant to the formal similarities that
need to be established. I shall therefore try to show that these claims to formal similarities
can be established from arguments that are independent of the problematic notion of
synthesis.
But we are still in need of an account of the single principle by which the table of
categories is derived from the table of judgements, and we want to know why the
categories apply independently of experience to all objects of intuition.
First of all one should recall that the validity of the categories was supposed to be
explainable “almost by a single conclusion from the precisely determined definition of a
judgment in general”. One would therefore expect arguments from this definition of a
judgement in general – i.e. from forms of judgements. This, however is not what appears
to be the case in the 2nd edition version of the Transcendental Deduction. Instead the
arguments go from an alleged necessary unity of self-consciousness, via a corresponding
necessary unity of intuitions to a claim that all objects of intuition stand under the
categories.
The necessary unity of self-consciousness is important in explaining another pure
concept, namely the concept of the soul – or the self, as we would say in today’s parlance
– but that is not crucial for the purposes of this thesis, so I shall again side-step these
considerations. What is important though is the considerations about any necessary
conditions for intuitions. If it could be shown that some of the formal aspects of
judgements must also be formal aspects of intuitions, i.e. that intuitions and judgements
share some of the same forms, then we would seem to have the missing link between
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Kant’s claims about how the validity of the categories could be shown (from the
definition of judgement), and how he actually presents it in the Critique (from the unity
of intuitions).
 A passage in the Clue seems to hint at this identification of forms of intuitions with
forms of judgements, though still by way of a notion of synthesis:
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also
gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition…173
Kant’s official term for forms of judgement is “logical functions of the understanding
in judgments”, so if the same function operates on judgements and on intuitions, as is
implied by the above quotation, then it does indeed appear that Kant holds that some
forms of judgements are also forms of intuitions. We shall return presently to how this
makes sense of the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction proper, but first we need
to get clearer about exactly what the relation is between the two tables.
What must be taken to be Kant’s explanation of this is found in the continuation of
the above quotation, in a paragraph that unfortunately is so dense as to be all but
incomprehensible:
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also
gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which
expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding,
therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the
logical form of a judgement into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings
transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the
manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the
understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can never be accomplished by universal
logic.174
I shall try to unpack the various interrelated points here. First of all “the same function
that gives unity …” must be just any of the forms that judgements and intuitions have in
common. Let’s call this a common form of judgement for the present. Further, such a
form “expressed generally” is called the pure concept of understanding – i.e. the
category. So, we can conclude:
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– A category is a name for a common form of judgement
Further, pure concepts of the understanding pertain to objects a priori. So, the categories
are concepts that apply to objects.
– The categories are concepts of objects
The categories apply to objects by means of “the synthetic unity of the manifold in
intuition in general”. Forms of judgement are called logical functions of the
understanding, and the same functions give unity to judgements and intuitions so the
unity of the manifold in intuition must be due to a common form of judgement, and
since the categories apply to objects “on account of” the unity of the manifold in
intuition, it follows that the categories must apply to objects somehow in virtue of – by
way of – the common forms of judgements.
– The categories apply to objects by way of the common forms of judgements.
Bringing these three claims together we can conclude that a category is the concept of an
object or objects insofar as it is the subject of a judgement of a specific form. So far we
can treat this notion of categories purely as a matter of definition.
If there are forms of judgements, and we have concepts of them, then we can clearly
form concepts of objects as being the subject of judgements of these forms. That is just
what the categories are.
This is of course still extremely abstract and preliminary, but then we are still discussing
claims made in a section that is called “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
Concepts of the Understanding”, which suggests that we should not expect anything
more than just a clue to how the categories can be explained. What remains to be shown
is that these concepts apply not only to objects that are subjects of empirical judgements,
but also to objects of intuition; and also that these concepts of objects as subjects of
empirical judgements are identical to the pure concepts of the metaphysical tradition.
This task is started in the Transcendental Deduction and completed in the Analytic of
Principles, as we shall see.
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J. M. Young in his “Functions of thought and the synthesis of intuitions” seems to
arrive at much the same conclusions about the relation between forms of judgement and
categories:
[T]he categories are the functions of judgment employed in a certain way. 175
Insofar as they serve to give unity to the synthesis of intuition, the functions of thought
are said to constitute pure concepts of understanding, or categories.176
However, Young thinks there is a problem in explaining why the categories should also
be applicable to objects of intuition:
Kant asserts that the logical functions of thought also constitute concepts that must be
applicable to things given in sensible intuition. It is hard to see why he should think
this.177
As we shall see, given the fuller view of judgements and intuitions (see section 4.1c), and
the identification of some forms of judgements and forms of intuitions, it will become
clear why Kant, quite rightly thought that the concepts of the functions of thought must
indeed apply also to objects of intuition.
Paul Guyer in this article on “The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” gives
two formulations of what Kant takes the categories to be:
[W]hat he means by a category is, in fact, just a concept of an object, which allows the
application of a judgment to that object.178
These categories are supposed to describe twelve different ways of conceiving of objects
that are necessary in order to make the twelve different logical functions of judgment
applicable to them.179
Guyer thinks there is an ambiguity in Kant’s views in that he (Kant) sometimes seems to
hold that the categories somehow facilitate the representation of the manifold of
intuitions as an object, and sometimes for the representation of it as the object of a
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judgement. Again, once we see how forms of intuitions are identical to forms of
judgements, we shall see that this ambiguity is only apparent.
We have now been presented with the table of forms of judgements, and we have been
given the clue that we can form concepts of objects falling under these forms of
judgements and that these could be called categories. I shall turn now to the explanation
of how such categories can and must apply to all objects of experience, which is the aim
of the Transcendental Deduction.
5.2 The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
a) The function of the Transcendental Deduction
In seeking to understand the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding, it is first of all important to understand what it is not. Given its name, it is
only too natural to expect deductive arguments yielding as conclusions the existence of
each of the categories. This however, is not the point of the Transcendental Deduction.
The existence of pure concepts (and of pure principles) is simply an observable fact of
human cognitive practices. Kant is completely explicit about this in the 2nd edition
Introduction to the Critique:
We are in possession of certain a priori cognitions, and even the common understanding
is never without them.180
[I]f one would have one [example] from the commonest use of the understanding, the
proposition that every alteration must have a cause will do…181
Not merely in judgments, however, but even in concepts is an origin of some of them
revealed a pr iori…182
Kant thinks it can be shown that a number of our concepts and principles do no doubt
purport to apply a priori – they are not derived or abstracted from experience – and we
shall examine later arguments to show that this must indeed be the case. What is in
question is whether these concepts really refer to anything, which is to ask whether they
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are validly employed. If they are not, we should be forced to conclude as Hume did, that
e.g. necessity, and by implication: causality “is nothing but an internal impression of the
mind”.183 The existence of purportedly pure concepts is not in doubt, and it is just these
concepts that have long been at issue in metaphysics. However, Kant thinks that thus far,
though we have undoubtedly recognised some of these concepts as such, we have really
not done so by any reliable method, but as he accuses Aristotle, “merely rounded them
up as he stumbled on them”.184
Kant’s purportedly novel idea is that all the pure concepts stem from a common root,
namely from the forms of judgements. Thus, he has presented the very appropriately
named “Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”. Now, he has
to show the details of this discovery, and this requires him to establish two quite separate
claims:
Claim 1: The pure concepts are identical to the concepts of objects considered as
subjects of forms of judgements
Kant has shown that we can form concepts of objects falling under judgements of the
various forms, and he has claimed that these are the pure concepts – the Categories. This
is of course in one sense a definition of the Categories, and it would be possible now to
proceed directly to showing how such concepts could be validly applied to objects of
experience. The problem is that this approach amounts to an introduction of the pure
concepts as technical terms – to giving a synthetic  definition of the Categories 185 – hence
to make, to legislate, the proper definition of the Categories. But our starting point was
the given, observable fact that pure concepts are employed in experience, and we have as
yet no reason to assume that this introduction of “Categories” as a technical term bears
any relation to the pure concepts that are found to be employed in experience.
All Kant has done so far is to give a synthetic definition of putative categories. Now
he has to show that the categories thus synthetically defined are identical to the pure
concepts which we can find by analysis to be employed in empirical knowledge. Kant
needs to establish the identification of the synthetically and analytically defined
categories.
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Claim 2: The pure concepts apply to objects independently of and throughout
experience.
Kant needs to show that the way he has explained the origin of the pure concepts also
accommodates an explanation of how these pure concepts can apply to their objects. We
still need an explanation of their representance.
Establishing these two claims together would constitute an explanation and justification
for the categories’ valid employment to objects of experience – a demonstration of the
validity of the categories. This is what the Transcendental Deduction is about.
Kant’s use of the term ‘deduction’
In the legal terminology which Kant borrows to describe his project, we may say that
while the factual question (“quid facti”)186 is determined, there remains the question of
right or validity (“quid juris”),187 and a proof of this is called a deduction.
Dieter Henrich, in his paper “Kant’s Notion of a Deduction” offers an invaluable
insight into the background for Kant’s terminology:
In Kant’s philosophical language, the meaning of the term “deduction” is different from
what we almost irresistibly expect … the logical procedure by means of which a
proposition – namely, the conclusion – is established through the formal relationship of
other propositions, its premises. Thus we take a deduction to be a syllogistic proof. Kant
was familiar with this usage of the term “deduction”. Yet, unlike now, this was not the
only, and not the most common, usage in eighteenth-century academic language…188
…By the end of the fourteenth century, there had come into being a type of
publication that by the beginning of the eighteenth century (when it had come into
widespread use) was know as Deductionsschriften (“deduction writings”). Their aim was to
justify controversial legal claims…189
…within the fast-growing methodological literature on law, academic jurists provided
analyses of what a deduction was and guidelines for a deduction’s author. …one of the
methodologists produced the following criteria for a good deduction: Since a deduction is
not a theory for its own sake, but rather an argumentation intended to justify convincingly
a claim about the legitimacy of a possession or a usage, it should refrain from unnecessary
digression, generalizations, debate about principles and so forth, which are of interest
                                                
186 A84/B116
187 Ibid.
188 Henrich 1989, p. 31
189 Op cit. p. 32
The Key to Metaphysics 5.2 The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
– 103 –
only to the theoretician. A deduction should be brief, solid but not subtle, and
perspicuous.190
One important consequence for this is that we should not expect any one particular style
of arguments. As mentioned in the introduction, Kant is engaged in presenting a theory
of knowledge. In presenting a theory, he is of course justified in using a variety of
different arguments, analytic and synthetic, as well as presenting theoretical hypotheses.
Kant is not obliged to give direct, justifying arguments for each and every assertion in
the Transcendental Deduction. Much of the structure of the argument should be seen as
hypothetico-deductive. To a large extent Kant propounds hypotheses to be tested against
their ability to explain the phenomena. The overall argumentative structure of any
proposal of a theory must be an “inference to the best explanation”. If Kant’s theory is
superior to the competitors, then that is a justification of his theory.
The very notion of a deduction is compatible with any kind of argumentation suitable for
reaching the goal – namely, the justification of our claims to a priori knowledge.191
The Transcendental Deduction and synthetic a priori judgements
Central to Kant’s analysis of metaphysics is the claim that it must consist of synthetic a
priori judgements, and part of the “Main Transcendental Question” of the Prolegomena
is ‘How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?’192 Now given that the Categories just
are pure or metaphysical concepts and that these Categories – these metaphysical
concepts – are claimed to make experience possible, it may seem natural to assume that
the Transcendental Deduction should itself employ synthetic a priori arguments – that is
arguments supporting synthetic a priori conclusions.
Paul Guyer, in his Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, discusses objections to the
Transcendental Deduction that seem to rely on such a view.
Several writers have asked what status the premises of Kant’s arguments must have if they
are to deliver synthetic a priori conclusions. Can such conclusions be derived from
nothing but analytically true premises? That seems impossible, but there has been
disagreement about the point at which synthetic premises must enter Kant’s arguments.
One view has been that Kant’s transcendental arguments must begin from a premise which
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is synthetic a priori – such as the premise that we have experience at all – but then proceed
to their conclusion by entirely analytical inferences – thus, for example, by analysis of
the concept of experience. The requisite analyses may not be obvious – hence the
difficulty of transcendental arguments, after all – but they ultimately show only the
analytical consequences of the original synthetic premise, and thus transcendental
arguments are at best unobvious analytical arguments.193
And it seems that Guyer holds that this is in fact close to the actual argumentative
strategy employed by Kant:
…what Kant himself explicitly recognized as a transcendental deduction always assumes a
synthetic but necessary truth for its premise…194
I think the assumption that the Transcendental Deduction needs synthetic a priori
judgements is a mistake. Kant’s claim is that metaphysics consists of synthetic a priori
judgements, and it must be borne in mind that the Critique is not a piece of metaphysics,
but of transcendental philosophy.195 Metaphysics is its object, not its method. To be sure,
the pure principles of understanding, the justification of which is prepared in the
Transcendental Deduction, are synthetic a priori, but the explanation of their validity
need not be. There is no claim that transcendental philosophy needs to consist of
synthetic a priori judgements.
Further this assumption seems to rest on taking the Transcendental Deduction as
being a deduction in the modern sense, i.e. involving deductively valid arguments, rather
than as a deduction in Kant’s archaic legal sense, i.e. as outlining a claim to validity.
The temptation is to take the valid application of the pure concepts or else the pure
principles as conclusions to be deductively inferred from some incontrovertibly true
premises, and then one might need to assume that some of these premises must
themselves be synthetic a priori.
But the valid application of the pure concepts and the purported truth of the pure
principles are neither conclusions nor premises in the Transcendental Deduction. They
are explananda. We find ourselves accepting the validity of the application of pure
concepts and the truth of pure principles, and stand in need of an explanation of how this
is possible – we require a theory for these kinds of cognitions, and the Transcendental
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Deduction is an outline of such a theory. Note how this reading of the Transcendental
Deduction answers an objection noted by Guyer:
…Kant’s own conception of a transcendental deduction always involves a premise which
is at least tacitly, if not explicitly, a claim to synthetic a priori knowledge. Although
only a proof that even empirical judgments have a priori conditions might seem like a
compelling deduction of such conditions to us, the hard fact is that Kant no more than
hints at the possibility of a transcendental deduction with such a premise in the official
texts of the deduction and instead relegates the exploitation of such a premise – though
only such a premise was contemplated in the original transcendental theory of experience
– to  the subsequent “Analytic of Principles”.196
That the deduction involves a “premise” that is a claim to synthetic a priori knowledge
is only natural, if such a claim is precisely what Kant seeks to explain – to “validate”.
And the Transcendental Deduction, true to its name as borrowed from legal language is
simply a brief outline, so we should expect the substantial arguments to appear later – as
it happens: in the Analytic of Principles.
Just as Henrich claims for the Transcendental Deduction, transcendental philosophy
is compatible with any kind of argumentation suitable for justifying a theoretical claim.
Typically this will involve both analytic arguments and abductive inferences.
This, I believe is a true description of the actual argumentative structure of the
Transcendental Deduction. We should not let ourselves be distracted by the fact that Kant
sometimes seems to overstate his case by claiming that the results of the Transcendental
Deduction are proved with “apodeictic certainty”.
Let us pause at this point to recapitulate the points established so far, and the task facing
us in the Transcendental Deduction:
We are investigating propositional experience – empirical knowledge consisting of
judgements. The making of such judgements requires that certain conditions be met, and
such judgements can be classified by means of a system of forms of judgement.
The aim of the Transcendental Deduction is to give an outline of a theory designed
to show (a) that the table of concepts of objects considered as subjects of the forms of
judgements are identical to the total number of Pure Concepts, and (b) that such Pure
Concepts are applicable to objects of experience – i.e. that they have empirical validity.
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It is essential to realise that the Transcendental Deduction gives no more than the
outline of such a theory. It is little more than a plan of action.
The conclusions made about the structure of empirical judgements will come into play in
the treatment of the subsequent parts of the Critique, specifically the Analogies of
Experience.
b) Synthesis and the “unities of self-consciousness”
Before we can proceed to the proper interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction, we
shall need to deal with one of thorniest problems in making sense of the core doctrines
of the Critique: Kant’s notion of synthesis. This notion figures importantly in both
versions of the Transcendental Deduction, and if nothing else it seems clear that Kant
took the appeal to synthesis to be a vital step in the argument of the deduction. But it is
unclear to say the least whether it can actually do the logical work that it is supposed to.
Synthesis and Transcendental Psychology
Kant defines synthesis as the act or process by which disparate elements of cognitions are
brought together into some kind of cognitive unit:
By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting
different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness
in one cognition.197
It would seem hard to think otherwise than that an “action of putting different
representations together” must be some form of actual mental process, be it conscious or
unconscious, deliberate or automatic. Patricia Kitcher, in her introduction to the Hackett
edition of the Critique thinks that the notion of ‘synthesis’ should be understood as the
more modern concept of ‘information processing’
Kant did not refer to the “processing” of information, but to the combining or
“synthesizing” of the contents of 198{re}presentations. In this case, however, the
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contemporary equivalent of “processing information” for “synthesizing [the contents
of]199 {re}presentations,” captures his meaning very well.200
If Kitcher is right in this, and I believe that she is, it would seem that ‘synthesis’ is a
psychological201 notion, rather than a logical or epistemological one, and it is unclear
how this notion relates to other explicitly logical or epistemological concerns of Kant’s.
This has led different commentators to take radically different stances towards Kant’s
doctrines of synthesis.
At one end of the scale, we find P.F. Strawson, who thinks that Kant is indeed caught
up in psychological considerations, but that this is a grave mistake on Kant’s part. He
says of the Transcendental Deduction:
[I]t is also an essay in the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology […] The theory
of synthesis, like any essay in transcendental psychology, is exposed to the ad hominem
objection that we can claim no empirical knowledge of its truth; for this would be to claim
empirical knowledge of the occurrence of that which is held to be the antecedent condition
of empirical knowledge.202
Whatever stance we might in the end take towards transcendental psychology as such,
Strawson’s objection to it here does not seem particularly well-founded. Claiming
empirical knowledge of the occurrence of what is an antecedent condition of knowledge
is no different from claiming empirical knowledge of whatever is deemed to be a
necessary condition of something whose existence is empirically known. For instance:
surely an antecedent and necessary condition of empirical knowledge is the possession of
some form of cognitive mechanism (i.e. a brain in the human case, and there may be no
other cases), so from the empirical fact that some epistemic agent has some empirical
knowledge, we can draw the conclusion that an agent has some form of cognitive
mechanism, i.e. a brain. So the occurrence or existence of that which is held to be an
antecedent condition of empirical knowledge is indeed empirically knowable. What is
arguably not empirical is the premise that possession of a brain is a condition for
empirical knowledge, but that was not the target for Strawson’s objection.
There are other grave problems with the notion of synthesis though, some of which
do indeed render understandable Strawson’s “hope of by-passing the doctrine of
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synthesis altogether”.203 One of the problems with psychological notions is that they will
tend to describe solely subjective states, from which one cannot automatically draw any
conclusions with objective validity. In essence, from a claim that such and such a mental
process is taking place, one can draw no conclusion as to how things are in the world, or
at least not without further argument. Frege was acutely aware of this, and in his
Foundations of Arithmetic he expressed the methodological admonition “always to
separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the
objective…”.204 Strawson’s categorical dismissal of any reliance on psychological
notions is very likely influenced by this principle from Frege.
At the other end of the scale we find Patricia Kitcher, who, in eloquent defiance of
Strawson, names her book after the Transcendental Psychology that Strawson termed
“an imaginary subject” and thinks that what can be found of transcendental psychology
is not only historically important, but that in neglecting it “scholars lose the opportunity
to contribute to current debates in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science”.205
One challenge that faces Kitcher or anyone else who wants to defend the value of
transcendental psychology is to define it – to show how transcendental psychology
(which is a term Kant never uses) is distinguished from empirical psychology on the one
hand and from what Kant refers to as ‘rational’ psychology on the other.
Empirical psychology is roughly what we mean by ‘psychology’ in today’s terms
and falls within the domain of cognitive science. ‘Transcendental’ is supposed to denote
what has to do with “our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a
priori”206 so that would exclude empirical psychology by definition, as anything
empirical is by definition a posteriori.
On the other hand, Kant claims of rational psychology (which is a priori), that its
“sole text” is “I think”207 and its most important feature is its paucity of valid
conclusions. Since Kant argues forcefully for the need to curb the pretensions of rational
psychology, it had better not turn out that transcendental psychology just is rational
psychology under another name.
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However, it would seem that there is a reasonably straightforward way to define
transcendental psychology. Presumably empirical psychology tells us about mental or
cognitive processes, the knowledge of which is established by normal inductive reasoning
based on available evidence of human behaviour. This proceeds largely by inference to
best explanation: “If we possess psychological faculty A, we would be able to have
cognitive ability B. We have cognitive ability B, therefore the hypothesis that we possess
psychological faculty A is supported.” This is basically to claim that psychological
faculty A is sufficient, given certain background assumptions, for the possession of
cognitive ability B. The inference will have something like the following form:
B if A,
B,
Therefore A is supported
Note that this is not strictly logically valid, so there is no demonstration or proof of the
reality of psychological faculty A. The inferences here are straightforwardly empirical.
Now, if we suppose in contrast to this that it is possible to establish that some
psychological faculty or process is necessary for the very possibility of empirical
knowledge, then the actuality of these processes would be presupposed by the existence
of any empirical knowledge at all; hence their existence could be logically deduced from
the (admittedly empirical) premise that we have some empirical knowledge. Thus, such
arguments would claim some form of necessity, and the reasoning required to establish
those claims would seem to fall precisely within the field of what could then
appropriately be termed “transcendental psychology”.
Say we wanted to give a transcendental psychological argument that some mental
process P is necessary for empirical knowledge (K). The transcendental psychological
argument would then be of the following form:
K only if P,
K,
Therefore P
Now, this is clearly a valid form of argument, and if transcendental psychology were able
to establish premises of the form ‘K only if P’, then this would be a promising line of
investigation. So at least the concept of a transcendental psychology seems to make
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sense. But unfortunately, establishing premises of this form is by no means
unproblematic. The problem is that in order to be able to argue that some mental or
cognitive process is necessary for some empirical knowledge, i.e. to argue that K only if
P, then the characterisation of P is likely to have to be quite non-specific; i.e. of the order
of claiming rather trivially that some mental activity is necessary for possession of
empirical knowledge. Conversely if P is given a highly specific characterisation, then it is
feasible to argue that if this mental or cognitive process takes place, then some empirical
knowledge is possible, but the truth of that does not entail that only if this mental or
cognitive process takes place is that empirical knowledge possible. One could of course
nevertheless argue for the actuality of the mental process P by inference to best
explanation or by ordinary inductive grounds, but that would again amount to doing
empirical psychology. Transcendental psychology would then be in danger of either
being vacuous or at least to have too little content, or else to collapse into empirical
psychology.
We shall see that Kant’s reliance on claims about synthesis, which can plausibly be
cast as transcendental psychological arguments, is caught in this dilemma in that his
doctrine of synthesis is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing the premises he
ultimately needs.
Empirical Transcendental Psychology
Though the dilemma presented in the last section does indeed present a serious challenge
to Kant, it would be unfair to Kitcher not to acknowledge that her re-interpretation of the
Kantian project offers a way out of the dilemma – albeit it one that comes at quite a
considerable price.
The problem was to find a conception of transcendental psychology that could have
a valid claim to being a priori hence in some sense necessary, while at the same time
having enough content to yield interesting conclusions. One way of resolving this is
cheerfully to embrace the collapse into empirical psychology:
– Of course, one might argue, our knowledge of transcendental psychology, our
knowledge of the various kinds of synthesis, is empirical – gleaned inductively from
observation of human behaviour – what else could it be? It is the content of the beliefs
resulting from these syntheses that is a priori, hence justifying the title of
“transcendental” to this branch of empirical psychology. Recall that ‘transcendental’
denotes what has to do with ‘our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be
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possible a priori.”208 So a transcendental thesis concerns a priori cognition of objects, but
need not therefore itself be a priori. Such an empirical transcendental psychology could
for instance conclude that our minds are so constituted that we always think of the world
in terms of the Categories. That is why all human experience conform to the categories
and eo ipso why the Categories are necessary throughout human experience. This makes
the necessity of the Categories (and of the Principles that are alleged to arise from their
application) a subjective necessity. It is a consequence of contingent facts about our
minds. Such a conception of empirical transcendental psychology could arguably be
seen as a continuation of Hume’s project.
If true, it would indeed constitute an explanation of why and how pure concepts are
actually applied in human experience. However, this view faces grave intrinsic problems,
and it is quite clear that this was not how Kant conceived of his answer to the Key to
Metaphysics.
The problem with this view is that rather than having provided a justification – an
explanation of the validity – of the rational application of pure concepts, it has given a
causal explanation of the imposition of pure concepts. If our use of pure concepts and
pure principles is correctly explained by reference to empirical transcendental
psychology, that means that we cannot but think of the world e.g. in terms of substances
and attributes and in terms of causal necessities. Empirical Transcendental Psychology
could in principle explain how pure concepts spring from necessary preconditions for
empirical knowledge, namely by arguing for instance that in order to apply the concepts
we do, we have to believe that the world consists of discrete and solid physical objects.
What is unavailable to Empirical Transcendental Psychology is the claim that these
preconditions are in some way constitutive. The necessity of these preconditions would
have to be regarded as psychological – it would be sufficient that we believed that the
world conformed to the categories.
If this is a psychological necessity we would think of the world in those terms, no
matter how the world might be. Since it is psychologically necessary for us to think of
the world in those terms, the beliefs arising from purely from those terms do not in any
sense “track” how the world actually is. Hence we cannot conclude from the subjective
necessity of these beliefs to any corresponding facts. This immediately gives rise to
sceptical worries: if my belief in causal laws, or indeed of mind-independent objects at all
is merely a result of my psychological constitution, then it would seem eminently possible
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that those beliefs might be false. Maybe I cannot help thinking of the world as consisting
of mind-independent objects, but I would think that, wouldn’t I, if that was the way my
mind worked, independently of any objective state of affairs. This illustrates the whiff of
paradox that emanates from any claims of empirical transcendental psychology: if I am
given reasons to believe that some belief I hold is but a result of a psychological
necessity, then that immediately gives me grounds to doubt that belief, since it follows
that I would hold the belief no matter what the world is like, so for all I know, the belief
might be false. One natural retreat then, is to become an anti-realist about the content of
such pure beliefs and say that this doubt is really empty, the question of facts corres-
ponding to these pure beliefs should never really arise. Since we cannot but think in
these terms, it makes no sense to question their correctness. These beliefs have subjective
necessity and that ought to be the end of the debate.
But this is clearly a deeply unsatisfying position. Though it may be psychologically
impossible e.g. really to disbelieve in the existence of the external world, surely that
hasn’t stopped people from worrying about the justification of that belief, as is amply
evidenced by the history of philosophy. It may be impossible to disbelieve, but it is
certainly possible to doubt.
It might of course turn out that we can in the end give no rational justification for the
validity of the pure concepts. If that were to be the case, then we should have to settle
with the causal explanation of their imposition on experience, but since this would be so
clearly unsatisfying, we should at least investigate whether there are any more attractive
alternatives; and this is precisely what I think that Kant’s Critique shows us.209
Now, Kant’s doctrine of “Transcendental Idealism” and his claims about the invalidity
of inferring from truths about appearances to claims about “things in themselves”,
sounds very much like an anti-realist response to the problems of psychological
necessity, so it is not difficult to see the attractions of such a reading of the Kantian
project. It should, however, be resisted. In summing up the results of the Transcendental
Deduction Kant contrasts the view he has just presented with any attempt at explaining
the Categories as “subjective predispositions for thinking,
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implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would
agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs.210
And he notes the sceptical worries attaching to such a view:
[I]n such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to the concept.
For e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a
presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity,
arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain empirical representations according to
such a rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the cause
in the object (i.e. necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this
representation otherwise than as so connected, which is precisely what the skeptic wishes
most, for then all our insight through the supposed objective validity of our judgments is
nothing but sheer illusion…211
We are clearly justified in not treating empirical transcendental psychology as a correct
interpretation of Kant’s project, and only if we fail to meet Kant’s aims of validating the
pure concepts should we fall back on such an interpretation.
Synthesis as transcendental justification
Paul Guyer presents a third alternative in stances towards the notion of pure synthesis in
claiming that it should really be taken as some kind of metaphor: The various functions
of synthesis should not be seen as stages of a temporal process but rather as the relations
between premises and conclusion in a kind of possible argument whereby claims to
knowledge could be justified.
What Kant’s argument requires, indeed what the use of his own distinction between
syntheses of apprehension and recognition should allow us to see, is not the
transmutation of a nontemporal manifold into a temporal one by a mysterious act of a
transcendental self, but just the transmutation of mere beliefs into claims to knowledge.
The interpretation of our present manifold must therefore not be thought of as a
psychological event in which a sense of its succession is first generated, but as something
more akin to the kind of argument – that, of course, will often remain unstated – by which
our judgments about the temporal order of even subjective states of affairs, even mere
representations, can be confirmed.212
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My own view is that Kant’s appeals to synthesis are largely redundant in his arguments.
What is needed as premises for some vital arguments are claims to formal aspects of
experience that is supposed to be the result of various syntheses, but not only is the
appeal to synthesis insufficient to establish the formal claims, it is also unnecessary.
But this is anticipating the discussion – we should first examine how the notion of
synthesis figures in the Transcendental Deduction. And to do that, we need to
recapitulate what the Transcendental Deduction ought to establish: We have seen that we
employ a number of pure Concepts like ‘self’, ‘substance’ and ‘causality’ whose
representance cannot be explained on the same model as that of empirical concepts.
These are the Categories as analytically defined. Further we have shown that we can form
concepts of objects qua subjects of judgements of specific forms. These are the
Categories as synthetically defined. Clearly, all objects that are subjects of empirical
judgements are subject also to the Categories as synthetically defined. So the Categories
as synthetically defined necessarily apply to all objects of empirical judgements. If it be
possible to show that the Categories as synthetically defined are identical to the
Categories as analytically defined, then it is shown that the Categories necessarily apply
to all objects of empirical judgements. But that is not yet sufficient: We cognise objects
also through mere intuition, which is defined as one species of objective representations.
So, the Transcendental Deduction needs to give an outline of how to establish first that
also objects qua objects of mere intuitions are subject to the Categories as synthetically
defined, second that the Categories as synthetically defined are identical to the Categories
as analytically defined. This would constitute an answer to the problem of the
representance of the originally listed pure concepts. Of these two the first claim is given a
relatively full treatment, and is supposed to be argued for conclusively in the
Transcendental Deduction itself, whereas the second claim is explicitly only given a
preparatory treatment. And the notion of synthesis is drawn upon chiefly to establish the
first claim: that the Categories as synthetically defined also apply to intuitions.
Though the structure of the argument is markedly different in the two versions of the
Transcendental Deduction, and the notion of synthesis is more predominant in the
1st edition version; its logical role is largely the same in the two versions.
In the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction Kant refers to “a threefold
synthesis,”
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which is necessarily found in all cognition: that, namely, of the apprehension of the
representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them
in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept.213
Kant argues that synthesis is required for three different epistemic phenomena, namely
intuition, imagination and subsumption of representations under concepts. The syntheses
needed for these three phenomena are termed synthesis of apprehension, reproduction
and recognition respectively. A plausible way to read this is as a claim that some kind of
mental information processing must take place for each of these phenomena to be
possible.
It is not too difficult to make a case for Kant’s claims with respect to intuition and
subsumption but the case of imagination is less straightforward.
That some form of information processing must take place for intuition – perception
– to occur, seems straightforward enough: The mere fact that inputs from different
sensory modalities all go into making our perceptual representation of one particular
object indicates that some form of processing; some form of bringing together different
sensory states is necessarily happening when we perceive something as an object. When
perceiving e.g. a galloping horse, my representation of it includes both the sight of it, the
sound of its hooves on the ground and quite plausibly its smell; and if I touch it, the
tactile sensations of a rough, hairy hide also go into my complete perceptual
representations of the horse; they are all taken as belonging together in the
representation of that object.
As for subsumption, Kant seems further to be claiming that in any application of a
concept to material given in sensibility – any cognition – there is always an implicit
possible or actual re-cognition. With the cognition of something as being of a certain
kind there is always the possibility of cognising the “same again”. If things were never
recognisably similar, if we could never be aware of either having encountered that kind
of thing before or the possibility of encountering that kind of thing again, the very
notion of generality, the very notion of a concept becomes meaningless.
Kant illustrates this in the context of counting
If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively
added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude
through this successive addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize
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the number; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the
synthesis.
The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark. For it is this one
consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also
reproduced, into one representation.214
But though especially true in counting, where the awareness of just having applied the
previous member of the series of instances of the concept of ‘number’ is essential, it
would seem equally that any use of a concept implies the possibility of “same again”-
cognition, i.e. recognition, and this seems strongly to suggest that in applying any
concept, some sort of calibration against stored information derived from previous
applications (or at least storing of information for use in future applications) is going on.
Much is murky in Kant’s arguments in the 1st edition Deduction, but he seems at least to
be driving at points similar to those adduced here. For instance, in a rather cryptic
passage about “the transcendental unity of apperception” he implies that “the synthesis
of all appearances in accordance with concepts” is a synthesis “in accordance with rules
that … make them necessarily reproducible”.215
But reproduction is supposed to be the kind of synthesis necessary for imagination,
not for subsumption. Furthermore, the kind of examples Kant gives to make the case for
the synthesis of reproduction in imagination seem to point equally to the need for
recognition in subsumption:
If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being were now
changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the longest day the land were now
covered with fruits, now with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never
even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation
of the color red; or if a certain word were attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one
and the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the governance of
a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no
empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place.216
If there were no unchanging sensible property by which we could recognise a kind of
thing as being subsumable under the general concept of that kind of thing, then the very
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possibility of applying that concept would be absent. So, recognition is necessary for the
very possibility of applying concepts in the first place.
But, as mentioned this quotation is taken from Kant’s discussion of the synthesis of
apprehension in imagination, not of the synthesis of recognition in subsumption. So, it
would seem that the “threefold” synthesis is not quite as neatly trichotomised as one
might first think, but we shall see that Kant claims certain interdependencies and relations
between the three “folds” that can go some way to explain this. A more important worry
is that it is hard to see how any of this ties in with the Categories being defined as
concepts of objects considered as subjects of empirical judgements. We were told in the
Clue that the table of Categories correspond perfectly to the table of judgements, so we
should reasonably expect now in the deduction of the validity of the Categories to find
some mention of forms of judgement, but the 1st edition Deduction makes no mention of
forms of judgement at all. Instead the focus seems to be on synthesis.
To make sense of this, it would seem that we need to make explicit some direct link
between the terms of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction and our expectations
from the Clue; and it does seem that Kant at least implicitly gives the material for finding
such a link. Recall that synthesis was defined as “the action of putting different represen-
tations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one
cognition” (see p. 103). In the Clue, Kant claimed that judgements are “functions of
unity among our representations”217 and that “[b]y a function […] I understand the
unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one”.218 Now,
“putting different representations together and comprehending their manifoldness in
one cognition” can be little else than the “unity of ordering different representations
under a common one”, which then entails that judging just is a case of synthesis, or
perhaps better: synthesising. Further, since “understanding can make no other use of
[…] concepts than that of judging by means of them”,219 it would seem that the
“synthesis of recognition in the concept” just is another characterisation of judgement.
The forms of empirical judgements must be just the ways in which this synthesis can be
performed. By insisting on the need for a synthesis of recognition to enable
subsumption, Kant is doing little more than reiterating the need for a combining of
concepts in order to make judgements, and that there are just so many ways concepts can
be combined in judgements – judgements have determinate structure, they are analysable
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in terms of certain formal notions; and this he can now claim is due to their being the
results of certain kinds of syntheses.
Presumably, Kant’s motivation for bringing in the notion of synthesis is so that he
can link the formal aspects of judgements (now under the title of recognition in the
concept) with the formal aspects of intuitions, thus to show that categories apply also to
objects of mere intuition. If the conformity of empirical judgements to categories is due
to the judgements’ being the result of synthesis, and synthesis is also necessary for
intuitions, then we begin to see a link between the formal aspects of judgements and the
formal aspects of intuitions. And the way this link is supposed to be established seems to
be by way of appeal to the mysterious synthesis of imagination.
The tacit premise underlying the claims in the 1st edition Transcendental Deduction
seems to be that it is one and the same synthesis that is in operation in all three cases of
intuition, imagination and subsumption, and that the functions of this synthesis conforms
exactly to the Categories. As we shall see, the problem with this argument is that it rests
on a subtle equivocation in the idea of the same synthesis which renders the argument
either invalid or unsound. I take it that sameness of synthesis can mean one of two
things: Either it means that it is the same faculty or mechanism that is responsible for the
combination of representations in all three cases (sameness of faculty), or else it means
that representations are combined in the same ways in all three cases (sameness of
combinations). Kant’s claims about the “threefold synthesis” seem to be plausible only
if taken to imply sameness of faculty, but unfortunately, in order to yield the conclusions
about conforming to categories they must be taken to imply sameness of combinations.
The three kinds of synthesis are not as one might first assume co-ordinated
analysanda of synthesis in general. Rather the claim is that the syntheses both in
intuition and in subsumption depend essentially on the synthesis in imagination:
We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human soul, that
grounds all cognition a priori. By its means we bring into combination the manifold of
intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity of apperception on the
other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be
connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination…220
The basic idea must be that we have one faculty of synthesis. In general, this can be
referred to as “pure imagination, … a fundamental faculty of the human soul”. When
this pure imagination is applied in sensibility to the manifold of intuition it is called
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“synthesis of apprehension” and when it is applied to concepts in subsumption it is
called “synthesis of recognition”.
Now, we have just seen that there are reasons why we should assume that the synthesis
in subsumption is governed by the Categories, and Kant needs to show that this is the
case also for the synthesis in intuition. One strategy would be to show that the pure
imagination as such is governed by the Categories. If this could be shown, then it would
indeed follow that intuitions conform to the Categories, as the synthesis in intuition just is
pure imagination applied in intuition. Kant does indeed claim that the synthesis in
imagination is governed by the Categories:
The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagi-
nation is the understanding,  and this very same unity, in relation to the transcen-
dental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding. In the under-
standing there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the
pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These, however,
are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding…221
But no arguments are given for why the “rules” for the synthesis of imagination should
be just the categories. Why should imagination be bound by forms of empirical
judgements? Allison takes due notice of this problem:
The second and perhaps most problematic aspect of Kant’s doctrine is the claim that the
imaginative synthesis is governed by the categories. Why, after all, should the
imaginative activity have anything to do with the logical functions of judgment? I take
this to be the most fundamental question raised by Kant’s analysis. Only by establishing
such a connection can Kant demonstrate the connection between the categories and human
sensibility that is needed for the explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori
judgments. The issue is thus central to the whole program of the Critique. Unfortunately,
Kant seems to beg rather than to answer this question. Instead of providing an argument,
he simply claims dogmatically that the imaginative synthesis is an expression of the
spontaneity of thought, that it determines inner sense a priori in respect of its form, and
that this determination is in accord with the unity of apperception.222
That the categories are the rules for the synthesis of recognition in subsumption follows
analytically from the definition of categories as concepts of objects of empirical
judgements, but this does not yet entail that the synthesis of pure imagination must
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always and only proceed by just those rules. This then must be supposed to be
established via the claim that it is just the same synthesis that operates in all three cases.
But what is the argument for that? We have seen that there are good reasons to accept that
some synthesis must take place both in the case of intuition and in the case of
subsumption, and of course we can define the term ‘pure imagination’ as the capacity to
perform such syntheses in general. But our only grip on this “power” of synthesis is
through the quite reasonable claim that some combining, some information processing,
must take place both for intuition and subsumption. This processing could be always
done by the same faculty – the same processor, or different processors could used for
different kinds of combinations or else a new processor could be procured for each
instance of a need for processing; and in each of these cases would the need for
information processing be met. Only on a purely trivial reading of “synthesis” as a
capacity for synthesising are we justified in claiming that it is the same synthesis that
operates in all cases of intuition and subsumption. So the only tenable claim that can be
made to sameness of synthesis of intuition and subsumption is as a sameness of faculty,
and at that only on a purely vacuous reading of “faculty”. Furthermore, even if we were
to allow by some kind of inference to the best explanation and a principle of
methodological simplicity that it was the same mechanism – the same processor – that
performed the synthesis it would still not entail that the synthesis proceed by the same
formal rules (i.e. the Categories) both in the case of intuition and of subsumption, hence
that intuitions and judgements have the same formal structure. Consider a more mundane
analogue: from the fact that two kinds of things are e.g. made by hand, it does not follow
that they possess any structural similarity apart from the purely vacuous claim that they
are both hand-made. Similarly with intuitions and empirical judgements: while they are
both synthetic unities since they both require synthesis, that does not entail that the same
functions of synthesis – the same rules of combination – are applied in both cases. The
most that could be claimed is that in virtue of relying on synthesis – on some sort of
combination of elements – they must both have some kind of formal structure; they
cannot be un-analysable simples.
So the only tenable claim to sameness of synthesis of intuitions and subsumption
turns out not to be sufficient to establish that intuitions conform to the categories.
On the other hand, if it could be shown on other grounds that empirical judgements
and intuitions do indeed show structural identity, and that these structural features
correspond to the categories, then that would in itself be sufficient to show that categories
apply to intuitions but it would not entail that the same mechanism was responsible for
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the structural identity. Artefacts may have precisely the same form whether they are
assembled by hand or by a machine. So the appeal to sameness of synthesis is not
necessary for a sameness of formal structure of intuition and subsumption.
Thus, I think we have finally reached a justification for following Strawson in by-
passing the doctrine of synthesis in my reading of the Transcendental Deduction. Instead
we shall look for independent arguments to establish the structural identity of intuitions
and subsumption.
c) The argumentative structure of the Transcendental Deduction
The Transcendental Deduction is without doubt the most complex and difficult part of
the Critique, a fact that Kant himself seems to have been acutely aware of,223 and its
interpretation has generated endless commentary and debate, and continues to do so.
Sebastian Gardner divides the possible interpretations of the Transcendental Deduc-
tion along two main lines:
The dominant line of interpretation finds in the Deduction a progressive, anti-skeptical
argument, from the incontrovertible premise that we have experience or are self-conscious
to the strong conclusion that we have experience of an objective world. The minority view
is that the Deduction is concerned with the conditions of empirical knowledge, not those
of self-consciousness: its argument is regressive, and effective against empiricism but not
skepticism.224
According to this division, my own reading falls squarely in the minority camp. As I
have been arguing, Kant thinks there is no mystery to our use of ordinary empirical
concepts, and as for the existence of external objects, the target of most sceptics, he states
in the Prolegomena:
My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however,
constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt it 225
If sceptical doubts never entered Kant’s thoughts, it would be odd to find him devoting
the central part of the Critique to refuting sceptical arguments. The target of the
Deduction is to explain the use of pure concepts, and our legitimate use of empirical
concepts are properly in this context taken as a given.
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Strawson226 gives a clear example of reading anti-sceptical arguments into the Transcen-
dental Deduction. He wastes little time on Kant’s statements about the links between the
table of judgement and the table of categories and the role of the categories as concepts
of objects as subjects of judgements. Instead he focuses on some of Kant’s remarks
about conditions for unity of consciousness and draws conclusions from this to the
necessity of an experience of a world consisting of objects conforming to spatio-
temporal regularity and connectedness. One problem with this line of argument is that it
can at best show that we must have an experience as of a world of external objects etc.,
not that this experience is veridical.
Most commentators seem to want to salvage a particular line of argument from the stated
version of the Transcendental Deduction. The starting point is that human intuition is
sensible – then Kant’s claim that space and time are a priori forms of human intuition is
taken to entail or justify a claim that human experience is necessarily interpretable as
being of an essentially unitary spatio-temporal frame-work.
Few commentators seem to have taken seriously Kant’s claim in the Foundations that
the validity of the categories could be argued from an analysis of the forms of empirical
judgements. But that is what I intend to pursue in the following.
The two conclusions of the Deduction227
Kant presents his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding as a
proof of their objective validity, i.e. a justification of the claim that the Pure Concepts of
Understanding – the Categories – can be validly applied to all objects of experience.
Given this, one would expect the Deduction to end with a concluding passage saying in
effect: “Therefore the Categories validly apply to all objects of experience.” – or
something similar.
 But the Deduction as stated in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
presents a persistent puzzle with regards to these expectations: A prima facie concluding
remark, very similar to the one adduced above, occurs in §20:
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All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their
manifold can come together in one consciousness.228
And then one might expect Kant to end the Deduction, but in the next paragraph he
states that he has made only a “beginning of a deduction of the pure concepts of the
understanding.”229 and then goes on for another six paragraphs before he again seems to
reach a conclusion in §26:
…all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness,
i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under the
categories…230
Let us label these the First and Second Conclusion respectively. Now, the puzzle is: Why
does Kant produce these two very similar Conclusions and what is the relation between
them?
According to Henry Allison most interpretations have tried to read this division of the
second edition “in terms of a model borrowed from the First Edition Deduction… [as]
distinctions between an ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ deduction and between the proofs
‘from above’ and ‘from below’”231 Further, he claims, following an article by Dieter
Henrich,232 that these approaches cannot succeed, and that any successful interpretation
of the Deduction must make sense of these two distinct conclusions as two steps in a
single proof; if one fails to meet this challenge, one fails to make sense of the
argumentative structure actually employed by Kant.
While I accept the challenge that any successful interpretation of the Deduction must
make sense of the fact that Kant draws these two distinct Conclusions, I reject both the
traditional strategies and Allison’s/Henrich’s “two-steps-of-a-single-proof” suggestion.
It seems to me that the changed meaning of the term ‘deduction’ strongly conditions
contemporary readers into expecting a single argument with one neat conclusion, when
Kant is really trying to give the outline of a theory to explain the valid employment of
no less than twelve distinct categories subdivided into two divisions and four classes. This
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should at least alert us to the possibility that the “proof-structure” of the Deduction
might be considerably more complex than that of a single argument towards a single
conclusion.
The proper solution to the puzzle, however, requires us to look quite closely at what
Kant says about the table of the categories, what he says about the two relevant
paragraphs of the Deduction and at the precise technical meaning of some of his
terminology.
The first clue to solving the puzzle of the two conclusions is found in a paragraph added
in the second edition. After presenting the complete table of categories, Kant pauses to
make some comments about it in §11. Of interest to us in the present inquiry is his first
comment:
…this table, which contains four classes of concepts of the understanding, can first be
split into two divisions, the first of which is concerned with the objects of intuition (pure
as well as empirical), the second of which, however, is directed at the existence of these
objects (either in relation to each other or to the understanding).
I will call the first class the mathematical categories, the second the dynamical
ones.233
At first glance, it might seem hard to see the distinction between being “concerned with
the objects of intuition” as against “being directed to their existence”, but the key here
is the clause that Kant somewhat unfortunately places within brackets: The dynamical
categories are directed towards objects insofar as they are related  to each other or to the
understanding, whereas the mathematical categories are directed to objects insofar as they
are merely objects of intuition. With slight inaccuracy but considerable clarity, we could
say that the mathematical categories concern the mere intuition of objects, while the
dynamical categories concern the relations between intuitions. Note also that the category
of existence only occurs in the second division – the dynamical. Now, according to Kant,
the magnitude of existence is duration – i.e. persistence throughout some time.234 So,
when Kant talks about existence of objects in relation to each other, it seems that he
really has in mind their persistence. If we regard intuitions as momentary representations
– representations for which passage of time makes no difference to their content – it
seems only natural to hold that any cognition as of persistence of objects would have to
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be based on some combination of intuitions, and the dynamical categories just are
concepts of the logical functions of such combinings.
Now, compare this to Kant’s explanation in §26 of the difference between his two
conclusions:
…in the transcendental deduction [so far], [the categories’] possibility as a priori
cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited (§§ 20, 21). Now the
possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may come
before our senses,    not    as   far    as   the     form     of    their    intuition     but    rather      as    far     as    laws     of
their    combination    are    concerned   , […] is to be explained.235
So it seems that the first division of the deduction concerns the form of intuition of
objects, whereas the second division concerns the laws of combination of objects or of
our intuitions thereof. Recall that the Second Conclusion concerns “all appearances of
nature, as far as their combination is concerned”.
There is thus a strong parallel between the division of the Deduction and the
Divisions of the table of categories, and my proposal is that the first division of the
Deduction justifies the valid applicability of the first division of categories – the
mathematical, whereas the second division of the Deduction justifies the valid
applicability of the second division – the dynamical.236
This, however, immediately raises a number of interesting questions: Why do we need
a deduction of categories – pure concepts of understanding – to account for the form of
intuition of objects? Isn’t that supposed to have been accounted for in the
Transcendental Aesthetic, where forms of intuition are equated with forms of sensibility?
On the traditional reading of Kant, where the dichotomy between sensibility and
understanding is seen to coincide with the distinctions between intuitions and concepts,
this becomes incomprehensible. If, however, I am right in claiming that a concept is
always involved in any intuition, and given that on Kant’s view, by definition, concepts
are the work of the understanding, then we immediately see that the understanding is at
work also in procuring intuitions as it were; and hence the categories, as modi operandi
of the understanding, may have employment even prior to judgements. And, we shall see
that that is indeed what is claimed in the Transcendental Deduction
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The ground plan of the Transcendental Deduction
As if Kant’s exposition was not complicated enough, the first part of the Transcendental
Deduction of the Categories turns out not to be concerned with any of the categories at
all. This is because one of the Pure Concepts which I listed in section 3.3d) as being
among Kant’s long-standing points of interest, namely the concept of the self, is really
not to be found among the categories, but rather at an even higher point of abstraction as
being a condition for the making of any kind of judgement, not merely empirical ones.
So not only is the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Categories of Understanding
not really a deduction, it is not even solely concerned with the Categories. Nevertheless, it
is an outline of a theory to account for the empirical validity of the categories, or so I
shall claim.
The Transcendental Deduction consists of 13 numbered paragraphs: §§15–27
inclusively (the numbering starts with the Transcendental Aesthetic), which should
logically be divided into four distinct sections: three argumentative steps interspersed at
one point with a collection of comments and elaborations:
I §§15–18 concerns the identity of the self throughout experience,
II §§19–20 establishes the applicability of the mathematical categories to intuitions,
§§21–25 is a digression into a number of comments and elaborations
III §26 shows the applicability of the dynamical categories to objects of experience
“with regard to the laws of their combination”
and a final summing-up of the results is given in §27.
5.3 Intuitions and the mathematical categories (step II)
Step I of the Transcendental deduction is concerned chiefly with the concept of the self;
and Kant’s theory of self-consciousness, self-knowledge and the concept of the self,
though profoundly interesting, is not necessary for making the case concerning our
knowledge of causal facts, so we shall bypass that discussion here, save for the barest
mention of the main structure of the arguments in it. The main claim is that sensibility
delivers no more than unconnected, isolated impressions, which to yield knowledge must
be connected and combined, and that these combinations must be due to activities –
“syntheses” of the active mind. Now, as was argued in section 5.2b) any reliance on the
notion of synthesis is going to be neither necessary nor sufficient for the aim of showing
that all intuitions conform to categories. My aim is to present a reconstruction of the
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argument of the Transcendental Deduction, based on Kant’s claim that the validity of the
Categories could be shown to follow from an analysis of the form of empirical
judgements,237 so I am going to disregard the entire discussion about synthesis, and thus
most of step I. The only thing we need from this section, is a distinction Kant makes
between the subjective and objective “unity of self-consciousness” towards the end of
step I.
His point seems to be that we can and do become aware of a number of correlations
among our representations. It is for example true that often when I see the sun, I also feel
warmth on the skin of my face; and that whenever I smell diesel I think of the smell of
sea-water. The first case is of course due to the fact that the sun is causally responsible
both for my seeing it and for heating the skin on my face. The second case is due to my
spending many childhood summer holidays aboard a diesel-powered fishing boat. The
first correlation is clearly objective, and due to circumstances that are true independent
of my being aware of them, which I could express by saying, for instance
(7) The sun is hot
The second correlation is due to purely subjective associations that I make, but that
nobody else would be supposed to make. The latter correlation should therefore
properly incline me to express
(8) The smell of diesel makes me think of the sea
rather than
(9) *The diesel smells of sea-water
Even if I associate diesel and sea-water, there is no reason why others should do so. In
Kant’s words:
One person combines the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with
something else; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, with
regard to what is given, necessarily or universally valid.238
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The point here is just to point out that we do distinguish between objectively valid and
merely subjective correlations between representations. How, or by what warrant is not
yet discussed. This point will become important in the passages to follow.
In §19 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant has concluded his discussion about self-
consciousness and turns his attention to “the logical form of judgments”. This has
strong resonances with the table of judgements and the “logical functions of
understanding”, so we might reasonably expect to see Kant redeem some of the
promissory notes made in the Clue, and these expectations are not left wholly unfulfilled.
a) The objectivity of judgements – §19
The conclusion to be arrived at in §19 is also the title of the paragraph:
§19 – The logical form of all judgments consist in the objective unity of the apperception
of the concepts contained therein239
‘Apperception’ is Kant’s term for self-consciousness, so the claim of §19 is in essence
that the logical form of a judgement consists in the objective validity of the combination
of concepts used in that judgement, but we should look into this in some more detail.
Kant starts out §19 with a criticism of the received definition of judgement given by
logicians of his day: “[A judgement] is, they say, the representation of a relation between
two concepts.” But this has the defect that “it is not here determined wherein this
relation consists.”240 We shall not waste too much time on what might be the case with
“logicians” – as logic has progressed so significantly since Kant lived – but we should
look at what Kant is presenting as the preferable alternative. He points out that we
distinguish between subjective associations of ideas and purportedly objective
judgements. If we did not, there should be no principled difference between (8) and (9),
but there clearly is such a difference, so we do make such distinctions. When we form a
simple judgement, we intend precisely that the relation between the subject concept and
the predicate concept have more than mere subjective reality – the essential form of a
judgement is precisely to make a claim to objective validity .241 This judgmental relation,
Kant says, is
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… a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the
relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity,
e.g., in accordance with laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say
“If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,” but no t “It, the body, is heavy,” which
would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless
of any difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in
perception…242
To judge is precisely to assert a relation that obtains independently of any state of the
judging subject – that is the logical form of judgement in general. Basically §19 is an
analytic argument, it reminds us that we distinguish between mere subjective associations
of ideas and correlations that purport to be objectively valid, and that the latter just are
judgements.
b) Categorisation of Intuitions – §20
The next paragraph is the most crucial one of the entire Transcendental Deduction, and
yet, characteristically and infuriatingly, it is the briefest one. In a mere five sentences, the
vital first connection between categories and possible cognition is supposed to be
established. This is, of course, precisely the first part of the solution to the Key to
Metaphysics.
As before, Kant starts out with stating the conclusion to be reached, in the title of the
paragraph:
§20 – All sensible intuitions243 stand under the categories, as conditions under which
alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness244
This claim rests heavily on Kant’s discussion about synthesis in Step I, but I intend to
show that the claim can be established from far less contentious premises.
Let us examine closely the claim made in §20. The categories are said to be
necessary conditions for the possibility of the manifold of sensible intuitions coming
together in one consciousness. This is why all sensible intuitions stand under the
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categories, and by the same token why all objects of sensible intuitions stand under the
categories.
 Now first, what is the “manifold of sensible intuitions”? This is explained in §17 of
Step I, to which Kant refers in his justification of the claim:
[Cognitions] consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object. An
object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is
united.245
The manifold of an intuition is united in the concept of an object, and a cognition
consists in the determinate relation of a given representation to an object. So, the
manifold of an intuition must be that which is represented by an intuition as falling
under the concept of an object – it is whatever part of reality that is being represented as
the object of an intuition. An object in general is precisely whatever can be represented
as a particular instance of a sortal concept.246
So the claim of §20 is that categories are necessary conditions for the representation
of anything as an object of intuition.
Now, why should that be? Categories are supposed to be concepts of objects being
subjects of judgements of various forms, why should they also be conditions of
representing something as objects of intuition?
Kant gives the following reason for this:
That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given
representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception
in general, is the logical function of judgments (§19). Therefore all manifold, insofar as it
is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical
functions for judgment… 247
Here he is doing little more than just asserting that the forms of judgement are also
forms of intuition. But again, we may wonder – why? Why should the “action of the
understanding” needed to become aware of an object of intuition be identified with the
logical function of judgement. Clearly, this premise needs to be argued for.
This is precisely the point where we will see the benefits, and thus reflectively the
justification of the dual-faculty view of intuitions, as this will provide the necessary
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arguments for showing that (some) forms of judgement are also necessarily forms of
intuitions.
On the simple view of intuitions, this claim is in grave danger of seeming under-
motivated or even completely unjustified. If intuitions are supposed to be the
undifferentiated material of sensibility, given prior to and independent of any conceptual
subsumption, it is hard to see why Kant should claim that all the material of an intuition
is determined by some logical function for judgement. It would of course be possible to
read this as a claim that intuitions, insofar as they are to become representations of
objects by being subjected to judgements, will then be determined by some logical
function for judgement. But that does not sit happily with the claim Kant actually makes
in the passage quoted above. Prima facie it seems quite clear that it is already in virtue of
being intuited that “the manifold” is determined by some logical function for
judgement. Otherwise one should expect Kant to say something like ‘all manifold
insofar as it constitutes the subject of a possible judgement, is determined in regard to
one of the logical functions for judgement’, but he doesn’t.
Better, therefore to look for reasons why intuitions per se should be subjects to
logical functions for judgement. Kant’s first argument for this, is to point out that
intuitions have objective purport, though his actual statement of this needs some
unpacking:
That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given
representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception
in general, is the logical function of judgements (§ 19).248
By definition, intuitions, as one kind of cognition, refer to objects. This entails that in the
case of intuitions we can make much the same distinction between objective and
subjective validity that we could in the case of judgements. Suppose I intuit a white horse,
and that I report this by uttering “Wow, a white horse!” or perhaps “There’s a white
horse.”249 Now, clearly I want to convey something more than the simultaneous presence
in my consciousness of different impressions of equinity (say a visual impression of a
largish four-legged figure, a certain equine smell and so on). Clearly my utterance
implies an assertion of the presence of an actual horse – a mind-independent object. And
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this is of course not tied in with my reporting or expressing the intuition, but holds
equally in the case of my merely mutely intuiting the beast – we could not say that I
intuited a horse if there were no horse there for me to intuit.250 We clearly distinguish
between the mere co-presence of a set of impressions in consciousness and the successful
intuition of objects as different notions (though it may still be a moot question how we
are able to do it). If these were not two distinct notions, how could Macbeth even raise his
famous question: “Is this a dagger which I see before me?”251
But this invoking of objective – subject-independent – states of affairs just is the
logical form of judgement in general as expounded in the previous paragraph of the
Transcendental Deduction. The objective purport is a necessary criterion of a judgement,
as argued in the previous section, otherwise we would not distinguish between subjective
associations and objective judgements. And intuitions too meet this necessary criterion of
judgements (though they fail to meet other criteria). Recall further that it is a necessary
condition for a basic empirical judgement that its subject be an object of intuition252 and
that an intuition must have at least the same structural complexity as the subject clause of
a basic empirical judgement. If therefore there are forms of judgement – logical
functions of the understanding in judgement – that necessarily apply to the subject
clause of a judgement regarded in abstraction from the rest of the judgement, then there
would be forms of judgements that would apply also to mere intuitions. And as we shall
see in the next section, there are such forms of judgement which apply directly to the
subject clause, namely the forms of Quantity and Quality. And from this, Kant’s
conclusion really follows, namely that all objects of intuition stand under (at least some)
categories, namely those of Quantity and Quality.
It is worth examining this in some detail, and not merely in the abstract as above.
c) Quantity of intuitions
Any subject clause in an empirical judgement, and correspondingly any expression of a
simple intuition must contain a determiner and a sortal concept. The determiner is
needed to specify which particular instance or instances of the sortal concept the intuition
is of, out of a potential multitude. Whatever I intuit, I must either intuit it as one
“something” or as several “somethings”. Take equine intuitions – either it is of one
horse or of several – tertium non datur. Note that the significance of determiner and
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sortal concept is tightly connected: only with reference to subsumption under the specific
sortal concept of the intuition does the quantitative determination make sense – only in
relation to a sortal concept does it make sense to ask whether something be a unity or a
plurality. Is the pack of cards essentially one or many? – The only sensible answer is to
say: One or many what? – it is one pack and many cards. A corollary of this is that in
abstraction from the sortal concept by which we intuit any given part of reality it makes
no sense to enquire into its quantity – it is neither a unity or a plurality in itself, but
merely in relation to the sortal concept through which we cognise it. Only as they appear
conceptualised in judgements are objects subject to the categories of quantity.
Now, I have just claimed that every intuition will be subject to one of two quantitative
forms of judgement: unity or plurality, but Kant claims that there are three moments
under the heading of quantitative forms of judgement, and these two claims do not seem
to add up. The anomaly is, however, only apparent. We should note first one of Kant’s
“nice observations” about the structure of the table of categories from §11
…each class always has the same number of categories, namely three, which calls for
reflection, since otherwise all a priori division by means of concepts must be a
dichotomy. But here the third category always arises    from   the     combination    of    the     first    two
in    its    class.
Thus allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as unity…253
The fact that some intuitions conform to the third moment is no exception to the fact that
all intuitions fall under one of the first two, since the third moment amounts to a
combination of the first two. I take it that examples of such totalities would be a bunch
of flowers regarded as a single bunch though consisting of a plurality of flowers, or a
pack of cards regarded as a single pack though consisting of a plurality of cards.254
In the Axioms of Intuition, Kant shows how the categories of unity and plurality give
rise to the notion of a unit and thus to counting and notions of magnitude and quantities,
thus linking these categories with mathematics and establishing why these categories are
termed mathematical, but again, that is a discussion which I shall not enter into here.
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d) Quality of intuitions
Kant does not discuss this, but it seems to me that as well as being subject to categories of
quantity; in virtue of intuitions’ being conceptual, objects of mere intuition are also
subject to some qualitative category. The qualitative forms of judgements are affirmative,
negative and “infinite” judgements. For reasons that will shortly become apparent, I wish
to bracket the third moment for the time being, but we shall focus on affirmation and
negation. These, it seems, are relevant also to mere intuition, and so also to the analysis of
subject clauses in abstraction from the complete judgements containing them. By being
subsumed under a concept, an object is in essence having the property represented by
that concept affirmed of it. Simply by intuiting a horse, I am affirming equinity of that
object – namely the horse. Similarly it seems that in intuition I am able to negate a
property of an object. Say I am visiting a stud farm and have been told that they only
rear white horses, but as it turns out they have one black stallion. On seeing the black
stallion it seems perfectly possible that I might recognise it simply as a non-white horse –
thus immediately and intuitively negate the property of whiteness of that horse. Kant
terms the categories corresponding to affirmative and negative judgements reality and
negation respectively, but I think we shall get at least as close to understanding these
matters by using the terms presence and absence. By employing a concept affirmatively
in an intuition or a judgement, I am asserting the presence of that which the concept
represents, and conversely by employing a concept negatively, I am asserting the absence
of that which the concept represents.
Now, to the enigmatic third moment of quality. What could possibly be the
combination of affirmation and negation, of presence and absence? 255 Kant claims that
this is the “infinite judgement” corresponding to the category of “limitation”. These
terms seem particularly unhelpful, but the ideas underlying them are reasonably clear.
Again, the Logic, gives the clearest statement of what Kant is thinking of:
§ 22. Quality of Judgments: Affirmative, Negative, Infinite
As to quality, judgments are either affirmative, negative, or infinite. In the affirmative
judgement, the subject is thought under the sphere [i.e. extension] of the predicate; in the
negative it is posited outside the sphere of the latter; and in the infinite it is posited in the
sphere of a concept which lies outside the sphere of another.
The core idea seems to be the notion of concepts whose extensions lie outside each other
– i.e. mutually exclusive concepts, and the “infinite” judgement somehow asserts that
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the subject is subsumable under one such concept. But then Kant goes on to give
examples which seem to illustrate quite a different notion, namely the fact that some
judgements, while syntactically affirmative, might nevertheless involve a negation, either
by having negation explicitly included in the predicate, such as in
(10) The soul is immortal
Or in cases where the definition of a predicate simply is the negation of some other
predicate. We might for example take it that ‘fresh’ simply means ‘not decayed’, in
which case a judgement such as
(11) That apple is fresh
whilst from the point of view of formal logic is affirmative, should be regarded as
negative in epistemological and semantic contexts. But neither this notion of mutually
exclusive concepts, nor the examples of syntactically affirmative, but semantically
negative judgements seem to have much to do with infinity nor limitation.
I do not know what is behind this confusing tangle of ideas, but I think that the
valuable strand of thought is the one that can be gleaned from the definition in the Logic
that was quoted above. The phenomenon of mutually exclusive concepts is clearly one
that is not available to a purely syntactic logic, but which nevertheless is important in
epistemology. When I judge that an apple is green all over, I have ipso facto also judged
that it is not red all over. Nothing can simultaneously be both red and green all over,
because these concepts are mutually exclusive. This kind of judgement seems also to fit
what we were looking for, namely something that could be regarded as a combination of
affirmation and negation. By affirming greenness of an apple, by the same token I also
negate redness (and of course, blueness, yellowness and so on) of it. It would seem that a
better name for the form of judgement would be exclusive judgements, and the category
should properly be called exclusion. In summary then, I claim that we can make sense of
three qualitative forms of judgement – affirmative, negative and exclusive –
corresponding to three qualitative categories – presence, absence and exclusion.
(All the suggested modifications to the tables of judgements and categories are
summarised in appendix 11.1)
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e) The first turn of the Key to Metaphysics
I started this thesis with claiming that we stand in need of an explanation of the
representance of certain pure concepts that are employed in experience. At this stage we
have finally reached the first partial answer to this challenge, though one might be
excused for having lost sight of this in the twists and turns of the discussion thus far. So,
it would be useful to sum up the investigations so far.
We have noted that in the case of ordinary empirical concepts like ‘horse’, ‘table’
and ‘apple’ we can always demonstrate their validity by pointing out or procuring
positive and negative examples of instances of the concepts. (“This is a horse, that is not
a horse”). Given certain assumptions about a shared human nature, this method will also
often go a long way towards conveying the meaning of such concepts. This is what Kant
calls an empirical deduction.
But then we find that we have concepts whose validity cannot be demonstrated in this
way. Take the concepts of presence and absence. What could serve as a positive example
of presence? Well, everything; and as a negative example: nothing. And conversely for
absence. So, no amount of examples would serve to convey the meaning of ‘presence’
and ‘absence’, since all possible examples would be completely equivalent in terms of
presence and absence. No empirical deduction is available for these concepts, and if the
concepts of absence and presence are not to be given up as chimeras we need to find
some other account for their application to objects.
Then we have seen that we can find such an account by way of the specific forms of
empirical judgements that we make. ‘Presence’ is the concept of a property – any
property – being affirmed of an object256, and ‘absence’ is the concept of a property –
any property – being negated of an object. ‘Unity’ is the concept of an object being the
subject of a singular judgement, and so on. Since our access to objects is by intuitions
and judgements, and these pure concepts spring from the logical forms of intuitions and
judgements, we know that all objects of our experience – anything that can come to be
regarded as an object by us – must fall under these concepts. These concepts apply to
objects only mediately, by way of application to the formal aspects of our knowledge. So,
by a long and complex process of conceptual analysis, we bring out what was implicitly
contained in the concepts all along, and we also provide an explanation of how they are
necessarily valid throughout experience.
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f) The transition to dynamical categories
Having established the first part of his deduction, Kant now pauses for some comments.
Parts of these relate to remnants of his forms-of-sensibility model of pure intuition,
which I shall disregard here. Others are of more interest, but I shall postpone discussion
of them until we have investigated step III of the Deduction – the justification of the
dynamical categories. Before doing so, however, I shall pause briefly on Kant’s
comments on what has been achieved so far, and see why further considerations need be
brought in in order to proceed.
This brings us back to the question about the two conclusions of the Transcendental
Deduction. Paton, in his Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, and Walsh in Kant’s Criticism
of Metaphysics take similar lines in suggesteing that Kant is going from the general to the
specific: §20 is a conclusion about intuitions, defined solely as non-intellectual –
belonging to some form of sensibility, while the conclusion in §26 is drawn from the
added premise that the sensibility in question be the specifically human form of
sensibility, 257 intuiting “a world … of continuing objects set within a unitary spatio-
temporal system.”258. But the idea that we could even consider any form of intuition
other than human sensibility, seems to be contradicted by Kant’s claim in §17 that we
cannot form “the least concept of another possible understanding” – either based on
non-sensible intuition or one whose sensibility was not constrained by space or time.259
I aim to show that rather than reading the Transcendental Deduction as moving from the
general to the specific, reading it as moving from the mathematical categories to the
dynamical makes much more sense with regards to the actual text. Let us first look at
how Kant comments on the need to progress from the conclusion about categories and
intuitions. In §21, “Comment”, Kant sums up the discussion thus far, and signals that
there is still something left to be done before the deduction is completed:
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A manifold that is contained in an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to
the necessary unity of self-consciousness through the synthesis of the understanding,
and this takes place by means of the category.…In the above proposition, therefore, the
beginning of a deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding has been made…
 In the sequel (§ 26) … the aim of the deduction will  first be fully attained.260
And if we jump to §26 we find:
Now the possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may
come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition but rather as far as
the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as it were prescribing
the law [of combination] to nature and even making the latter possible, is to be explained.
For if the categories did not serve in this way, it would not become clear why everything
that may ever come before our senses must stand under the laws that arise a priori from the
understanding alone.261
As we know where we are supposed to be heading (the complete justification of the table
of categories), it is not difficult to explain why the deduction is necessarily incomplete at
this stage. So far we have considered only the forms of judgements that apply to the
subject clause in abstraction from the rest of its judgement. So, supposing there are forms
of judgement and corresponding categories that only make sense as applied to a full
judgement with a separable subject and predicate clause, there are still categories whose
validity needs to be explained.
Kant rightly thinks that there are indeed such forms of judgements which only makes
sense as regards what he terms the relational aspects of judgements. It is however less
clear that he is correct about precisely which aspects these are.
The simplicity of basic empirical judgements
The first of Kant’s relational forms of judgements is the categorical. This, he claims,
concerns the relation between the predicate and the subject in a judgement.262 Further the
categorical form of judgement is supposed to correspond to the category of substance
and attribute. There seems to be a reasonably simple idea behind this: The distinction
between subject concepts and predicate concepts in particular empirical judgements,
gives rise to the notions of substances as “bearers” of attributes. We get the pure idea of
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attributes that are shareable among objects from predicate concepts that can occur in
different judgements, and correspondingly the idea of substances that can have various
properties from subject concepts that can occur in different judgements.
There are, however, a number of problems with this view. The first problem is that the
substantiality of whatever is the subject of a judgement is cognisable as substance only
within the context of that individual judgement. We seem to get only the notion of
something that appears as subject within each individual judgement. Kant, however, is
committed to a notion of substance as something which can always only be considered as
subject, and never as predicate:
Through the category of substance …, if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is
determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject,
never as mere predicate…263
It is hard to see how this unconditional distinction could be derived from the distinctions
between the subject and predicate concepts in individual judgements. Indeed, in many
categorical judgements, the role of subject and predicate are reversible. For instance
(12) That apple is a tasty fruit
and
(13) That tasty fruit is an apple
have exactly the same truth conditions, namely that there be an object which is both an
apple and a tasty fruit saliently present to the cogniser. Of course, as we have seen, only
sortal concepts can occur as subject concepts in judgements, which means that qualitative
concepts are such that they can only ever be predicates. But what we were after was the
converse: what could only ever be a subject. And it is hard to see how the categorical
form of judgement could give us that.
A second problem is that the metaphysical principles that are supposed to follow
from the relational categories are supposed in turn to be essentially connected to
conditions of knowledge of temporal relations , but there are no obvious implications of
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temporality merely in virtue of a judgement being categorical. I will consider these
matters more closely in Chapter 7 – on the 1st Analogy of Experience.
A third problem is that the logical form of a simple categorical judgement seems to
be no different from the logical form of an intuition. Take the categorical judgement
(14) That horse is white
and compare this to an intuition that could be expressed as
(15) There’s a white horse!
The objective conditions for both the categorical judgement and the intuition are
precisely the same, namely that an object which is both white and a horse be saliently
present to the cogniser. It seems that nothing more is required for the making of a
categorical judgement over and above what is needed for an intuition, namely that the
concepts employed in the judgement be co-instantiated in the object. Making a
categorical judgement about an intuited object simply adds to the number of concepts
that an object needs to instantiate in order to make the judgement true; but even an
intuition can involve more than one concept, as in (15), so there are no principally
different conditions for making categorical judgements that do not also apply to mere
intuitions. The object must fall under all the concepts involved (and in the case of
intuitions, there may be only one), for the intuition or judgement to be true.
I shall not claim to prove  conclusively that no notion of substance as necessarily
subject could be derived from the categorical judgement, though I do think it is
impossible so to derive it. Instead, I shall attempt to show that there is a slightly different
set of premises from which the notion of substance can be validated: I shall claim that in
order to account fully for our actual empirical knowledge, we need to recognise a form
of judgmental relations that Kant fails to mention, and that these relations do indeed give
rise to a pure notion of substance.
It seems to me that in order to derive the results that Kant wants, we need to look at a
more complex form of judgement than the categorical one; namely judgements of
change, or what I term transformational judgements. My reasons for holding this view
will be treated in much greater detail in Chapter 7 – where it will also be shown that
assuming the existence of this form of judgement is necessary and sufficient to account
for the derivation of Kant’s notion of substance, his analysis of causation, the principle
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of the permanence of substance and the temporal character of the schemata. But first we
should deal with the final step of the Transcendental Deduction
5.4 Complex judgements and the dynamical categories (step III)
Given that intuitions and simple categorical judgements have principally the same
objective conditions; that the object or objects constituting the subject of the judgement
instantiate (all) the concepts; simple categorical judgements have no more logical
complexity than intuitions. When referring to intuitions in terms of their logical form, we
can assume that we are therefore referring also to simple categorical judgements as far as
their logical form goes. They all involve objective conditions that can in principle be
established by one single observation – they need not be taken to apply at more than one
single point in time. So when in the context of the Transcendental Deduction reference is
made to categories of intuitions, or to logical forms of intuitions264 we can safely assume
this to encompass also simple categorical judgements.
Now, though Kant is arguably wrong in holding that the categorical form gives rise to
any conditions over and above those deducible for mere intuitions, he is nevertheless
quite right in insisting that human empirical knowledge contains judgements that can
only be validated by reference to some kind of combination or relation of intuitions. An
obvious example are judgements involving the notion of causation. No object and no
event is a cause or effect regarded in isolation – only with respect to relations between
objects and their persistence and change throughout time does it make sense to talk of
causation. To get any grip on essentially relational notions, we clearly need some
principles for linking discrete intuitions, which is exactly where the dynamical forms of
judgements and their corresponding categories come in.
We have seen that the categories of quantity and quality have validity for all objects
of intuition since determination with respect to quantity and quality is a necessary
condition for being intuited. Now, if an essential part of experience relied on the
combination of intuitions, in what could reasonably be termed ‘complex judgements’
then there might be additional necessary conditions for the objective validity of so
combining intuitions in complex judgements, and these necessary conditions which
might give rise to additional categories. Such categories would not necessarily apply to
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all objects of intuitions, but they would apply to whatever could only be known through
complex judgements.
So a natural next step is to investigate whether we have knowledge that we could only
have by making complex judgements, and to see whether transcendental conclusions can
be drawn from these considerations. This is precisely what Kant does in the final third
step of the Transcendental Deduction.
This part of the TD centres on the notion of laws of combination (of intuitions). In
briefest outline Kant wants to show how transcendentally logical laws of combinations of
intuitions give rise to laws of combinations of the objects of intuition, and that these
again serve as conditions for the laws of nature.
“Thick” experience and “weighty” objects.
Before we go into the details of the argument in this section, we must prepare ourselves
for some potentially quite confusing aspects of Kant’s terminology. One is his use of the
term ‘perception’265 which is defined as “representation with consciousness” (see p. 38).
Another complication is his use of the term ‘experience’. Hitherto in the Critique, Kant
has been using ‘experience’ as equivalent to ‘empirical cognition’,266 which must
include also single, isolated empirical intuitions, but now he seems to introduce a
“thicker” notion of experience, namely as “cognition through connected conscious
representations”. Now, ‘cognition’ is ‘objective conscious representation’,267 so this
“thick” experience implies an objective, i.e. mind-independent, content to our mental
states as they are connected or “held together” in certain ways – so the single, isolated
intuitions would not qualify as thick experience.
Why is there such a shift in the notion of experience? Kant gives no reason nor
forewarning, but merely states suddenly in a sub-clause in §26 that “since experience is
cognitions through connected conscious representations…”.268 Whence this new addition
to the notion of experience? As Kant gives no reason, there is of course no way to tell,
but the most charitable and easiest explanation seems to be that Kant is simply building
up his notion of experience. The discussion of intuitions hitherto in the TD has taken us
part of the way towards giving an explanation of human experience – now we need to
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add more in order to progress further. It is instructive to pause briefly for a slightly
closer look at that which is lacking and that which needs to be added:
The model of intuition we have seen so far, can account for our experiencing several
sensations as being objectively combined, and thus for our experiencing several
properties as being combined in the object (of intuition). This gives us grounds for
saying that the horse really is white – equinity and whiteness really are combined in the
object. So, we have a theoretical account for our cognition of identifiable objects of
intuition – parts of the world really possessing sets of properties. But so far, we only have
grounds for regarding these objects as mere momentary collections of properties. We
lack resources for the development of a more “weighty” sense of objects – namely (a)
objects that persist through time, and so can be recognised by us as re-identifiable
objects, and (b) objects that are more than mere “bundles of properties”, but can be
seen as somehow underlying “bearers” of those properties. I shall attempt to show that
these two notions are mutually interdependent, so that conditions for one will ipso facto
be conditions for the other.
This more weighty sense of ‘objects’ seems to go hand in hand with the “thicker”
notion of experience, so that we can as it were distinguish between the weighty objects of
thick experience and the light objects of mere intuition. “Thick” experience clearly
goes beyond what has been treated so far in the Transcendental Deduction. Up until now
we have considered single intuitions in isolation, whereas now we want to focus on how
intuitions can and must be connected and combined in order to make possible this thick
kind of experience that we do have – which is to say that we seek to explain experience
in terms of the combination of its elements – the intuitions. Kant’s basic method is to
show that the ways that intuitions are connected to form thick experience correspond to a
division of the forms of judgements, that these forms of judgements again correspond to
a set of pure concepts, and that the experience of nature as a law-governed whole is made
possible by the application of a set of synthetic, pure principles.
b) The Arguments of Step III
Kant starts out by announcing the final aim of the TD: In §20 we established that “All
sensible intuitions stand under the [mathematical] categories”269 – now we want to show
that all the categories are validly applied throughout experience. In Kant’s words we
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want to effect a “Transcendental deduction of the universally possible use of the pure
concepts of the understanding in experience”.270
If the weighty notion of objects cannot be established on the basis of single, isolated
intuitions, it seems natural to investigate whether it can be derived from ways of
combining these, so as it were to seek groundings for the weighty notion of objects from
the relations  of single cognitions. Now, the relational class of judgements denotes just
this: ways in which cognitions are related in judgements. And only with these relational
judgements do we acquire thick experience, so the objects of “thick” experience are
precisely the weighty, persistent objects as opposed to the light objects of intuitions.
Note that the synthetic principles corresponding to the relational categories are called
Analogies of Experience and that §26 introduces a conception of experience as cognition
through connected (i.e. related) cognitions, and also (as we shall see) introduces the
notion of laws of combination of intuition. All this shows quite unambiguously, I think,
that this part of the Transcendental is concerned with a deduction of the second division
of categories – the dynamical, whereas the previous parts were concerned only with the
first division – the mathematical.
Categories and Objects of Experience
When it comes to weighty objects, all classes of categories will be validly applicable to
them, and the first point to be made is quite straightforward: Since experience consists of
cognition through connected conscious representations, it is natural to assume that the
representations to be connected themselves be singular cognitions, i.e. intuitions.271 Now,
since the objects of intuition are subject to the mathematical categories, and experience
consists of connected intuitions, then the objects of experience must necessarily also be
subject to the mathematical categories, as they are precisely the same objects as the
objects of intuitions, only now viewed in terms of their being connected in judgements.
Conditions for the elements combined in experience must be conditions also for the
eventual combination of those elements – conditioning is basically a transitive relation.
Kant’s convoluted and long-winded argument is difficult to work out and contains
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remnants of the forms-of-sensibility model, but this seems to me to be the essence of his
third sub-paragraph272 of §26. The clearest statement is found in the final sentence:
…all synthesis, through which even conscious representation itself becomes possible,
stands under the [mathematical] categories, and since experience is cognition through
connected conscious representations, the categories are conditions of the possibility of
experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience.273
Kant now goes on to giving an example of the synthesis involved in acquiring an
intuition of a house. This adds little to the earlier considerations, and can safely be
ignored at this stage.
Kant’s next example is significant though, but unfortunately it is so brief as to be
utterly incomprehensible on its own. At present, all we can glean from it is a pointer
towards the discussion of the Analogies and some very general clues and hints. The
important clue to note is that the correlations implied by relational judgments are tied to
time-relations, and Kant states that through the category of cause “I determine
everything that happens in terms of its relation in time as such”.274 So, it seems clear that
the relational judgements and categories are tied in some way to relations of time, and we
shall follow up on that lead later on.
But before we go on with this, we need to become a bit clearer about just what a “law
of combination” is; and this I believe is best done by way of example. Suppose that a
cognition of A is always and immediately followed in my experience by a cognition of
B. In that case, those two kinds of cognitions would always be correlated in my
experience, so they would be subject to the law of combination that a cognition of A is
always followed by a cognition of B. In essence, laws of combination state unbreakable
universal correlations. Now, showing the universality of correlations is considerably more
complex than showing the universal applicability of the mathematical categories to
objects of intuition, which was done in Step II. In the latter case, the categories are
constitutive: For instance, being a unity just is being regarded as the subject of a singular
judgement. However, no form of correlation can be constitutive of the existence of the
correlata. They must of necessity first exist in order to be correlated at all. The
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Analogies of Experience are the synthetic principles arising from the relational
categories, and Kant states of these Analogies:
…an analogy of experience will be only a rule whereby unity of experience is to arise from
conscious representations (not a rule saying how conscious representation as such, in the
form of empirical intuition, is to arise.) And such an analogy will hold, as principle of
objects (i.e. appearances), not constitutively but merely regulatively.275
So, what then does universality of correlations amount to, and how could claims to such
universality be justified? In what sense are the principles of experience regulative (as
opposed to constitutive)? And finally, what is the connection between such universal
correlations and the relational276 categories?
The full answer to these questions becomes available only on completion of the
Schematism and the Analogies of Experience, following the Transcendental Deduction.
The Transcendental Deduction itself can do no more than give a necessary preparation
and a sketch – an outline – of what is to come. We shall follow the same pattern here, and
the following chapters will be devoted to following the argument through the
Schematism and the Analogies. It seems to me that of the dynamical categories – the
relational and the modal ones respectively – it is the relational that are more interesting,
and it is here that Kant’s treatment is most illuminating and fruitful. Consequently the
ensuing discussion shall focus upon these relational categories, and their corresponding
synthetic principles.
Universality of correlations
First, we should realise what a universal correlation is not. Saying that a correlation is
universally valid is not claiming that any two randomly picked cognitions will somehow
conform to a law of combination. Rather, the claim is that if, say, A’s and B’s are
correlated, then whenever you have an A – whenever there is an instance of A-ness in
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An analogy of experience will therefore be only a rule in accordance with which unity of experience is to
arise from perceptions (not as perception itself, as empirical intuition in general), and as principle it will not
be valid of the objects (of the appearances) constitutively but merely regulatively.
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clearer, but having essentially the same meaning.
276 Similar questions could and should be asked also about the Modal judgements and categories, but the format of this
thesis does not provide scope for going into these considerations here.
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experience – you will also have a B – there will also be an instance of B-ness in
experience. C’s and D’s need of course not conform to the correlation of A’s and B’s.
 Causal  relations are perhaps the clearest example of such alleged correlations in
experience, and the notion of causal relations as such could be termed the “Causal
Principle”  and is basically the idea that every event has a cause. Supposing that the
Causal Principle is such a universal correlation, then it will be the case that whenever there
is (experience of) an event, there will also be a cause of that event and that it not be
possible that there be (an experience of) an event without there being a cause.
It is of course this last italicised modal claim that is of interest to Kant; supposing that
the Causal Principle really entails claims to necessity (and we shall see that in the
Analogies of Experience Kant provides arguments that it does), then it clearly purports to
go beyond experience and thus stand in need of a transcendental deduction. We need an
explanation of the possibility of correspondence between experience and our concept of
causal relations. Part of the Kantian paradigm is that if there is to be an explainable
correspondence between object and concept, then there are only two options: Either the
objects must condition the concepts or the concepts must somehow condition the objects.
…either experience makes these concepts possible, or these concepts make the experience
possible277
In the case of empirical concepts the first option obtains: The concepts are abstracted
from experience of the objects and are thus conditioned by the very objects they are
concepts of. But as repeatedly mentioned, this model is not applicable to the Pure
Concepts, precisely because they purport to go beyond experience. This is to say that we
must hold that there is more than a de facto correspondence between object and concept
(which is sufficient for the empirical concepts) – we claim a necessary correspondence
between object and concept. To ensure this, Kant claims, the concepts must somehow
condition the objects – “the categories [must] contain the grounds of the possibility of
all experience in general from the side of the understanding.”278
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But more about how  they make experience possible, and which principles of its
possibility they yield in their application to appearances, will be taught in the following
chapter on the transcendental use of the power of judgment.279
So we shall have to await the following chapter of the Critique, specifically the
Schematism and the Analogies of Experience for the complete explanation of how the
dynamical categories apply to experience, and only then will the task of the
Transcendental Deduction finally be achieved.
But before we get to that stage, we should, as Kant does, examine the objection that
the two possible explanations of the correspondence between objects and concepts
adduced above are not exhaustive.
If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, already named
ways, namely, that the categories were neither self-thought a priori first principles of
our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions for
thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their
use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of
preformation-system of pure reason)…280
To generalise this objection and make it independent of creationism or theological
considerations, we might suggest that the correspondence of concepts and objects is due
not to one conditioning the other, but to their both being conditioned by a common
ground. In modern terms, this type of explanation could be instantiated by claiming that
our employment of Pure Concepts is due to evolution. We have simply evolved to
employ certain concepts, because it has turned out to be beneficial to do so. Possessing
these concepts have survival value. The objects of experience are of course subject to the
laws of nature, and our cognitive faculties have evolved as a result of the same laws of
nature, so we have a correspondence because of a conditioning by a common ground,
namely: the laws of nature, such as they are.
The problem with this hypothesis is that while it can explain the utility of the Pure
Concepts, it cannot justify their objective validity. They might of course be valid, but for
evolution to favour beings possessing them, it is enough that their possession is useful for
survival and procreation. Evolution might for all we know favour beings who believe in a
happy ending of every life, say, but that does certainly not guarantee its truth. On the
evolutionary view, the correspondence between concept and object is down to luck or
                                                
279
 Ibid. (italics added)
280
 Ibid. (insertion following Pluhar)
The Key to Metaphysics 5.4 Complex judgements and the dynamical categories (step III)
– 149 –
coincidence, and on the creationist view it is down to divine providence. We may of
course hold, with Descartes, that God would not deceive us – but why not, if it be in the
interest of a greater good, say our eternal salvation? Maybe it is good, necessary even, for
finite beings such as ourselves to believe in causality and the rest, but that in reality sub
specie aeternitatis, there be no such things. If our possession of Pure Concepts be
explained by evolution or divine providence, the sceptical worries may always appear to
plague us.
I would not be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (i.e.,
necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation
otherwise than as so connected; which is precisely what the sceptic wishes most…281
So, if we want to pursue the “third way” it seems that we can do no better than
attributing a subjective necessity to the Pure Concepts – we cannot but employ them, but
their validity remains at best uncertain. But how can we rule this option out? Isn’t it
possible that this is in fact the true explanation of why these concepts are necessarily and
unavoidably employed: it is part of our nature to so employ them, and that is the end of
the matter? Correspondence with reality will be as it may.
Of course such an explanation cannot logically be ruled out, but remember that we
are engaged in giving a theory. We are inferring to the best explanation, and an
explanation that can account for not only our unavoidable use of these concepts but also
their objective validity which is undoubtedly part of what we believe, will clearly be a
better explanation than one which leaves the question of objective validity wide open.
This is just once again to note the problem with any empirically transcendental
psychological explanation of the pure concepts. (See pp. 110 ff.) So, provided we can
give an answer to the question of how the dynamical categories make “thick”
experience possible, that explanation seems to be the best one.
c) Summary of the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction
The aim of the TD was to give a justification – an explanation of the validity of the
Categories. This it has done in two steps:
First, it claimed that the mathematical Categories are concepts of objects considered
as objects of intuitions. Unity is the concept of a single object having some property
attributed to it, Plurality of several objects having some property attributed to then,
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Totality of a collection of objects of a single kind having some property attributed to
them; Presence is the concept of a concept being attributed to some object or objects,
Absence of a concept being negated. They are thus in a sense concepts of aspects of
intuition as such. Since we can only have experience of objects if they be objects of
possible intuition, the mathematical Categories validly apply to all objects of experience.
Second, it said that the only way to explain the validity of the dynamical categories
would be to show that these Categories condition the objects of experience with regard to
the laws of their combination, that “these concepts make the experience possible”,282 but
that the actual explanation of this form will not be given until “the following chapter on
the transcendental use of the power of judgement.”283 ‘The following chapter’ must
refer to ‘On the schematism of pure concepts of understanding’, but we shall see
presently that not until we reach the end of Section III.3, ‘Analogies of experience’, of
the subsequent chapter, ‘Systematic representation of all synthetic principles of pure
understanding’, do we have a full explanation.
The Transcendental Deduction thus leaves us with a task: to explain how the dynamical
Categories make “thick” experience possible.
To this task we now turn.
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C h a p t e r 6 – T e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n s a n d E x p e r i e n c e 
The Transcendental Deduction has left us the task of explaining the validity of the
dynamical Categories by showing that they somehow make experience possible.
Somehow the application of the dynamical Categories is related to necessary conditions
for experience through combinations of intuitions or basic empirical judgements. We
shall see that in the process of explaining this, we will also find the premises needed to
explain and justify our belief in certain pure, metaphysical principles. Of the full list of
dynamical Categories, it is ‘Substance/Attribute’ and ‘Cause/Effect’ that are the ones of
most interest to the present debate. The discussion of these two is also essentially inter-
woven and connected, so we shall in the following debate be focusing on the these two,
and the corresponding pure principles of the Persistence of Substance and the Principle
of Causality.
In order to effect the final validation of the dynamical categories, we have been left
with a number of related ideas. First, we have the general synthetic definition of a
category: a concept of an object considered as subject of forms of judgement. Secondly
that the dynamical forms of judgement and ipso facto the dynamical Categories relate to
judgments requiring combinations – relations – of separate intuitions or basic empirical
judgements. Thirdly I have hinted on several occasions that the sort of combinations, the
sort of judgements of relations that cannot be validated solely by considerations of
isolated intuitions or basic empirical judgements, are temporal relations. In the following
I shall try to bring together all of these ideas.
6.1 Time, Combination and Subsumption
In the sections immediately following the Transcendental Deduction, Kant makes the
explicit connection between the need to account for our justification of empirical
judgements based on combinations of intuitions or basic empirical judgements, i.e.
“thick” experience, and considerations about time or more precisely temporal relations.
In “On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding” (The
Schematism), Kant briefly recasts the original problem of how pure representations relate
to their objects in terms of the notion of subsumption.
In the introduction immediately preceding the Schematism Kant discusses the notions
of subsumption and of rules. The gist of it is that all rational application of concepts and
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judgements is basically “determining whether something stands under a given rule”.284
That is to say that there is a normative aspect to all application of concepts and all
judging. There is a possibility of error, and a culpability if an error is made. Both in
intuition and in judgement we determine whether some object really falls under a “rule”
– in intuition whether an object stands under a concept, in judgement whether the object
picked out by the subject clause also falls under the predicate concept. In the
Schematism Kant revisits the problem of the key to Metaphysics, this time in terms of the
subsumption of objects under representations. This is to point out that the relation
between representations and objects, be those representations pure or empirical, has a
normative aspect. By examining the phenomenon of subsumption in general, we can
again illuminate the representance of pure concepts, and now chiefly those of substance
and of cause-and-effect.
Kant starts out by describing subsumption in general
In all subsumption of an object under a concept the representations of the former must be
homogenous with the latter, i.e., the concept must contain that which is represented in
the object that is to be subsumed under it… 285
In the case of empirical concepts this does not present any problem. The empirical
concepts are generated by abstraction from the observation of ordinary empirical objects,
and these concepts contain characteristics that correspond to basic sensible properties of
objects.286 The empirical concepts have as their representational content abstractions
from what is contained in our sensible representations of the particular objects we
perceive.
But this model is not applicable to the Pure Concepts. Let us take the concept of a
cause  as an example: Though we naturally observe a multitude of phenomena that in fact
are causes of further phenomena, we never simply perceive them as such. There is no
sensible aspect of observable objects or events that mark them out as causes – indeed any
and every sensible phenomenon will typically be caused by previous phenomena and
itself in turn cause further phenomena, but we never intuit something simply as a cause,
hence
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how is … the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would
say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is
contained in the appearance?287
In other words, the category is heterogeneous to the instances to which it is supposed to
be applied, and we need some sort of explanation of how phenomena get to be subsumed
under the category.
Kant’s solution to this problem is to say that we need something to mediate between
the empirical object on the one hand and the Pure Concept on the other. Since the
concept and the object are completely heterogeneous, we need some mediating principle,
some medium, which has something in common both with the concept and the object.
And we find such a principle, Kant claims, in the notion of a transcendental schema, also
referred to as a transcendental time determination. This, he explains,
is homogenous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is
universal and rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other hand homogenous with the
appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the
manifold.288
So, it seems clear that a particular kind of temporal relation – “transcendental time
determinations” are going to be crucial for explaining how dynamical Categories are
applied to objects, and this again is supposed to be a necessary condition for having
“thick” temporal experience. But just what are these transcendental time
determinations?
a) “Transcendental time determinations”
First of all we should note that the term ‘transcendental’ is used to denote conditions of
the possibility of knowledge in general:
I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with
our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.289
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This of course fits in well with the task left us by the Transcendental Deduction: to
explain the validity of the (dynamical) Categories by way of showing them to be
conditions for the possibility of “thick” experience.
Next, we should examine carefully how Kant specifies the homogeneity of the
schemata with the objects of experience on the one hand and the Categories on the other.
The transcendental time determination is said to be homogenous with the category
insofar  as it is universal (and rests upon an a priori rule).290 This indicates that Kant
might not think that every transcendental time determination is by definition universal
and hence a priori, but that only if it is universal, then it is homogenous with a category.
So we shall have occasion later on, to look for time determinations that have precisely
such a universal character.
Likewise, it is not implied that every “empirical representation of the manifold”, i.e.
every cognition of an object necessarily “contains time”, but only that insofar as it
contains time –only if it contains time – then the schema is homogenous to it. Now, it is
not clear whether we would say of intuitions that they contain time, if they, as I have
argued, are essentially instantaneous (at least in the sense that their duration is irrelevant
with regard to their content); and the role of schemata in connection with the
mathematical Categories remains an interesting question in its own right, but one that we
shall not have occasion to go into here. For “thick” experience however, for which we
need precisely to combine single, instantaneous intuitions, there can be no doubt that
these contain time. If intuitions are instantaneous and individuated by the time of their
occurrence and if my  or any other subject’s intuitions are not distinguishable by spatial
determinations, then the combining of them into thick experience will have to take place
in time,291 and thus the resulting complex representation of two or more instantaneous
intuitions combined across time can appropriately be said to contain time. Consequently,
we shall see below that it is in connection with “thick” experience and the dynamical
categories that the notion of the transcendental time determination plays a vital role in
accomplishing the unfinished task of the Transcendental Deduction.
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b) Schemata and the mathematical Categories
Kant claims that schemata are necessary as mediators between empirical objects and all
of the Categories. However, if my reconstruction of the Transcendental Deduction is
correct, it seems to me that the application of the mathematical Categories is already
justified in the Transcendental Deduction itself, and that the notion of transcendental
schemata are really redundant with respect to this first division of the Categories. The
schemata do  play a role in deriving the Pure Principles corresponding to the
mathematical Categories, but since Kant, in my opinion erroneously, runs together forms
of sensibility and forms of intuition, the proper assessment of these claims requires
extensive considerations that I cannot enter into here.
I shall instead focus upon fulfilling the task of the Transcendental Deduction with
regard to the dynamical Categories, and of these I elect to focus upon the class of
relational Categories as I find these to be the most philosophically interesting.
There is however, one important objection that must be met before we can proceed:
Kant claims that because (representation of) empirical objects is utterly heterogeneous
with any Pure Concept, we need something to mediate between them, which is
homogeneous to the object on the one hand and the Pure Concept on the other. Now, I
have claimed that schemata do not play a role in the case of intuition and the
mathematical Categories. So, unless I want to reject Kant’s claim about the need for a
medium between object and Pure Concept – and I certainly do not want that  – I owe an
explanation of what serves as medium in this case. Fortunately, such an explanation
seems to be readily available on the basis of the preceding discussion:
The medium between the object of an intuition and the mathematical Categories is
precisely the universal form of intuition. Being a form of  intuition it is homogeneous
with the intuition of the object and being a universal form it is homogeneous with the
Category. Since there are only so many ways of determinately attributing some concept
to some object or collection of objects, every intuition will fall under the concept of one
of these ways of intuiting, and all objects of intuition will fall under such a concept
mediated by the form of the intuition whose object it is. The universal form of intuition
is quantity and quality, therefore every object of intuition is subsumed under the pure
concepts of quantity and quality – every object of intuition has quantity and quality.
With this, we leave the discussion of intuitions and the mathematical Categories and
finally turn to “thick” experience and the dynamical Categories. Henceforth, whenever I
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speak of ‘experience’ and ‘Categories’ with no further specification, this should be
understood as ‘“thick” experience’ and ‘dynamical Categories’ respectively.
c) The medium of synthetic judgements
The notion of a medium plays an important role in Kant’s epistemology beyond its role
in subsumption under Pure Concepts. We have seen (on p. 154) that in order to subsume
objects under Pure Concepts – i.e. Categories – we need a transcendental schema to act
as a medium. Now, when we eventually move to seeking a justification also of the Pure
Principles, which are in essence Pure Judgements, we likewise need something to act as a
medium between the concepts being connected in the Pure Judgement.
The need for a medium is not something that is particular to the Pure Principles, but
is just a special case of a requirement that is shared by all synthetic judgements. Judging
consists in connecting – consciously relating – representations. In order to make true
judgements, i.e. valid connections, we need some kind of grounding of the connection –
some principle validating the judgement. In the case of analytic judgements, the
grounding is the principle of identity: We connect as predicates concepts which are
identical to or are contained in the intension of the subject concept e.g. ‘all bachelors
are unmarried men’ or ‘all horses are animals’. In the case of synthetic judgements,
however, the predicate concept is by definition not  contained in the subject concept, so
we need something external to the concepts to warrant their connection. As there is no
homogeneity between the subject and the predicate concept, we need some kind of
medium homogenous to both, to warrant their connection, much in the same way that we
needed a medium for subsumption under Pure Concepts.
There are three kinds of synthetic judgements, each with its own kind of medium.
First, and least interestingly, we have empirical judgments – ordinary judgments of
experience. These “are all synthetic”,292 and their medium is experience itself: Our
warrant for connecting two concepts in an empirical judgement is the concepts’ co-
instantiation in an object of experience, which enables our co-intuition of the two
properties represented by the concepts. The object is homogenous to both of the
concepts connected, in being an instance of both of them. As these judgements are
precisely experiential, they are classified as a posteriori.
In addition to these we have the synthetic a priori judgements, which are the focus of
Kant’s interest, as metaphysics must consist solely thereof. Of synthetic a priori
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judgements there are again two brands according to Kant: namely mathematical and
philosophical.
Like empirical judgements, mathematical judgements are grounded by co-
instantiation and consequent co-intuition, but in this case in pure  intuition.293
Philosophical judgements, on the other hand, of which the Pure Principles are examples,
involve Pure Concepts of which we can have no  intuition, so co-intuition cannot mediate
between the concepts in these cases; and as there can by definition be no intensional
factor in common between the concepts,294 we need a third something to mediate between
the concepts – a medium.
Now, Kant characterises judgements as “functions of unity among our
representations”,295 while a function is “the unity of the action of ordering different
representations under a common one”.296 This common representation must be a
concept, of course, since no intuition can have other representations subsumed under
itself, and when e.g. we connect a subject concept and a predicate concept in a singular
affirmative judgement, what we do is precisely to arrange them under the concept of a
singular affirmative judgement. (The concept of a singular affirmative judgement is of
course just the concept of a judgement consisting of a singular determiner, a subject
concept and the affirmation of a predicate concept; and it is thus homogeneous both to
the subject concept as such and the predicate concept as such.) This then is a clue to
finding the medium of philosophical judgements:
But now what is this third thing as the medium of all synthetic judgments? It is just a
comprehensive notion297 containing all298 our representations, namely, inner sense and
its a priori form, time.299
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Note that time is a medium of all synthetic judgements. For philosophical judgements
then, time presumably is the sole medium300 – so we shall have to investigate whether
there are aspects of time determinations which on the one hand are valid for
all judgements, and on the other hand are capable of grounding Pure Principles; and this
would seem to be precisely the transcendental time determinations discussed on p. 154
So, as was the case with subsumption under Pure Concepts, Time has the role of
medium for Pure Judgements. We shall not here dwell on the claim that time is the a
priori form of inner sense, as that belongs to the parts of the Kantian project that I want
to disregard, but we shall pursue the thought that time is the form of a comprehensive
notion of all our representations, and that time determinations mediate both between Pure
Concepts and their objects and between the concepts of Pure Judgements. First, we
should look at the claim that time contains all of our representations.
d) Time – the container of empirical judgements
Now, what does it mean to say that time is a comprehensive notion of all representation,
and therefore a fortiori also of all empirical representation? – In what sense are all
empirical representations “contained” in the representation of time?
If we liberate ourselves from the obscure notion of time as the form of inner sense, I
believe that this claim turns out to be relatively straight-forward: It is a simple – I dare
say brute – fact that all our representations stand in time-relations. Any kind of
representation which I have, produce, become aware of, perform, express, apprehend or
what have you, must have some kind of occurrence. Any instance of representation, any
                                                                                                                                         
representations…” (Pluhar) or “There is just one whole in which all our representations are contained…” (Kemp
Smith). This is implausible both by purely linguistic considerations and in terms of argumentative structure:
From a linguistic point of view, the standard translations make one expect that Kant had used the German phrase
‘es gibt…’ rather than the ‘es ist…’ of the actual text. (This is basically the same distinction as that between ‘there is’
and ‘it is’ in English.) In addition, they all seem to be guilty of failing to make a concept/object distinction: While
’Inbegriff’ lacks an obvious counterpart in English, it must clearly be a kind of Begriff – a concept – and thus is a rather
a representation of a totality or “totalitarian” representation, rather than a totality itself. My ‘comprehensive notion’
seeks to do justice to this. ‘Highest concept’ might be an alternative, but that should be reserved as a technical term in
Kant-interpretation see below, p. 205
In terms of argumentative structure, Pluhar’s and Kemp Smith’s rendering makes Kant’s conclusion rest on a
conspicuously missing and dubious premise: Why should there just be one “totality”, “sum total” or “whole” which
contains all our representations? Surely our consciousness, for one thing, contains all our representations as well?
Given the translation proposed here, on the other hand, the quoted passage constitutes a natural conclusion to
Kant’s discussion and the way he poses his rhetorical question. If connecting representations in judgements consists
of subsuming them under some common concept, what could be more natural than to say that all judgments contain
representations that fall under some concept that comprises some aspect of representation as such?
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token as it were, takes place in time – even if the relevant kind of representation, its type,
may perhaps be said to have a timeless or abstract quality. Why I cannot have, nor
conceive of having, any instance of a representation not standing in time-relations to all
of my other representations may be an empty question – and it is certainly not one which
need or could be answered here. I cannot at any rate see how it could be claimed that we
have or could have any empirical representations which do not, both in respect of their
occurrences as representations and in respect of what they represent, stand in mutual
time-relations (even if the time-relations might be different with regard to the
representations as vehicles on the one hand and with regard to the represented content on
the other hand).
If then, there is a limited number of kinds of time-relations, that will place restraints
on the possible connections of representations, so we are on the track of universal aspects
of experience, solely by consideration of the form of empirical knowledge. Hence we
should like to know the nature of all basic time-relations.
Any such determination of the total number of kinds of time-relations would have to
be reached by  analysis, and as is his wont, Kant simply presents the result of this analysis
without further ado:
The three modi  of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity301
One might feel that surely duration and change must be basic time-relations which
should be included among these three, but I believe that it can be seen quite easily that
these are not basic relations, but derived from the three basic ones: Change is derived
from a combination of persistence and succession (as we shall have occasion to examine
in detail below), while duration is derived from a comparison of types of changes, where
one type of recurring change is chosen as a unit.
At any rate, Kant assumes in the Critique that there are exactly these three modes of
time, and the chapter on the Analogies of Experience is structured around this
assumption: There are three Analogies, each of them related to one mode of time; each
Analogy provides justification for the applicability of a Pure Concept302 and the truth of
a Pure Principle.
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Again, one might want arguments for why we should assume that there are exactly
these three basic time-relations. Even if none of these can be reduced to any of the
others, how can we know that the list is complete?
As the list is derived by analysis, we can never logically rule out the possibility of
further possibilities, but the onus would seem to be on the opponents of Kant to provide
examples of time-relations which cannot be reduced to these three. Myself, I can see no
such; nor any possibility thereof, but should there be, it would make little difference to
the fundamental point which is that there is a limited number of kinds of time-relations,
each one related to a pure Concept and a an Analogy of Experience. Were there to be
additional basic time-relations we should expect to find additional Analogies of
Experience.
e) Particular and general time-relations
Because of the conceptual element in every cognition – explicit with Kant in the case of
concepts, and implicit in the treatment of intuitions (or so I claim, at least) – any
cognition will have both a particular and a general aspect. It will be particular in terms of
its occurrence and the object it represents; and general in terms of the concept or
concepts involved.
Now, cognitions will obviously stand in particular time-relations in terms of their
particular occurrence – say for instance I saw Tom before hearing Dick and Harry
yesterday; but there will also be a number of general time-relations among our
cognitions – say I always see Tom before going to lunch with Harry, for instance.
General time-relations could be termed typical, while we could use the term ‘occasional’
for particular ones.
In looking for transcendental time-determinations, then, which by definition are
universal time-relations, we should be looking for general time-relations without any
possible exceptions – strict typical time-relations, which is a clue we shall follow in the
reading of the Analogies below.
I aim to demonstrate that it is important to distinguish clearly between occasional and
typical time-relations, but that Kant himself does not always do so explicitly.
6.2 Objectivity and the object of Experience
We now have the ideas that strict typical time-relations are necessary to mediate between
Categories and objects, thus enabling the application of the Categories, and that this in
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turn must be shown to be a necessary condition for and an explanation of the possibility
of “thick”, temporal experience.
To pick our way through this complicated collection of ideas, we should first make
something of a tactical retreat and look at what sort of temporal experience we actually
have, what sort of judgements we make concerning temporal relations.
First of all, we should note that in judging of the temporal relations between intuitions
or empirical judgings, we can and do make a distinction between objective and mere
subjective validity in precisely the same way as we do in the case of judgments and
intuitions as was discussed in sections 5.3a)–b).
a) Successions of experiences and the experience of succession
Let us start out with some examples of kinds of experiences and the distinctions we draw
between them. Imagine that I am standing on the pavement of Parliament Square in
London one fine spring day. Looking around, I first look at Westminster Abbey,
momentarily interrupted as a double-decker Routemaster bus passes in front of it, then I
spend a few moments admiring the Houses of Parliament, and finally I observe a boat
passing downstream underneath Westminster Bridge.
In each of these three cases, we may suppose my experience to consist of a series of more
or less distinguishable perceptions.
In the first case I observe, let us say:
West transept, Stained-glass window, Red engine hood, passenger door, marble
doorway …303
Admiring the Houses of Parliament, I am delighted to find the following:
Turret, window, wall, column, brick, window, door …
And finally, watching the boat passing downstream underneath Westminster Bridge, my
perceptions comprise:
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Murky water, half concealed prow, stern, railing, tarmac, car, car, bus, car,
railing, prow, half concealed stern …
Now in all these cases, there is clearly some temporal relation obtaining between these
representations considered as mental entities, insofar as they were had by me at a
particular stretch of time. Furthermore this is clearly in one sense an objective fact: It is
objectively true that these experiences were had successively by me on each occasion.
However, when we enquire into the objective validity or reality of a set of representations,
we are normally interested in more than the mere fact that these representations were
actually had by someone. If, on a sunny day, you were to say: “I think it is raining”, I
would not reply “Yes, you’re right”, meaning that you are correct in asserting that ‘it is
raining’ is actually what you are thinking at the moment. Rather, I would say that you
were wrong  in thinking that it is raining, when in fact the sun is shining. This illustrates
the very different sense in which we can enquire after objective relations of perceptions,
namely in terms of the objects  being represented by these perceptions, not just in terms
of these perceptions actually occurring. Exactly as it is objectively true to say that I had
successive experiences as of a stained-glass window, a marble doorway and so on;
provided that my experiences be veridical, it is also objectively true that a stained-glass
window, a marble doorway and so on were presented to me. While both these sets of
relations are in some sense objective, they are so as it were from different perspectives.
The relation between my perceptions-regarded-as-objects, irrespective of their veracity is
surveyable only on reflection. Only when I or someone else reflects upon my experience
as such, can these relations be assessed. In having these experiences, my attention is ipso
facto  directed towards that which is being represented, and in order to attend to the
relations of the representations – the experiences – as such, these in turn become the
objects of further representations, i.e. my (second-order) thoughts of having these
thoughts about the immediate environment of Parliament Square. The relation between
the perceptions-as-objects, though objective as viewed on reflection, is in terms of my
having the perceptions most naturally termed a subjective relation of perceptions,
inasmuch as the perceptions are related in the subject having the perceptions;304 while the
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relation obtaining to that which is being represented should properly be called the
objective relation, inasmuch as the relation holds between the perceived objects.
Now, as it happens, we often judge that the subjective relations of our perceptions are
different from the objective relations that obtain between the objects represented by those
perceptions, which means that the true objective relation of objects of perception is
undetermined, or rather underdetermined by the mere occurrent temporal relation of the
perceptions.
I am … only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not
that the one state precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere
perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another
remains undetermined.305
Given, that we do make the distinction between subjective relations of perceptions and
objective relations of objects of perceptions, we do in fact cognise this objective relation.
But as we have seen, it is underdetermined by the subjective relation, so the question then
is what more we have access to that enables us to cognise this objective relation. Since we
have no immediate access to the objects of perceptions, save through the perceptions that
represent them, it is something of a puzzle how we are able to draw this distinction, and
the solution to this puzzle will cast considerable light on the nature of human knowledge.
Of course, one response to this puzzle is to deny that we draw the distinction and
claim that all our judgements really concern only the subjective relations of perceptions.
This strategy leads fairly directly to a kind of scepticism which Kant finds unacceptable.
So the first task would be to produce simple, uncontested examples of cases where this
distinction is drawn in ordinary experience, next to offer an explanation and justification
for our ability to distinguish between the subjective and the objective.
We shall look at how Kant states the problem of the distinction between the subjective
and the objective; then point out some examples of how we actually routinely make this
                                                                                                                                         
The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts
succeed one another. Whether they also succeed one another in the object is a second point for reflection.
(A189/B234–5)
All that is claimed here, is that this distinction is in fact drawn – as demonstrated by the fact that we do not invariably
infer from the subjective relation of perceptions to the objective relation of objects of perception. How we are able to
draw the distinction, is what we seek to find out.
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distinction, related to the examples of my experiences in Parliament Square, before we
turn to the theoretical explanation of our ability to distinguish the subjective and the
objective.
Kant sets out the enquiry into the distinction between subjective and objective
relations of representations at the beginning of his discussion of the 2nd Analogy of
Experience306:
[O]ne can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as one is
conscious of it, an object; only what this word is to mean in the case of appearances, not
insofar as they are (as representations) objects, but rather only insofar as they designate
an object, requires a deeper investigation.307
Let us first contrast my experience of Westminster Abbey while a bus is passing in front
of it with my experience of the Houses of Parliament. In both cases we have a set of
perceptions that are both objectively and subjectively combined. On the occasion of my
having these experiences, a certain combination of objects was present, thus enabling a
combination of perceptions to be had by me. However, certain counter-factual relations
obtain in the one case and not the other. Take my experience of Westminster Abbey,
rather annoyingly interrupted by the bus passing in front of it. It is perfectly possible
that I observe Westminster Abbey without a bus passing in front of it. Though the
perceptions of the bus and the perceptions of Westminster Abbey occurred together in
my experience that fine day, there is no necessity of them doing so. I could well
experience the Abbey without the bus, and what I would then be experiencing would still
be the very same Westminster Abbey. Objectively the co-presence of the bus and the
Abbey is merely contingent.
Not so with the observation of the Houses of Parliament: Let us say that I perceive
first the foundations, then the ground floor and work my way up to the roof. In this case,
it is clear that I could not have one of these perceptions, without at least being able to
have the others. Even though I might not actually continue my perusal of the
architectural delights of the palace of Westminster, these delights would at least always be
available as a package. A house has parts that are necessarily co-present for perception –
‘necessarily’ in the sense that they could not come apart without the object itself being
disintegrated or radically altered. So long as the Houses of Parliament are still standing,
                                                
306
 This problem is also treated in the 1st edition of the Transcendental Deduction, see for instance A108–9
307
 A189–90/B234–5
Temporal relations and Experience 6.2 Objectivity and the object of Experience
– 165 –
whenever their foundations are perceivable to someone, then the ground floor will also
be in principle available for perception.
There is thus an objective distinction between the experience of Westminster Abbey
interrupted by a bus passing in front of it and the experience of the Houses of
Parliament. In the latter case there is a necessary relation between the objects of
perception while in the former there is a mere contingent one. On the subjective level,
when we regard only the perceptions as such, without regard to what they represent, all
we have is a collection of successive perceptions which we can imagine being recombined
and re-experienced in any kind of order. Surely it takes no great leap of imagination to
suppose that, for instance in a dream or in some hallucinatory state, one might have the
perceptions of the Houses of Parliament in a jumbled and incomplete order. The notion
of the necessary relation of perceptions seems to be empty on the subjective level, yet we
employ it on the objective level, when we judge that the bus and Westminster Abbey were
merely contingently co-perceived, while the different parts of the Houses of Parliament
are necessarily co-perceived.
This difference between the subjective and the objective relations are even clearer if
we compare the experience of the Houses of Parliament with the experience of the boat
passing downstream underneath Westminster Bridge.308 In both these cases the
combination of perceptions is necessary in the Kantian sense – they are objectively
related. However, in the former case the order of the perceptions is objectively
contingent, while in the latter case it is necessary. I can easily imagine having the
collection of perceptions of the Houses of Parliament in the reverse order from that in
which I actually had them and still be perceiving the very same object, i.e. the Houses of
Parliament themselves. Not so in the case of the boat passing downstream underneath
Westminster Bridge: I first see the boat upstream of the bridge, then disappearing under
the bridge and finally reappearing downstream of the bridge. While I can of course
imagine having these perceptions in the reverse order, I cannot do so without imagining
experiencing a different state of affairs. If the order of the perceptions be reversed, that
would amount to my observing a boat passing upstream underneath Westminster Bridge,
rather than it passing downstream as in the original experience. In the case of the
experience of the Houses of Parliament, the order of the perceptions is irrelevant to the
experience being of that state of affairs; while in the case of the experience of the ship
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passing downstream, the order of the perceptions is essential to it being an experience of
the relevant state of affairs.
This brings us closer to the sense of necessity that Kant is invoking here. As is so
often the case, the necessity is not some kind of “metaphysical” necessity – true in all
possible worlds – but much more straightforwardly a necessary condition. If the order of
perceptions is a necessary condition for the experience being the kind of experience that
it is – e.g. seeing the ship first upstream and then downstream is a necessary condition
for the experience being as of a ship passing downstream – then that amounts to a
necessary order of perceptions.
I see a ship driven downstream. My perception of its position downstream follows the
perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this
appearance the ship should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream.309
Now, in what sense is it impossible that the time-order of the perceptions be reversed, i.e.
in what sense is the time-order necessary? Clearly I could have perceptions of a ship first
downstream and then upstream, but not without experiencing a different event. So the
time-order of the perceptions involved in experiencing a ship passing downstream is a
necessary condition for having an experience of the kind of event being experienced.
So, we distinguish between experiences where the time-order of perceptions is
necessary (the boat passing downstream), and experiences where the time-order is
arbitrary (the Houses of Parliament). Now, I want to claim that this distinction amounts to
the distinction between experiences of objects and of events. In both these cases the mere
combination of perceptions – the co-presence – of the perceptions is deemed to be
necessary, and both these kinds of cases are contrasted with cases were the combination
itself is arbitrary (the bus passing in front of Westminster Abbey). Now, whence this
necessity? Since the necessity only pertains to the objective relations and not to the
subjective, it seems likely that if we can find the justification for this judgement of
necessity, we might also expect to find the justification of the distinction between the
subjective and the objective.
Graham Bird also reads the first two Analogies basically as answering this question.
When we perceive first the roof and then the basement of a house, we perceive in
succession two states of the same object, but nobody would normally say, as Kant points
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out (B235), that this is to perceive an event … Kant argues that because there are some
descriptions of perceived states in the same object which do not yield event-descriptions,
the latter inference is not valid. He concludes from this that the perception of states in an
object is not enough to discriminate between events and non-events.310
b) Rules of Apprehension
As the above discussion has shown, I am routinely able to distinguish the subjective
relation of perceptions from the objective relation of the objects of perception, and
making this distinction is tied in with judgements of necessity on the objective side of the
distinction. The question is how I am able to judge of this necessity, hence to draw the
distinction between the subjective and the objective – between the objects of experience
and the experience of the objects.
It is clearly no good to suggest that I compare my representations and the relations
between them with the objects they represent and any relations between these objects
themselves. My access to the objects of representations is exclusively through these
representations, so there is no way I can assess the objects themselves independently of
my representations of them. If I regard solely the representations involved in each
instance of experiencing, all I have is some list of the kind exemplified on p. 162. So,
how can I distinguish the order in which the list of perceptions was presented to me from
the objective order of the objects of those perceptions? From looking at the list alone
there is no way that I could draw this distinction.
We have representations in us, of which we can also become conscious. But let this
consciousness reach as far and be as exact and precise as one wants, still there always
remain only representations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind in this or that
temporal relation. Now how do we come to posit an object for these representations, or
ascribe to their subjective reality, as modifications, some sort of objective reality?
Objective significance cannot consist in the relation to another representation (of that
which one would call the object), for that would simply raise anew the question: How does
this representation in turn go beyond itself and acquire objective significance that is
proper to it as a determination of the state of mind?311
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So the ability to make this distinction must come from something else than the mere
collection of representations, but not from the objects themselves as we have no
unmediated access to them – so whence?
Kant’s slightly cryptic solution to this puzzle is stated thus:
One quickly sees312 that, since the agreement of cognition with the object is truth, only
the formal conditions of empirical truth can be inquired after here, and appearance, in
contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can thereby only be represented
as the object that is distinct from them    if    it      stands     under    a   rule   that distinguishes it from
every other apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That
in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary    rule     of     apprehension   is
the object.313
This is a brief restatement of a section of the 1st edition version of the Transcendental
Deduction, where Kant discusses the very notion of an object of experience as
distinguished from our representations of it. As these ideas are of central importance and
show clearly the tight connections between the Transcendental Deduction and the
subsequent sections of the Transcendental Analytic, I shall quote this section in full:
It is clear, however that since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations,
and that X which corresponds to them (the object), because it should be something distinct
from all of our representations, is nothing for us, the unity that the object makes
necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the
synthesis of the manifold of the representations. Hence we say that we cognize the object
if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But this is  impossible if
the intuition could not have been produced through a function of synthesis    in      accordance
with     a   rule   that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and a concept in
which this manifold is united possible. Thus we think of a triangle as an object by being
conscious of the composition of three straight lines in    accordance     with      a   rule   according to
which such an intuition can always be exhibited. Now this unity of rule determines
every manifold, and limits it to conditions that make the unity of apperception possible,
and the concept of this unity is the representation of the object = X, which I think through
those predicates of a triangle.
All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be; but as far as
its form is concerned the latter [concept] is always something general, and something that
serves     as     a   rule   . Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer
appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it. However, it
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can be a rule of intuitions only if it represents the necessary reproduction of the manifold
of given intuitions, hence the synthetic unity in the consciousness of them.314
These compact paragraphs contain a number of intricately related ideas. The main idea
we are after is the origin of our ability to distinguish between subjective and objective
relations of perceptions, which in turn provides the ground of the notion of an object of
experience as distinct from the experience of it.
According to Kant, the key to making this distinction between subjective and
objective relations of perceptions is clearly to examine whether the set of perceptions in
question stand under a “a rule that distinguishes [them] from every other apprehen-
sion”. So there is apparently some kind of “rule of apprehension” that will tell us that
this set of representations correspond to an objective relation of perceptions, while that
set does not. Now, what are these rules of apprehension, how do they provide us with at
distinction between subjective and objective relations of perception and how do we have
knowledge of these rules?
c) The faculty of rules
Initially we should look into the notion of ‘rule’ itself, as this is an idea that Kant makes
widespread use of all through the Critique. First of all it is illuminating to note the
connection between the notion of a rule and that of regularity. The German term for
‘regular’ is ‘Regelmäßig’, which means literally ‘rule-likeness’ or ‘in accordance with a
rule’, and is etymologically related to the term for ‘rule’: ‘Regel’. This intimate
connection is present also in English, inasmuch as the word ‘regular’ stems from the
Latin term for ‘rule’ – ‘regula’, and the literal meaning of ‘regular’ is “conforming to
a rule or principle; systematic”.315 We should also note that regularity has clear
connotations of generality. To speak of a regularity which is never repeated is clearly
nonsense. One of the senses of ‘regular’ listed in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is
“acting or done recurring or uniformly or calculably in time or manner; habitual,
constant, orderly.” This implication of generality is important, so we should keep it in
mind.
Next we should examine the close terminological connection Kant makes between the
notion of a rule and that of a concept. We find a clear statement of this connection in the
passage from the Transcendental Deduction which was quoted on p. 170:
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All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be; but as far as its
form is concerned the latter [concept] is always something general, and something that
serves    as    a   rule.   
In other words: The form of a concept is always something general, and something that
serves as a rule. This echoes Kant’s point from the very beginning of his Logic, which
was quoted on p. 73, namely that the logical form of a concept is generality – i.e. its
capability of having several instances subsumed under itself.316 Here, this connection
between concepts and generality is further related to the notion of a rule.
Again a fuller discussion is found in the 1st edition of the Transcendental Deduction:
We have above explained the understanding in various ways – through a spontaneity of
cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensibility), through a faculty for
thinking, or a faculty of concepts, or also of judgements – which explanations, if one
looks at them properly, come down to the same thing. Now we can characterize it as the
faculty of rules. This designation is more fruitful, and comes closer to its essence.
Sensibility gives us forms (of intuitions), but the understanding gives us rules. It is always
busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them.
Rules, so far as they are objective (and thus necessarily pertain to the cognition of
objects) are called laws. Although we learn many laws through experience, these are only
particular determinations of yet higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others
stand) come from the understanding itself a priori, and are not borrowed from experience,
but rather must provide the appearances with their lawfulness and by that very means make
experience possible.317
Important here is the claim that rules are the work of understanding, not of sensibility.
Since these rules are what enable us to distinguish between subjective and objective
relations of representations, hence to form the notion of an object of experience distinct
from our experience of it, it is clear that Kant holds that the notion of an object of
experience is not simply given by sensibility – which amounts to little more than
reiterating that from a mere enumeration of a particular collection of representations we
can draw no distinction between the representations and what they represent.
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d) The criterion of objectivity
Keeping these inter-related notions in mind, let us return to Kant’s explanation of how
we draw the distinction between subjective and objective relations of representations and
thus are able to represent an object as distinct from our representations of it, if (and only
if) it “stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and makes
one way of combining the manifold necessary.”
 Now, I take it that saying that an object stands under a rule of apprehension that
distinguishes it from every other apprehension must mean simply that my apprehension
of it conforms to a distinct regularity among my apprehended perceptions. In other
words, I can only realise and correctly judge that a particular collection of perceptions
correspond to an objective relation of appearances by collating it with other apprehended
perceptions and finding that it conforms to a form of regularity among perceptions that I
have previously encountered.318
Take the example of my observing the Houses of Parliament. The reason that I can
correctly judge that this observation corresponds to the objectively existing Houses of
Parliament themselves is that the sequence of my perceptions correspond to general
patterns among the totality of my perceptions. Partly, this is trivial of course: I recognise
it as a building because I have previous experience of buildings, I identify the building as
The Houses of Parliaments because I have previously had them pointed out to me, seen
images of them or had them described to me – thus having acquired the concept of them,
which I now apply to the houses themselves. So far, we are in complete agreement with
the empiricist model of experience. Ordinary empirical concepts are abstracted from
experience, and our ability to acquire these concepts is essentially explainable in terms of
our ability to recognise patterns of perceptions.
However, this ability to recognise previously encountered patterns of perceptions,
while explaining our mastering ordinary empirical concepts such as ‘house’ and ‘bus’,
cannot account for our ability to draw a distinction between subjective and objective
relations of perceptions, since there is nothing in the “list” of perceptions which by itself
grounds the making of the distinction. Since we clearly do  make this distinction – even if
I have previously repeatedly observed buses passing in front of Westminster Abbey, and
                                                
318
 Note that we are not enquiring into the meaning of the concept of an object of experience distinct from the experience
of the object. We have a quite clear understanding of what this means, namely precisely an object of experience
distinct from the experience of the object. If we did not understand the meaning of this, how could we even enquire into
how this concept could have a valid application? But knowing this meaning does not by itself give us any application
criteria for the concept, and that is what we are enquiring after. This illustrates the gap between meaning and
application criteria that was discussed in section 2.3
Kant and the Epistemology of Metaphysics Eilert Sundt-Ohlsen
– 172 –
so am in a position to recognise this particular pattern of perceptions, I clearly
distinguish between the bus and the abbey – the empiricist model does not provide a full
explanation of our actual epistemic practices.
The empiricist model can adequately explain how we acquire “feature-placing”
abilities: Different features of the environment present themselves to us, and we gradually
acquire an ability to recognise these features, and subsume them under basic qualitative
concepts. Similarly we become versed in the application of more complex concepts, i.e.
sortals, as combinations of basic qualitative concepts.
This model however, cannot account for the notion of an object of experience
distinct from our representation of it. From an ability merely to recognise and
successfully distinguish between representations of different general features, there will
be no way to get to a notion of an object distinct from these representations, since what
cannot be represented by first-order representations, however complex, is their relation to
their object.
The virtue of the Kantian theory of knowledge is to point out a candidate validation
of this notion, namely that with reference to certain pervasive patterns among our
representations can we begin to ground the notion of an object of experience distinct
from our experience of it. By looking for pervasive patterns, we can notice that certain
correlations of perceptions always go together, say visual impressions of roundness and
glossiness always go together with tactile sensations of smoothness and hardness in my
experience of a china cup, whereas the perceptions of bus and Westminster Abbey do not
always go together. Their co-apprehension has a comparative regularity, but no strict
universality. By contrast the perceptions involved in the cognition of a china cup form a
universal relation within my experience, which is just Kant’s definition of a necessary
relation among perceptions.
If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our representations by the relation
to an object, and what is the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does
nothing beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a certain way,
and subjecting them to a rule; and conversely that objective significance is conferred on
our representations only insofar as a certain order in their temporal relation is
necessary.319
Here it is necessary to guard against confusion. The claim is not  that there is one rule
such that subjecting our representations to it confers objective significance on them.
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Rather the claim is that insofar as our representations are subjected to some – any – rule
of the requisite kind, they have objective significance conferred upon them. The notion
of the object of experience is thus a kind of reflective or second-order representation –
roughly the notion of types of representations – any representations – being universally
correlated in apprehension.
We are then not  looking for some set of general features that all and only objects
have – that would amount to an empirical  deduction of the concept of object and would
have to proceed analytically. Rather, what we are after is more the notion of something
being objectively the case, as opposed to mere subjective relations of perceptions. Kant’s
explanation here is that our notion of an object of experience in this sense should be
regarded as a second-order representation of first-order empirical representations being
universally correlated in experience. The more universal a correlation of perceptions is in
experience, the stronger grounds we have for believing that it corresponds to an objective
state of affairs. And asserting a correlation of a set of perceptions just is subjecting them
to a rule in Kant’s terms.
Further, subjecting representations to a rule must be equivalent to subsuming them
under a concept, and subjecting them to a rule which makes their combination necessary
in a certain way then seems to be nothing else than subsuming them under a pure
concept – in this case the concept of the object as such. This must be the elusive
“concept of the transcendental object” which Kant discusses in the 1st edition of the
Transcendental Deduction:
The pure concept of this transcendental object (which [concept]320 in all of our cognitions
is really always one and the same = X)321
This is precisely the notion of an object of experience as such . Since it applies to every
experienceable object or objective state of affairs, it can of course have no particular
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empirical content, hence “= X”. It is rather a formal or second-order concept, a concept
of ways in which first-order representations can be related.
But, the empiricist might object, this concept again is still just extracted from
experience: Even if subsumption under a formal object-concept is slightly more
complicated than simply recognising for instance the colour red, it is still something you
derive purely from past experience – an exception-less combination of perceptions – all
its elements are drawn from experience: where else could they come from?
Now, this objection leads us to the heart of the matter. While it is true that the
elements of the combination are drawn from experience, it doesn’t follow that the form
of the combination, can simply be read off of experience. In what way does experience
instruct us to look for these correlations of perceptions rather than others? Why favour
these relations? Sensibility and perception merely furnishes us with the individual
representations, and they can be connected and “held together” in any number of ways.
Why attach special significance to collections of perceptions that conform to strict
pervasive patterns? Why not instead look for new patterns, for instance – why not seek
out collections of perceptions that we have never seen before, and try to rearrange our
past experiences into a maximum number of unique sets of perceptions? At the very least
this would to lead to an astonishing level of innovation in thinking – why should that not
be desirable?
The Kantian answer, which will be examined in detail in the ensuing sections on the
Analogies of Experience, is that favouring these correlations makes possible objective
experience, i.e. grounds the notion of an object of experience distinct from our
experience of it. Favouring universally combined perceptions enables us to conceive of
the world in terms of distinct objects, not just as individually disjoined features; while
favouring temporal patterns of perception in which certain co-located characteristics
remain while others alternate enables us to conceive of – think about – the world in terms
of objects persisting through change – and thus in terms of transformations of those
objects – events. This description of the form of event-experience as patterns of
perceptions in which some characteristics remain while others alternate thus amounts to a
specification of the form of event-concepts. Since this form cannot simply be given by
experience – Why favour this form rather than others when any number of forms,
combinations, will be instantiated among the sum of our perceptions? – imposing this
form on our experience, favouring this regularity, “dictating” this rule, is a necessary
condition for the experience of objective events; which is just the thesis that we are
attempting to justify.
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A consequence of this theory of knowledge, since it holds that the ability to distinguish
between the subjective and the objective is grounded in an ability to recognise the
general or universal in perceptions, is that a new-born baby, upon openings its eyes and
ears to the world would not be able to distinguish between the subjective and the
objective relations of its novel experiences, which would seem to be an empirical
consequence that so far has not been falsified.
6.3 Dictating Laws to Nature
As we move into the discussion of the Analogies of Experience, it seems that Kant’s
notion of experience undergoes a subtle shift. In arguing for the existence and validity
of the mathematical Categories, Kant needed no more than the notion of experience as
consisting of true basic empirical judgements, whereas in the discussion of the dynamical
Categories and the Analogies of Experience Kant relies essentially on a notion of
experience as being of a law-governed, systematic nature. This is a complicated web of
ideas that needs to be brought out more clearly, before we can proceed. To this end, I
shall first recapitulate some of the reasoning that has gone into the explanation of the
validity of the mathematical Categories.
a) Categories and basic experience
The starting point is the observable fact that we have experience consisting of basic
empirical judgements. We make, exploit and communicate ordinary empirical
judgements, using ordinary empirical concepts like ‘horse’, ‘table’, ‘apple’, ‘green’,
‘round’ and so on and so forth. Now, the validity of the mathematical Categories was
explainable by investigating necessary conditions for having this basic kind of
experience. So, what were these necessary conditions?
We have to assume that we are able to apply empirical concepts as subject- and
predicate concepts in basic empirical judgements. From this assumption we can explain
how we are able to experience presence and absence, unity and plurality, namely as
objects considered as subjects of basic empirical judgements of specific forms. Thus, we
have explained the validity of the mathematical Categories by reference to necessary
subjective conditions for having the kind of experience that we happen to have. Now,
Kant claims that categories “make experience possible” and “contain the grounds of
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the possibility of experience in general from the side of the understanding”.322 The latter
formulation can be made sense of, but the former seems to be misleading or at best
imprecise; although it is not too difficult to see what correct idea might lie behind it.
We have seen that there are necessary conditions on our cognitive capacities for our
having experience consisting of true basic empirical judgements. Now, I have argued that
the correct definition of the mathematical Categories are as concepts of objects
considered as subjects of basic empirical judgements. This is what I had in mind by
saying that the Categories are second-order concepts:323 The mathematical Categories are
concepts of objects falling under concepts applied in basic empirical judgements – they
apply to objects by way of the formal aspects of basic empirical judgements. The ability
to apply empirical concepts in specific ways corresponding to these formal aspects are
necessary conditions for having experience; and the Categories have these formal aspects
as part of their meaning – part of that in virtue of which they apply to objects. Recall that
Kant talks of concepts as containing their intensional constituents – their meaning-
components – so it makes sense for Kant to say that the Categories contain the grounds
of the possibility of experience in general. However, that is not  yet to say that the
Categories themselves make experience possible, it seems to me. What makes experience
possible is our ability to apply empirical concepts in judgements of certain forms. Let’s
grant the Kantian term ‘synthesis’ for this ability, and we can say that the Categories
contain the functions of synthesis that make experience possible. It is this thought in this
precise sense we need in order to understand Kant’s claims about the necessary
conditions for thick experience and the relation of these conditions to the dynamical
categories.
b) Laws and Nature
In his discussion of the dynamical categories and the Analogies of Experience, Kant
makes use of, and sometimes equivocates between two related ideas. One is the notion of
thick experience, that is experience consisting of complex empirical judgements, i.e.
judgements that require the combination of two or more basic empirical judgements. The
other idea is of experience of nature as a law-governed whole – experience as a system of
knowledge of natural laws. I have already mentioned several times the idea of some
judgements relying on combinations of simple judgements. The precise kinds of
judgements that this involves will be dealt with in the discussions on the three Analogies
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of Experience. However, Kant’s notion of nature as a law-governed whole is more
mysterious and needs to be looked into more carefully.
The claim that Kant makes as regards the nature as a law-governed whole, taken at
face value, must strike one as deeply puzzling – namely that understanding prescribes
laws to nature and thereby makes nature possible.324 This might seem the most rampantly
subjectivist idealism and will no doubt be quite unpalatable to many thinkers. But with
some careful untangling of the number of ideas that are involved here, I believe it can be
shown that this idea need not be so objectionable.
Kant himself was aware of the controversial character of his claim:
Thus as exaggerated and contradictory as it may sound to say that the understanding is
itself the source of the laws of nature, and thus of the formal unity of nature, such an
assertion is nevertheless correct and appropriate to the object, namely experience.325
There are, however, a number of qualifications and nuances to his claim. First, it should
be noted that Kant uses the term ‘nature’ in a specific, technical sense which maybe does
not coincide completely with its normal usage. Kant seems to think that nature is by
definition law-governed – this is just what we mean by the word ‘nature’. He talks about
“that order and regularity in [the appearances] that we call nature”326 But this law-
governedness is only “formal” – it concerns merely the purported fact of the world
being governed by natural laws as such, not what the specific content of those natural
laws might be. It is only this “formal” aspect of the law-governedness of the world that
is supposed to be dictated by the understanding.
To be sure, empirical laws, as such, can by no means derive their origin from the pure
understanding … But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws
of the understanding, under which and in accordance with whose norm they are first
possible, and the appearances assume a lawful form…327
But what is this notion of nature as a law-governed whole – how is it related to our
experience of the world? Do we really experience the world as one systematic whole,
completely and comprehensibly governed by knowable laws? This would seem to be
claiming too much, but it is equally clear that our knowledge of the world is not confined
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to mere logically atomic facts. We have a considerable knowledge of systematic, law-like
facts about the world – we have a considerable knowledge of causal – natural – laws, at
least to a high degree of approximation. It would also seem that natural science is striving
towards an understanding of the world precisely as nature in the Kantian sense, as a
system which is fully describable and predictable in physical terms. This is the quest for
the “total theory” – the completeness of physics.
Now, this scientific world-view is hardly necessary. There can be little doubt that
human existence is possible with a conception of the world as fundamentally capricious.
Such a world-view, I take it, would be one in which superstition and ritual would be rife.
Not possessing the epistemic tools to determine the efficacy of actions; authority,
arbitrary association and personal inclinations would serve as practical guidance, rather
than effective procedures.
It is arguable that the scientific revolution personified by Isaac Newton represents a
transition precisely from a capricious world-view to a law-governed one.
It is reasonably clear from Kant’s text that his notion of experience in the context of
the analogies is precisely a notion of experience of nature qua a law-governed whole.
By nature (in the empirical sense) we understand the combination of appearances as regards
their existence, in accordance with necessary rules, i.e., in accordance with laws. There are
therefore certain laws, and indeed a priori, which first make a nature possible; the
empirical laws can only obtain and be found by means of experience, and indeed in accord
with its original laws, in accordance with which experience itself fist becomes possible.
Our analogies therefore really exhibit the unity of nature in the combination of all
appearances under certain exponents, which express nothing other than the relation of
time (insofar as it comprehends all existence in itself) to the unity of apperception, which
can only obtain in synthesis in accordance with rules. Thus together they say: All
appearances lie in one nature, and must lie therein, since without this a priori unity no
unity of experience, thus also no determination of the objects in it, would be possible.328
This conception of nature as a law-governed whole, is also the flip-side of Kant’s notion
of science. If nature is systematic and law-governed, then it would seem that an
appropriate body of knowledge about nature should also display a corresponding
systematicity, and this is just how Kant defines science in Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science (Foundations):
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Every doctrine, if it is to be a system, i.e., a whole of cognition ordered according to
principles, is called science.329
The Analogies are Pure, hence metaphysical principles, and in the Foundations, Kant
argues precisely that natural science depends essentially on the use of metaphysical
principles:
All natural philosophers who wanted to proceed mathematically in their work had therefore
always (though unbeknown to themselves) made use of metaphysical principles, and had
to make use of them, even though they otherwise solemnly repudiated any claim of
metaphysics on their science.330
Now, as we have seen in the case of the mathematical Categories and experience of the
world as consisting of objects with properties, we may reasonably assume that there are
necessary subjective conditions for such scientific knowledge of natural laws to be
possible. Kant’s point must be that these subjective conditions have to do with
epistemically formal constraints on any experience of natural laws.
c) How Laws prescribed by Reason make Nature Possible
Just as in the case with the claim that the mathematical Categories make experience
possible, the claim that the laws dictated by the understanding makes nature possible is
deceptively simplistic. I shall argue that the claim that understanding prescribes laws to
nature and thereby makes nature possible, must be unpacked in the following way:
– It is an observable fact that we make judgements where we distinguish between
subjective and objective time-orders of the perceptions involved in the judgements,
namely in the case of transformational judgements and hypothetical judgements.
– It is a necessary condition for making transformational judgements that our sortal
concepts fit into a hierarchical system of species and genera.
– The Category of Substance is the concept of the referent of the highest genus
concept in such a hierarchical system.
– The form of transformational judgements is the form of judgements of objective
events.
– Hypothetical judgements consist of two transformational judgements combined as
ground and consequent.
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– The Category of Cause is the concept of an event that is the subject of the
transformational judgement in the antecedent of an hypothetical judgement.
– It is a necessary condition for justifying hypothetical judgements that a regulative
principle of Universal Causality be implemented in our empirical investigations.
– It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the regulative principle of
Causality to be successfully implemented that a regulative principle of the Persistence of
Substance be implemented in our empirical investigations.
– The successful implementation of a principle of Universal Causality is the goal of
natural science.
The remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to justifying this series of claims.
6.4 Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding
Before we tackle the individual Analogies, we need to examine what is involved in Kant’s
notion of an Analogy of experience as such. The analogies are a subset of the Pure
Principles,331 and in the “systematic representation of all synthetic principles of pure
understanding”,332 Kant outlines the claims that he wants to establish in the forthcoming
sections. The basic point seems to be that Pure Principles are second-order rules of
objects of experience.333 Pure Principles do not directly apply to objects of experience,
they will not directly tell you which regularities you will find in experience and they do
not specify any natural laws; but they do specify what form a rule of experience must
have. They are in essence rules of rules – they specify the form of regularities under
which perceptions must fall to count as experiences of events, causes and so on. The pure
principles tells us what kinds of rules we might encounter in experience, but do not
specify the actual instances that fall under them.
…without exception all laws of nature stand under higher principles of the understanding,
as they only apply the latter to particular cases of appearance. Thus these higher
principles alone provide the concept, which contains the condition and as it were the
exponents for a rule in general, while experience provides the case which stands under the
rule. 334
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So, analogous to the way that Pure Concepts are second-order concepts335 – concepts of
concepts, the Pure Principles are second-order rules – rules of rules.
a) Analogies of Experience
The three Analogies are specifications of a general principle which Kant states at the very
outset of the section “Analogies of Experience”. This general principle is stated in two
alternative versions in the two editions of the Critique. The second edition (B) has:
Their principle is: Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary
connection of conscious representations.336
While the first edition (A) states:
Their general principle is this: As regards their existence, all appearances stand a priori
under rules of the determination of their relation to each other in one time.337
It seems to me that these two formulations are essentially equivalent, but that they have
slightly different emphasis, each one illuminating in its own right, so we should examine
and compare the two.
With regard only to the specific wording, the subject of principle B is experience,
while principle A concerns appearances as regards their existence; but this is no real
conflict of course, since the existence – the persistence through time – of appearances is
exactly what is the content of “thick” experience,338 which must be the sense of
‘experience’ that is relevant here.
Principle B is concerned with conscious representations.339 If any connection of these
are to constitute or make possible experience, I take it that the conscious representations
in question must be objective representations, in a word: cognitions. So principle B states
that one can only have “thick” experience (i.e. of “weighty” objects) through
representation of a necessary connection of cognitions. This is emphasised in the next
paragraph, Kant’s “proof” of the general principle, where he discusses
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what is essential in a cognition of objects of the senses, i.e., of experience (not merely
intuition or sensation of the senses).340
 So, according to principle B, if we are to have experience, we must have it by way of
representing a necessary relation of intuitions.
In principle A it is stated that appearances must be subject a priori to rules governing
the determination of their mutual time-relations. Now, saying that appearances are subject
a priori to rules is, I take it, just saying that the intuition of them stand in necessary
relations. Remember that necessity is one of the sure criteria of the a priori, and to say
that the objects of intuitions are subject to rules is obviously just a way of saying that the
intuition of those objects are related in certain ways. To say that they are subject a priori
to rules, is to say that the intuitions of them are related necessarily.
However, principle A gives us one important specification of the nature of the
relation of intuitions in question which is missing in B, namely that the rule governs the
determination of the intuitions’ relation to one another in time. So, if we combine all of
these insights we can reformulate the general principle of the Analogies of Experience in
the following way:
“Thick” experience of “weighty” objects is possible only by way of representing
some necessary temporal relation of intuitions.
Kant’s initial formulations are ambiguous, in that one might either conclude that there is
one necessary temporal relation of intuition that is such that experience is only possible
through it, or that each instance of experience is only possible through some necessary
temporal relation. However, his subsequent comments shows that Kant holds the latter:
The three modi  of time are persistence, succession,  and simultaneity. Hence three
rules of all temporal relations of appearances, in accordance with which the existence341 of
each can be determined with regard to the unity of all time, precede all experience and first
make it possible.342
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Since the time-relations in question are supposed to be necessary, they are of course just
instances of the transcendental time-relations mentioned in the “Schematism”,343 so what
we are looking for are strict universal temporal relations of intuitions. But this
immediately raises the question of how we can have knowledge of such strict universality,
since that  is precisely something that would go beyond anything which experience could
tell us. Part of the answer of course is the claim that experience is only possible through
these rules, and if that is true, then we can deduce the existence of these rules from the
premise that we do have experience. However, it would seem not to be a necessary truth
that we have experience, so the existence of the rules is certainly not necessary in that
sense. Kant has in mind a very different conception of necessity though, which is
roughly the idea that firstly, these rules must always be assumed true at the beginning of
any empirical enquiry, and secondly that they could never be falsified by experience. In
this way they are both prior to and independent of experience.
So, supposing that Kant’s forthcoming argumentation will be accepted, we shall know
experience to be possible only through some a priori rule – some necessary relation, but
we shall not thereby know what that rule is on each occasion. And this observation ties in
with Kant’s explanation of the term ‘analogy’. To start with, Kant’s use of the term is
contrasted with its use in mathematics:
In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in
mathematics. In the latter they are formulas that assert the identity of two relations of
magnitude, and are always constitutive, so that if two members of the proportion are
given the third is also thereby given, i.e., can be constructed. In philosophy, however,
analogy is not the identity of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations, where
from three given members I can cognize and give a priori only the relation to a fourth
member but not this fourth member itself, although I have a rule for seeking it in
experience and a mark for discovering it there.344
This difference between quantitative and qualitative analogies can be illustrated quite
clearly by a couple of examples. Let us start out with a quantitative one. Suppose we are
given the following equation:
2
4
=
x
6
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This tells us that there is something (x) which is related to 6 as 2 is related to 4, and by
simple arithmetic we can find out that this x in fact equals 3.
A qualitative analogy, in contrast, could be something like this:
Immanuel Kant is related to someone in the same way as Nicomachos is related to
Aristotle, his father.
Which could be formalised in the following way (N=Nicomachos, A=Aristotle,
K=Immanuel Kant, F(x,y)= ‘x is the father of y’):
F(A,N) ∧ ∃x[F(x,K)]
Now, this tells us that there is someone (x) who is related to Kant in the same way that
Aristotle was related to Nicomachos, namely as father to son. In other words we know
that someone is Kant’s father, but we do not of course thereby know who he is. However,
and this is the crux of the matter, we do  know what to look for: someone related to Kant
in the same way as Aristotle was related to Nicomachos – we have a “mark for seeking
him in experience”: roughly (in Kant’s day) a man living with the woman who gave
birth to Kant.
As we have seen, the relata of the Analogies of Experience are conscious
representations, and Kant sums up what these Analogies will tell us in the following way:
…if a conscious representation is given to us in a temporal relation to others (even though
indeterminate), it cannot be said a priori which and how great this other conscious
representation is, but only how it is necessarily combined with the first, as regards its
existence, in this modus in time.345
So far, we have no arguments for any of these claims about the Analogies, and the above
is no more than a preliminary survey of what is to come. The analyses and arguments are
presented in connection with each of the three analogies, and only by way of arguing for
the truth and validity of the three Analogies will the validity of the relational Categories
finally be justified. In the following sections, we shall look at each of the Analogies in
turn.
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To bring out what is defensible in Kant’s treatment of the Analogies, I believe it is
necessary critically to re-examine Kant’s arguments whilst keeping the following
considerations in mind:
i) To distinguish clearly between occasional and typical time-relations.346
ii) To distinguish clearly between those arguments that proceed from necessary
conditions for any kind of complex judgements and those that proceed from
necessary conditions for experience of the world as a law-governed whole.347
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C h a p t e r 7 – T h e 1 s t  A n a l o g y – P e r s i s t e n c e a n d S u b s t a n c e 
Kant inherits the concept of substance from the philosophical tradition, and in order to
properly understand the first Analogy, our first exigency is to look somewhat closer at
this notion of ‘substance’ itself.
7.1 The notion of substance
In the philosophical tradition following Aristotle, there are a number of inter-related
aspects of the characterisation of the notion of substance:348
– (Primary) substance is that which exists by virtue of itself as opposed to properties and
relations which only exist as properties or relations of something. This can be termed
‘substance-as-inherence’.
– Substance is that which undergoes change but itself remains the same, i.e. the persistent
in change. This is substance-as-persistence.
– Substance is that of which everything else can be predicated, but which cannot itself be
predicated of anything else. This is substance-as-ultimate-subject.
We shall see that Kant’s analysis results in a conception of substance that encompasses all
of the above aspects of substance within his overall program. In reconstructing this
analysis we shall start with the notion of substance-as-persistence, as that corresponds
closely to the focus of the first Analogy, and see how this ties in with the other senses of
‘substance’.
a) The unity of time and the unity of nature
In the 1st Analogy, Kant seeks to justify a principle of the persistence of substance as a
metaphysical, hence synthetic a priori principle. The structure of the argument is that as
a matter of fact we experience temporal unity, and that the truth of such a synthetic a
priori principle is a necessary condition for experiencing temporal unity. However, the
details of this argument are confusing to say the least.
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There seems to be an important tension between two logically related arguments. In
the introduction to the Analogies Kant investigates conditions for experiencing time as
one-dimensional:
Hence three rules of all temporal relations of appearances, in accordance with which the
existence of each can be determined with regard to the unity of all time, precede all
experience and first make it possible.349
In the 1st Analogy this is used to argue to the effect that our experience must contain
something represented as absolutely persistent; otherwise we could not experience even
occasional succession without violating conditions for experience of time as essentially
one-dimensional. This is the argument from One Time.
In the conclusion to the Analogies, when summing up, Kant seems subtly to have
shifted his ground to conditions for experience of nature as a unity:
Our analogies therefore really exhibit the unity of nature in the combination of all
appearances under certain exponents, […] Thus together they say: All appearances lie in
one nature, and must lie therein, since without this a priori unity no unity of experience,
thus also no determination of the objects in it, would be possible.350
This is the argument from One Nature. Throughout the actual text of the section on the
Analogies it seems that the argument from One Time is dominant, whereas the summing-
up implies that the argument form One Nature has been intended.
It is hard to see how the argument from One Time could be made to work, but it
seems to me that an argument from One Nature could be extrapolated from Kant’s
writings, roughly to the effect that an a priori principle of the persistence of substance is
a necessary condition for distinguishing between subjective and objective relations of
succession, which in turn is a necessary condition for knowledge of the world as a law-
governed whole – i.e. for scientific knowledge.
Kant’s stated idea in the 1st Analogy is that if it were not the case that something is
represented as permanent through all experience, then experience of succession as fitting
into a system of one-dimensional time-relations would be impossible. The argument is
roughly that if we assume the opposite, namely that some substance were to arise out of
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nothing, then we could not explain how we could cognise this occurrence as succeeding
whatever occurrence that immediately preceded it and vice versa.
…if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise … then
everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity
of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity.351
If you assume that something simply began to be, then you would have to have a
point of time in which it did not exist. But what would you attach this to, if not to that
which already exists? for an empty time that would precede is not an object of perception;
but if you connect this origination to things that existed antecedently and which endure
until that which arises, then the latter would be only a determination of the former, as that
which persists…
Substances (in appearance) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of
some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the
empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times,
in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in
which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.352
This argument seems to rely on at least the tacit premise that the particular succession of
experiences is not directly observable. The argument would go that there is nothing
within our experiences that determine how they are ordered in time – they “do not come
with a time-stamp”. Hence there must be something among the represented content that
determine how they are ordered successively in time, and this again requires something
to be represented as constant throughout any proper part of the sum total of our series of
experiences. It is hard to see why this should be accepted. On the contrary it seems that
my experiences do come with “time-stamps”. Even when my experiences are purely
subjective, as in a dream, my experiences are presented as succeeding one another, and I
am able simply to remember what happened before or after what. Of course, it can often
be difficult to remember exactly, and we may sometimes get it wrong, but that is due to
normal imperfection of human cognitive capacities, not to experiences not being
intrinsically temporally ordered. Surely, even if I were to experience the miraculous ab
annihilo appearance of some object I would be able to answer questions of what
happened immediately before the object appeared.
I am not going to offer conclusive arguments either to the effect that the argument
from one time can not be made to work, nor to what it would take to make it work.
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Instead I shall try to reconstruct an argument from One Nature, and show how this does
indeed explain why a pure principle of persistence is a necessary condition for a natural
science that aspires to completeness.
7.2 Transformational judgements
The category of substance, or rather: substance and attribute corresponds in Kant’s
system to the categorical form of judgement. Now, I have argued that categorical
judgements do not differ from mere intuitions in terms of transcendentally logical
significance, that there is no fundamental distinction between subject concept and
predicate concept in such judgements, and that consequently the distinction between
substance and attribute cannot be made on the basis of categorical judgements. (See pp.
139 ff.)
However, it seems to me that there is one kind of relational judgement that is missing
from Kant’s table, and that this does indeed provide the foundation for making the
necessary distinction, namely what I term “transformational judgements”.
Every waking hour, I, like any human knower, experience objects undergoing
changes – transformations. Flowers wilt, the coffee cools in my cup, the cat wakes up, the
telephone rings and my desk fills up with papers. Transformational judgements typically
have as predicate concept a tensed verb,353 and they all entail some kind of change of
state of an object. It is, I take it, an undeniable fact that we do make judgements of this
kind and that we believe the vast majority of them to be true. Let us take this as a premise
then: that we do make transformational judgements, and let our first task be to try to
effect an analysis of what is involved in the making of a transformational judgement.
 Now, I argued (on p. 140) that any categorical judgements could be translated into
intuitions, and that intuitions and categorical judgements thus are equivalent in terms of
logical form. I shall adopt the term ‘simple observation’ as a generic term for intuitions
and categorical judgements. It would be interesting then, to enquire whether transfor-
mational judgements too can be analysed as simple observations – to see whether trans-
formational judgements can be translated into categorical form. I shall argue that such a
translation into categorical form is not possible, but that transformational judgements can
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only be analysed in terms of combinations of simple observations – which brings them
into the domain of the dynamical Categories.
Take as a specimen transformational judgement:
(16) That cup of coffee has cooled
Superficially, this seems to have much in common with a categorical judgement:
‘That cup of coffee’ is the subject clause, and ‘has cooled’ is the predicate concept. But
there is a crucial difference in the predicate concept in this case. The predicate ‘has
cooled’ is clearly not a simple predicate which can be reliably attributed on basis of a
simple observation; rather ‘has cooled’ entails a succession of contradictory simple
predicates, in this case: ‘hot’ and ‘not hot’.354 I further set forth the analytic hypothesis
that any transformational predicate is analysable in this way, in terms of contradictory
simple predicates.355 In some cases this is explicit in constructions which express the
acquisition of some simple predicate, such as ‘grow old’, ‘turn sour’ etc. In other cases
the succession of contradictory simple predicates is more implicit, but then clearly
specifiable by analysis, such as: ‘wilt’ corresponds to ‘not wilted’ and ‘wilted; ‘wake up’
corresponds to ‘sleeping’ and ‘awake’ and so on.
Thus, whereas (16) could be classified as a categorical judgement by general logic
which disregards the meaning of predicates, we see that from the point of view of
transcendental logic, which must also take into account the possibility of knowledge by
way of the predicates employed, it cannot pass muster as a categorical judgement as it
stands, but must be further analysed in order to investigate its relationship with bona fide
categorical judgements. So, it seems to me, by considerations of a judgement’s role in
the acquisition of knowledge, not merely its role in inferences, we must distinguish
transformational from categorical judgements, just as Kant found it necessary to
distinguish between singular and universal judgements.356
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And we can take our transcendentally logical considerations further: Since a
transformational judgement is clearly an empirical judgement, we can draw upon the
conclusions of section 4.1c), in particular the demand that the subject of a judgement be
an object of intuition (p. 84). Let us first try to articulate what is required in terms of
observation in order to make a transformational judgement, and then see what must be
brought in in addition, and what conclusions can be drawn from that.
Clearly, to be able to make the judgement that (16), I must first of all perceive a
suitable portion of coffee; and to affirm that it is indeed cold, I must also perceive its
coolness, for example by touching its surface with my lips and perceiving its lack of heat,
prompting me to utter truthfully: “That coffee is cold”. This will indeed warrant my
judging that the coffee is cold, but that is not the same as judging that it has cooled – nor
is it entailed by it, unless one assumes that all coffee has been hot at some time, and that
is manifestly false (you can make café froid by dissolving instant coffee granules in cold
water, though you need to stir vigorously). To restate the point about transformational
predicates in this special case: To be in a position to say that the coffee has cooled, it
seems that I must be able to correctly ascertain not only that the coffee is now cold, but
also that it was hot. This in itself poses no great problem of course, I may have observed
as much at the time. Suppose that I start working at 10 am and that upon seating myself I
take a sip of my freshly brewed cup of Mocha Java and so doing make the simple
observation that the coffee is hot. Now, we can imagine, I become engrossed in
philosophical speculation and the cup is left untouched until 12:30, when I suddenly
reach for it, lift it to my lips and consequently make the simple observation that the
coffee is cold. While I grant that I now have good grounds for asserting that the coffee
has cooled, I submit that I have so not solely on the basis of the two cited simple
observations. To demonstrate this, we need only envisage a story wherein I make two
successive simple observations with precisely the same content as the original ones, but
where this does not warrant the judgement that the coffee has cooled. Suppose I start out
by pouring myself a cup of Mocha Java fresh from the percolator, immediately take a sip
and make the simple observation that the coffee is hot, whereupon I distractedly leave the
cup on the kitchen counter and go to work at my desk. Some time later I reach for the
cup I left on my desk yesterday and make the simple observation that the coffee is cold.
Now clearly, these two observations do not  warrant my judgement that the coffee has
cooled while I have been working. – Which coffee, in that case? The cup on the desk or
the cup left in the kitchen? It might even be possible that the first cup is still hot if I
accidentally left it on the hot plate which I forgot to turn off.
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Since my two simple observations are not simple observations of one and the same
portion of coffee, they can not warrant any judgement concerning transformations of
one of them. –Yet these simple observations have precisely the same content as those in
the original version of the story.357
To generalise: A simple observation that some A is B, followed by simple observation
that some A is ¬B does not warrant the judgement that some A has been transformed
from being B to ¬B. To make such a judgement we clearly need the further premise, that
it be one and the same A which was B then and is ¬B now. And this condition, that one
and the same object be the object of two distinct simple observations is not something
that can itself be established by any simple observations. – Neither of the two obser-
vations in question will do of course, since what we want to know is the obtaining or not
of some relation between them. And if we suppose a third simple observation to link
them, we would obviously then need some warrant for asserting that the object of this
third simple observation be the same as the objects of the first ones, and so on in an
infinite, vicious regress. Nor will it make much sense to suppose that we have one simple
observation of A in which both B and ¬B are asserted of it, as any attempt at expressing
such an observation would simply amount to a contradiction in terms: “This coffee is
hot and not hot”.
My point here is not to try to raise some sort of sceptical worry that we may never
know whether one and the same object is ever the object of two distinct simple
observations, and thus that we might perhaps never be in a position reliably to make
transformational judgement. Clearly, we do  make such judgements, and though the
investigation of conditions of the possibility of re-identification of objects is no doubt
not without merit or interest, our ability to re-identify objects is not in question here. We
clearly make such judgements every day, and in practice we do not doubt our general
ability to re-identify objects. This is taken as a premise here, and we want to find out what
conclusions regarding Pure Concepts that can be drawn from that premise.
7.3 The Form of Transformational Judgements
Given the analysis above, we can begin to specify some formal requirements for
transformational judgements:
– They cannot be translated into any simple observation, i.e., a categorical judgement
or an intuition.
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– They consist of a subject clause and a predicate being successively attributed and
negated (or vice versa) of an object.358
If we let the ellipsis (…) signify temporal succession, we can symbolise the basic form of
a transformational judgement in the following way:
ΘA is (B … ¬B)
Where ‘A’ is the subject concept and ‘B’ is the predicate concept.
We shall see presently, that all the desired consequences regarding the Pure Concept of
Substance and the corresponding Pure Principle can be drawn from the premise that we
make transformational judgements and this proposed analysis of their form.
7.4 The Principle of Persistence
In translating Kant’s convoluted German into English, there is frequently a considerable
risk of distorting points of his arguments, and in particular the first Analogy – the
“Principle of the Persistence of Substance” seems to be prone to distortion.
Both the first and the second Analogy focus on change and closely related notions.
Kant draws fine and important distinctions between these notions and in order to make
sense of his arguments we too need to keep them clearly apart.
a) The ambiguity of ‘change’
The English word ‘change’, which is used in the Cambridge translation, has an
ambiguity which can be illustrated by comparing the two expressions ‘the changing of
the guards’ and ‘the guards changing’. The former suggests that one set of guard is
replaced with another set, while the latter is more naturally used to denote that one and
the same set of guards is undergoing some change such as growing old or changing their
uniforms. The former is an alternation while the latter is a transformation. Now, in the
first Analogy Kant uses the German word ‘Wechsel’359 which unambiguously means
alternation, i.e., a replacement of one thing with another. In the second Analogy, the
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term ‘Veränderung’ is introduced into the discussion, and Kant takes care to explicitly
define it as “a successive being and not-being of the determinations of the substance that
persists there”360 – i.e., transformation. In quoting from the Analogies I shall modify
Guyer & Wood’s translation so as to use ‘alternation’ for ‘Wechsel’ and ‘transfor-
mation’ for ‘Veränderung’.
Before proceeding any further with the discussion of the First Analogy, I believe it is
helpful to quote it in full after the second edition:
First Analogy.
Principle of the persistence of substance.
In all alternation of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased
nor diminished in nature.
Proof
All appearances are in time, in which as substratum (as persistent form of inner intuition),
both simultaneity as well as succession can alone be represented. The time,
therefore, in which all alternation of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does not
alternate; since it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be represented only as
determinations of it. Now time cannot be perceived by itself. Consequently it is in the
objects of perception, i.e., the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered that
represents time in general and in which all alternation or simultaneity can be perceived in
apprehension through the relation of the appearances to it. However, the substratum of
everything real, i.e., everything that belongs to the existence of things, is substance,
of which everything that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination.
Consequently that which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of
appearance can be determined is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in appearance,
which as the substratum of all change always remains the same. Since this, therefore,
cannot alternate in existence, its quantum in nature can also neither be increased nor
diminished.361
It is also useful to note the formulation of the principle that is given in the 1st edition:
All appearances contain that which persists (substance) as the object itself, and that
which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists.362
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b) The claim and its proof
As usual, Kant’s argumentation is quite dense and confusing, so I shall adopt the strategy
of first trying to elucidate the claim, and then give independent arguments in its support,
tying this in with points from Kant’s text as and when it is relevant.
First of all, then, we need to establish exactly what the Principle of Persistence claims.
Significantly, the Principle is presented as a conjunction of two sub-claims:
(1) Substance persists through all alternation of appearances
(2) The “quantum” of substance is never increased or diminished in nature.
We shall see that while (2) does not exactly follow from (1), the justification of the
former is nevertheless vital to establishing the latter. In this regard, we should first of all
bear in mind that the Analogies are analogies of experience – that they are supposed to
be universally valid for all possible experience, but specifically not for things in
themselves independent of experience. The sub-claims are claims about what could count
as a possible experience for us, on what might or might not be possible beyond that, we
can give no verdict. The principle of persistence is thus not making a transcendent
metaphysical claim to the effect that of that which we call substance it is true (de re) that
there is no possible world in which this could increase or decrease in quantity. Rather, the
claim is that it is impossible for us to have an experience as of the increase or decrease in
the quantity of whatever we term ‘substance’ in nature (2), and that it is impossible for us
to have an experience as of the alternation of substances, not merely of appearances (1).
To examine this claim we shall start out by looking at the kind of judgements of
temporal change that we routinely make, namely transformational judgements, the form
of which was discussed on p. 194. First, we shall see that from this we can derive both a
notion of substance-as-ultimate-subject and the beginnings of a notion of substance-as-
persistence;363 next that no transformational judgement could constitute experience of
arising or perishing of substance. Thereafter we need to show in addition that not only
could we not experience an arising or perishing of substance by way of a transfor-
mational judgement, but moreover, we could not experience the alternation of substance
in any other way either. My strategy will be to try to show that nothing could count as
evidence for a judgement of the arising or perishing of substance.
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c) Transformational judgements and The Ultimate Subject
One of the standard definitions of substance is as that which can be thought of as subject
only and never as mere predicate. This idea is most clearly expressed in the Critique just
prior to the Transcendental Deduction where Kant explains the relation between
intuitions, the logical functions of judgement and transcendental logic:
Through the category of substance …, if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is
determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject,
never as mere predicate…364
But we need some further elaboration of this notion of substance in order to appreciate
its connection with the present concerns. Prior to that, however, I should like to warn
about, and hopefully fend off, one initially tempting but ultimately misleading way of
thinking of the notion of substance:
As we are discussing the possibility of or otherwise of the arising or perishing of
substances, it might be tempting to think of substances as a particular kind of entity,
possessing the unusual property of being indestructible and uncreatable. It seems that
atoms or elementary particles can be thought of in this way, and one might then be
tempted to identify these with substances. This is in effect to try to determine substances
as one kind of entity in distinction from others, and it seems not implausible to construe
one of the aims of physics to be the discovery of these.
There are, however, several reasons why this cannot be a correct view of the Kantian
notion of substance. For one thing the supposed impossibility of the arising and
perishing of elementary particles is clearly physical365 – there is no logical, general or
transcendental, nor epistemological reason why one could not witness the destruction or
creation of elementary particles. But more conclusively, it quickly becomes clear from
textual considerations, that a “physical” interpretation of the notion of substance such as
outlined above is wholly inappropriate as an interpretation of Kant: We should remember
that in being the subject of a categorical judgement (or on my revised story: a
transformational judgement) an object is ipso facto  brought under the category of
substance; which is to say that any object capable of being the subject of such a
judgement also falls under the concept of substance. And any and every knowable of
object is of course capable of being the subject of such a judgement, as it is precisely
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through such judgements that we acquire knowledge of objects,366 which again entails
that any and every knowable object falls under the concept of substance. So ‘substance’
cannot be a concept that picks out a particular class of entities;367 rather it must be a
particular conception of things in general.
So, in enquiring into the nature of substance, we are not looking for a class of entities
that can only be thought of as subject and never as mere predicate; rather we are looking
for a concept or class of concepts that can appear as subject only and never as mere
predicate. Now, if we think about things by way of concepts, and if there are in fact such
a concept (or concepts) which can only appear in judgements as subject, it would seem
fair to say that whatever is represented by that concept is that as-yet-unknown which can
be thought as subject only – and ‘substance’ is just a name for this as-yet-unknown.
This then, raises two questions:
(a) Why should we believe that there is such a concept (or concepts) which can only
appear in a judgement as subject, never as predicate?
(b) Assuming there is such a concept, why could we never experience an arising or
perishing of that which the concept represents?
Note that in answering these two questions, we shall also be providing justifications for
the two sub-claims of the Principle of Persistence. This will hopefully become clearer
below.
7.5 That concept which can be thought as subject only
We shall start with the first of these two questions and seek to justify the claim that there
must be a concept which can only appear in a judgement as subject and never as
predicate. We should remember that we are now engaged in conditions of “thick”
experience, namely temporal relations between mere observations, which means that we
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are entitled to restrict ourselves to judgements involving references to time – in a word:
transformational judgements.
I argued (on p. 194) that a transformational judgement consists in a categorical
judgement and its subsequent negation with the proviso that the subject be the same in
the two categorical judgements. This should mean that all conditions for categorical
judgements must also be conditions for transformational judgements (but not necessarily
vice versa). Now, we saw in section 4.1e) that the subject concept of a basic empirical
judgement must be a sortal concept.368 Consequently, non-sortal, i.e., qualitative concepts
cannot be subject concepts of transformational judgements, but must always be thought
as predicates only. This, however, is the converse of what we are after, namely the
supposed concept which can only occur as subject, never as “mere” predicate. It is clear
from the above that this must be a concept which is capable of being used sortally, but
which one?
The problem is that it seems that for any concept occurring as the subject concept in
a categorical judgement, we can think of another possible judgement of which that
concept is the predicate. For instance, “That stallion is black” is a possible judgement,
but “that horse is a stallion” is equally possible; “Socrates is mortal”, but “that man is
Socrates”; “that sweet fruit is an apple”, but “that apple is a sweet fruit” and so on and
so forth.
However, if we bring in the further restriction of looking at transformational
judgements, we can make some headway. Let’s take a reasonably straightforward
example of a transformational judgement:
(17) Those flowers wilted
Now, we want to know whether the subject concept, ‘flower’, could appear also as the
predicate of a transformational judgement. Remember, a transformational judgement
involves a predicate being subsequently affirmed and denied or vice versa of something.
At first sight, we might suppose that such a judgement is:
(18) Those buds have blossomed
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(I take it that ‘to blossom’ means ‘to become a flower’, so that ‘blossom’ signifies the
successive non-being and being a flower.)
(18) seems at first sight to be a perfectly decent transformational judgement, but I
shall claim that there is more to this judgement than meets the eye.
First, let us examine in what circumstances such a judgement could be made: If we
assume that the judgement be true, it is clear that it could not be made by the judger
pointing to or otherwise indicating a bunch of buds and claiming of them that they have
blossomed; because if they truly have blossomed, then they are by that very fact no
longer buds, hence there are no longer any buds there for the judger to indicate by the
subject phrase ‘those buds’. In fact, ‘those buds’ could only enter into a discourse as
anaphora for ‘the buds I described earlier’ or some such sort of descriptive phrase. So
then, in asserting that those buds blossomed, what are we asserting? Clearly we are
asserting that previously, in some location specified by context and/or indication, there
were some buds, whereas now there are some flowers; but there has to be more than that.
If someone were to cut the buds off a rosebush and then glue on some flowering roses
from elsewhere, we would clearly have a case where there used to be buds, and now there
are flowers; but that would not  be a case of the aforementioned buds blossoming –
becoming flowers. For that , something more is required, and here we might find
ourselves wanting to say that in such a case it is the very same buds that we saw earlier,
which are now flowers, hence no longer buds – but that is absurd. They can’t both not be
buds (because they are flowers) and at the same time be buds (i.e., the very same buds as
the ones before). If they are not buds at all, how could they be the very same buds? That
is like saying that this man is the very same horse that I saw yesterday.
But exactly what then are we asserting? Clearly we are sometimes able to say truly
that these buds will one day blossom – those flowers did grow from buds. The answer is
quite simple, of course, and the discussion above does admittedly have an air of
sophistry. What we mean by saying that those buds blossomed is simply that the very
same things which were once buds are now flowers. By way of a more general concept
which subsumes both buds and flowers we are able to think of the blossoming as a
transformation of a persisting entity, and it is this that allows us to conceive of the idea
that it is the very same part of the plant which used to be a bud and is now a flower. In
order to be able to distinguish between cases of a replacement of some things which
happen to be buds with some other things which happen to be flowers from cases of buds
genuinely growing into flowers, we need to avail ourselves of a sortal concept which is
compatible both with being a bud and with being a flower – e.g. ‘part of a plant’.
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So, now we have found at last a canonical transformational judgement, where
‘flower’ is the predicate:
(19) That part of the plant grew from bud into flower
But what about the subject concept of this judgement – ‘part of a plant’. We must now
continue our quest, and ask: Could that concept in turn appear as the predicate of a
transformational judgement?
And yes, it seems that it could. We believe that the biomass of a plant is derived from
the soil wherein it is growing,369 and in a controlled experiment in a terrarium we might
be able to judge, say, that a certain amount of soil turned into the stem of the plant; or to
use the canonical notation:
(20) That mass of matter was transformed from soil into a part of the plant
But now, we seem to have reached a limit: It seems hard to imagine a possible judgement
to the effect that something which did not consist of matter now does or vice versa. Even
though matter can be transformed, and a certain mass of matter can partly or wholly
constitute very different things, we do not seem to believe that anything could be turned
into matter, nor that any thing which is already matter could cease to be matter.370
Let us take this at face value, initially: If it really is the case that we have reached a
limit, that seems to entail that there has in some sense been a direction to our quest for
ever new transformational judgements where the subject of the earlier appeared as
predicate of the later. In other words: there seems to have been a structure to the possible
combinations of concepts into meaningful transformational judgements. To make
‘flower’ the predicate of a transformational judgement, we needed a more
general concept as subject, namely ‘part of a plant’. I take it that saying that ‘part of a
plan’ is a more general concept than ‘flower’ just is to say that a part of a plant may or
may not be a flower, but a flower cannot but  be a part of a plant. Similarly a mass of
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matter may or may not be a part of a plant, but a part of a plant cannot but be a mass of
matter.371
So, by appealing to our intuitions about what could be a possible transformational
judgement (and thus exploiting our implicit knowledge of the intensions of concepts) we
can come to realise that sortal concepts stand in relations of generality and specificity,
and that these relations determine their possible combinations in possible
transformational judgements.
The existence of this system of relations between concepts plays an important part in
Kant’s philosophy in general. For one thing, it is necessary to explain analytic
knowledge, and as we are about to see, it is essential to the explanation of the categories.
We shall therefore pause briefly at this point to look at the backdrop to this notion of an
interrelatedness of concepts, which we find in Kant’s Logic.
a) Generality and specificity of concepts
I take it that we do not need to appeal to experience in order to realise that nothing could
be both flower and bud (in the senses used above). Being a flower entails not being a
bud and vice versa. Similarly nothing could be a flower and fail to be part of a plant.
(Even if cut and placed in a lapel, the rose is still part of a plant, albeit detached). It is not
just that so far we have not come across any exceptions to these – we seem compelled to
assert that there could not possibly  be any such. Research projects to search the
rainforests for blossoming flowers which are still buds would scarcely receive funding.
Clearly, we have some knowledge of compossibility of subsumption under various
concepts which goes beyond experience. Kant’s explanation for this – which is not too
controversial – is that we have (at least tacit) knowledge of the intensions of concepts. As
mentioned (on p. 47), concepts’ extensions are the parts of the world to which the
concepts are correctly applicable. These extensions may overlap in various ways: more
than one concept may, and normally will, be applicable to any given part of the world.
Thus, we should expect it to be the case that sometimes the extension of one concept, say
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‘P’, will lie totally within the extension of another concept, say ‘Q’ while the extension
of ‘Q’ does not lie totally within the extension of ‘P’. If this is the case, then it is true
that all P’s are Q’s. On occasion this will clearly be something we come to believe based
on experience, when we generalise from observed cases – like our belief that all ravens
are black. Sometimes, however, we seem to know truths of this form independently of
experience, for instance: ‘All bachelors are men’, and it is reasonable to assume that we
know this in virtue of knowing how these concepts should be applied to the world –
knowing criteria of their application.372 Knowledge of that which determines to what part
of the world a concept should correctly be applied, is termed knowledge of the intension
of a concept. Thus this account assumes the existence of intensions of concepts and that
these determine the extensions of concepts, which is to say that sameness of intension
entails sameness of extension, but not vice versa. For present purposes it will remain
totally open what the knowledge of intensions amounts to, or how it is possible to know
the intensions of concepts. We shall only take it that intensions determine extensions, and
that knowledge of intensional relations of concepts will yield knowledge of extensional
relations independently of experience. In non-technical terms this amounts to saying no
more and no less than that if I know the meaning ‘bachelor’ and the meaning of ‘man’
I can know that if there are any bachelors, they are all men, without needing recourse to
experience.
Now to the distinction between more and less general concepts, which in Kant’s
terminology is the same as that between higher and lower concepts. The definition of this
relation is simply that if by virtue of the intensional relations  between two concepts ‘P’
and ‘Q’ the extension of ‘P’ falls wholly within the extension of ‘Q’ and the extension
of ‘Q’ does not fall wholly within the extension of ‘P’, then Q is a higher concept with
respect to P and P is a lower concept with respect to Q. The italicised clause is inserted to
exclude cases where the extensional relations are due to purely contingent facts – ‘black’
is not a higher concept than ‘raven’.373 If the extensions of two concepts fall wholly
without each other, yet both fall wholly within the extension of a higher concept by
virtue of their intensional relations, then those concepts can be said to be ‘co-ordinate’
concepts. Note that ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ are purely relative terms. This relation of
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higher and lower concepts is the same as that between species and genus. The above
claims are summarised clearly by Kant in his Logic:374
§7. Intension and Extension of Concepts
Every concept, as a partial concept, is contained in the representation of things; as a
ground of cognition, i.e. as a characteristic, it has these things contained under it.  In the
former regard, every concept has an intension; in the latter, it has an extension.
Intension and extension of a concept have an inverse relation to each other. The more a
concept contains under it, the less it contains in it. […]
§8. Magnitude of the Extension of Concepts
The more things stand under a concept and can be thought through it, the larger its exten-
sion or sphere. […]
§9. Higher and Lower Concepts
Concepts are called higher (conceptus superiores) so far as they have other concepts under
them, which in relation to them are called lower concepts. A characteristic of a
characteristic – a distant characteristic – is a higher concept; the concept in reference to a
distant characteristic is a lower concept. […]
§10. Genus and Species
The higher concept in regard to its lower concept is called genus, the lower in respect of
its higher, species.
Just as higher and lower concepts, so the concepts of genus and species are also not
different by their nature but only in respect of their relation to one another in logical
subordination (termini a quo or ad quod).
Note that it is not claimed that all concepts stand in relations of higher and lower to each
other. For instance, there seems to be no sense in asking which concept is the higher of
‘yellow’ and ‘acidic’. Indeed in the case of qualitative concepts it seems that the relation
of higher and lower is not prevalent,375 but the case is different with sortals and substance
concepts. Our conceptual grasp of our world is permeated with concepts that fall into
precisely such relations. Biology is scarcely conceivable without the elaborate
                                                
374 In my presentation I have weakened those claims which seem inessential to the arguments of the Transcendental
Deduction, so as to keep the premises as uncontroversial as possible.
375 Though one might use the subordination model in saying for instance that ‘red’ and ‘green’ are co-ordinate concepts,
and both subordinate to the higher concept ‘coloured’. We have to draw some fine distinctions between the concepts of
‘colour’ and of ‘coloured’ though, and I am not sure what is the correct analysis in these cases. Anyway, nothing will
rest on any claims about subordination or lack thereof of qualitative concepts.
Kant and the Epistemology of Metaphysics Eilert Sundt-Ohlsen
– 204 –
classificatory systems of classes, orders, families, genera and species; and likewise in
chemistry the systematic division of chemical substances seems indispensable.
b) Summary – conclusions from the analysis of transformational judgements
We have now reached a convenient stage to summarise the results we have reached so far:
We have seen that it is a necessary condition for making transformational judgements
that our concepts stand in relations of generality. This is needed in order to specify what
it is that stays the same – what persists in a transformation; and this again is needed in
order to distinguish between cases where something is replaced by something else from
cases where something changes into  something else. If our concepts did not stand in
relations of generality, we would not be able draw this distinction, but we are clearly able
to draw the distinction (witness the example of roses being glued onto the stems where
the buds used to be as opposed to the buds blossoming), so by modus tollens we are
entitled to infer that our concepts do indeed stand in such relations. This then is an
example of a necessary condition for the possibility of experience – in this case for the
possibility of experience of change, through transformational judgements.
Having established the case for a systematic relation of generality among our
concepts, we can finally approach the drawing of the conclusion to the existence of a
concept that can only occur as subject. First we can sharpen the results of the discussion
about judgements about flowers and parts of plants. This discussion suggested that there
are certain necessary generality-relations among the concepts in a transformational
judgement. As no part of the argumentation was premised on the specific nature of the
change taking place, I believe that we are entitled to generalise from this that
any judgement of something being transformed into something else can be brought into
canonical notation (i.e. ΘA is [B … ¬B]) by way of a more general – a higher – sortal
concept. This can be sharpened into a Principle of Transformation:
If a sortal concept P is to be used as a predicate concept in a transformational
judgement whose subject concept is S, then S must be a higher concept than P.
Further, we saw that the subject concept of one transformational judgement could figure
as the predicate concept of another only if we could find some higher concept of which
to predicate it. So we went looking for ever higher concepts: ‘Bud’/‘flower’, ‘part of a
plant’, ‘mass of matter’. But this “conceptual ascent” has to end somewhere, else we
would have to allow an infinity of concepts (and how could that be grasped by a finite
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human mind?); or we would need a circularity of concepts, but that would entail that the
generality relation was not transitive, which it clearly is.376 We must therefore be able to
reach a highest concept. In Kant’s words:
When we think a series of several concepts subordinated to one another … we can here
obtain ever higher genera, for every species is always to be considered as a genus in
respect of a lower concept, e.g., the concept learned man in respect of the concept
philosopher – until we lastly come to a genus that cannot again be a species. And to such a
one we must at last be able to come, because there must be in the end a highest concept
(conceptus summus) from which as such no further abstraction can be made without making
the entire concept disappear.377
Now, if we combine this with the Principle of Transformation, we can conclude that such
a highest concept cannot appear as predicate of a transformational judgement, because
there is no higher concept of which it could be predicated. But that is just the definition
of the substance concept that we started out with, so the substance concept must be
identical to the highest concept.
So, at last we have answered the first of the questions on p. 198, why there must be a
concept that can occur as subject only, never as mere predicate: Because the making of
transformational judgements requires a structure to our concepts, such that there is a
highest concept which cannot appear as predicate. This concept is termed ‘the substance
concept’, but so far, we do not know which concept it is – we do not know its empirical
content.378
Nevertheless, we can now begin to answer the second question, why there could not
be an experience as of the arising or perishing of substance: Because the substance
concept can only occur as the subject concept of a transformational judgement and the
subject concept denotes that which persist – stays the same – through a transformation, it
is clear that no change of substance – no increase or decrease in amount of substance, no
arising or perishing of substance – can be known through a transformational judgement.
Thus, throughout all known transformation, the amount of substance must necessarily
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–save for the fact that we suggested tentatively on p. 200 that ‘matter’ seemed to be a concept, the extension of which
we could not conceive of as arising or perishing. More of this later
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stay the same. This now, is a partial justification of Kant’s conclusion towards the end of
the chapter on the First Analogy:
Transformation can therefore be perceived only in substances, and arising and perishing
per se cannot be a possible perception unless it concerns merely a determination of that
which persists, for it is this very thing that persists that makes possible the
representation of the transition from one state into another, and from non-being into
being, which can therefore be empirically cognized only as changing determinations of
that which lasts.379
This, however, is not yet enough, it seems to me. Granted, we could not know of the
arising or perishing of substance through a transformational judgement. But are
transformational judgements the only means by which we can apprehend change? – Why
should it be impossible  for us to experience substance “appearing out of nowhere” or
“vanishing without trace”, supposing for the sake of argument that this were to happen?
This challenge must, and indeed can, be met, I think; and we shall see that it ties in
intimately also with the concerns of the Second Analogy.
7.6 The regulativity of the Principle of Persistence
As we have seen above, according to Kant’s First Analogy of Experience, it is impossible
for us to have an experience as of the arising or perishing of substance. Because
substance is that which is thought as the ultimate subject of any transformational
judgement, it is clear that no transformational judgement could constitute experience of
the arising or perishing of substance. But that does not in any obvious way by itself rule
out the possibility of simply observing such a substantial alternation. It seems perfectly
easy to imagine objects miraculously appearing, so why should such an experience be
impossible?
Kant does give some arguments to this effect, but in my opinion they are
unfortunately rather inconclusive, if not to say downright weak. Partly this is due, I think,
to his failing to distinguish sufficiently between typical and occasional time relations,
which I mentioned in section 6.1e). In the introduction to the Analogies section this
distinction figures, but by the time he gets around to arguing for the individual
Analogies, the distinction is largely absent. In addition I believe that the weaknesses in
the arguments for the Analogies is due to Kant’s still relying partly on the
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Transcendental Aesthetic. I do however, believe, that arguments can be given which are
not subject to these weaknesses, and that these are related in interesting ways to Kant’s
own arguments and examples. But before we turn to that discussion, we need to get a
little clearer about just what is and isn’t claimed.
The Principle of Persistence is one of three “Analogies of Experience” which in turn
form one of four groups of “synthetic principles of pure understanding”. These
synthetic principles are supposed to pertain to all and only possible experience, while the
Analogies are said to be regulative principles so pertaining. It should be instructive then,
to determine what exactly is meant by a “regulative principle”, and in precisely what
way it is supposed to pertain to experience.
a) Constitutive and regulative principles
In the section explaining the notion of analogies of experience as such, preceding the
treatment of the three individual analogies, Kant explains the difference between the first
two groups of principles, the mathematical, and the last two groups, the dynamical:
…they [the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thought] are only
regulative principles, and […] they differ from the mathematical principles which are
constitutive…380
So, the Analogies are regulative principles, in distinction from the mathematical
principles (Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Conscious Representation) which
are constitutive.
I am not here going to go into the specifics of just how the mathematical principles
are supposed to be constitutive or how that is or could be justified; but it may be helpful
to dwell slightly on the very notion of constitutivity itself, in order that we may contrast it
with the regulative nature of the Analogies.
It is initially tempting to see Kant’s distinction between constitutive and regulative
principles as coinciding with the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.
It is easy to see how an analytic principle would be constitutive: For instance, it seems
analytically true that every effect has a cause – that is just part of what it is to be an effect,
part of the meaning of the word ‘effect’. This also fits well with Kant’s characterisation
of the mathematical principles as unconditionally necessary.381 True, analytic principles
are broadly logically necessary which could well be termed ‘unconditionally necessary’.
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However, both the mathematical and the dynamical principles are expressly presented
as synthetic principles. They are all treated in the section “Systematic representation of
all synthetic principles”. Kant is also unequivocally clear that analytic principles could
never figure in metaphysics. In an appendix to the Prolegomena, criticising the then
current state of metaphysics, Kant writes:
Let the concepts of substance and of accident be ever so well analyzed and determined; all
this is very well as a preparation for some future use. But if we cannot prove that in all
which exists the substance endures and only the accidents vary, our science is not the least
advanced by all our analyses. Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove a priori
either this proposition or that of sufficient reason, still less any more complex theorem
such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed any synthetic proposition. By all
its analyzing, therefore, nothing is affected, nothing obtained or forwarded…382
It seems clear that Kant holds (rightly in my opinion), that there is no metaphysical
mileage to be made solely from considerations of the meaning of terms – from
conceptual considerations. For this reason, I must disagree for instance with Graham
Bird, who seems to hold that the principles of the Analogies are a kind of conceptual
truths:
Kant’s argument is only that the concept of an event presupposes that of a cause in
general, and not that a particular recognition of an event requires us to have discovered the
particular cause. […] The relation between the notions of a cause and an event is simply of
a conceptual kind …383
So the challenge is to make sense of how a principle can be constitutive and yet not be
analytic – rest on the meaning of the terms involved. My suggestion is that constitutive
principles follow not from the meaning of the terms, but from the actual (and
contingent) application criteria we happen to use to determine which instances to
subsume under the terms in question. This idea can best be illustrated by an example:
Suppose for the sake of argument that being an elector for the Norwegian parliament
is constituted by being in possession of a valid Norwegian passport. The possession of
the valid passport is the criterion by which the electoral status is determined – by being in
possession of a valid passport one is ipso facto an elector. Thus, all and only genuine
electors for the Norwegian parliament will necessarily be in possession of a valid
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Norwegian passport; we will need no census of the population to determine this – no
recourse to experience. Now, as a matter of fact a Norwegian passport has the form of a
small, red booklet. Given this fact, we can know that all genuine electors for the
Norwegian parliament must be in possession of small, red booklets.
This then, is an example of a constitutive, but not analytic principle:
All genuine electors for the Norwegian parliament, will, insofar as they are
genuine electors thereof, be in possession of small, red booklets.
And given the fact of Norwegian passports being small, red booklets, this will be valid for
all possible experience, hence necessary. However, being in possession of a small red
booklet is no part of the meaning of the term ‘elector for the Norwegian Parliament’,
and it is important to note just what kind of necessity is being claimed here. The
necessity is clearly not logical, and there are of course possible worlds in which genuine
electors of the Norwegian parliament are not in possession of small, red booklets; so the
necessity is not “metaphysical”; but given the way that we – rational beings in this world
– determine electoral status and the form in which we actually issue passports, the
principle holds for all experience we may have in this world.
In the case of a valid constitutive principle, any entity of the class falling under the
principle will in virtue simply of being such an entity conform to the principle. Hence
there is no difficulty in understanding why the principle must apply to all possible
experience (which is not to say that there will be no difficulty in establishing the validity
of the principle in the first place, of course).
However, the Analogies (and the Postulates) are not claimed to be constitutive, but
“merely regulative”. As the term suggests, a regulative principle of understanding is one
which regulates – guides the understanding, and as we are here dealing with synthetic
principles of pure  (i.e., a priori) understanding, these principles must be ones that are not
derived or derivable from experience, but which have some kind of valid claim to going
beyond current experience, and extend rather to all possible  experience.
Let us enumerate some demands this makes of a legitimate a priori, i.e., pure
regulative principle:
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i) It must be one which in some sense guides our enquiry, determines “which way to
go” when experience alone does not provide conclusive reasons for choosing to go
one way rather than the other.
ii) As the Pure Principles are supposed to be yielded by the Categories’ application to
appearances and to give principles of the possibility of experience, (see p. 148) a
pure regulative principle must somehow be a condition for (our kind of) experience,
or follow logically from such conditions.
So, one way to elucidate a notion of pure regulative principles, would be to show first that
in empirical investigations certain guiding principles are always assumed – that there are
certain presuppositions always and necessarily made in our quest for empirical
knowledge, and that (our kind of) experience would not be possible without these
assumptions; second that these guiding principles are not automatically satisfied by any
mere cognition of objects qua objects of a certain kind or kinds; and thirdly that these
assumptions are such that nothing could count as their empirical falsification (else their
empirical validity could not be ensured). The pure regulative principles, then, formulate
necessary conditions, not for the existence of objects, but for experience of objects.
To sum up: constitutive principles concern necessary conditions for determining the
existence of entities qua the kind of entities specified in each principle, while regulative
principles concern necessary conditions for the experience qua the kind of experience
specified, of entities.
This is, I think, essentially what Kant has in mind when explaining the difference
between the mathematical and the dynamical principles:
Hence the principles of the mathematical use will be unconditionally necessary, i.e.,
apodictic, while the principles of the dynamical use, to be sure, also carry with them the
character of an a priori necessity, but only under the condition of empirical thinking in an
experience, thus only mediately and indirectly; consequently these do not contain the
immediate evidence that is characteristic of the former (though their universal certainty in
relation to experience is not thereby injured).384
So, the Kantian claim in the Analogies is in short that there are three interestingly related
necessary presuppositions always made in experience; further that these presuppositions
cannot be empirically falsified, and that they each make possible a kind of judgement of
temporal relations, so that knowledge of time in this sense depends upon these principles.
                                                
384
 A160–1/B199–200
The 1st Analogy – Persistence and Substance 7.6 The regulativity of the Principle of Persistence
– 211 –
This synthetic unity in the temporal relation of all conscious representations, which
is determined a priori, is thus the law that all empirical time-determinations must
stand under rules of general time-determinations, and the analogies of experience, with
which we will now deal, must be rules of this sort.385
Note that Kant here, in the introduction to the Analogies section makes explicit the
distinction between “empirical” and “general” time-determinations. I take it that this
must amount to the distinction between occasional and typical time-determinations that
was treated in section 6.1e) insofar as any single empirical time-determination must be a
determination of a particular sequence of appearances. Of particular interest here is the
entailed claim that all incidental time-determinations must stand under typical ones. We
shall see below that this provides us with important clues towards the understanding of
the Analogies.
But before that we need to establish the claim that pure regulative principles in the
form of necessary presuppositions are always employed in experience, and that they are
of the requisite kind. A prudent strategy for making this case would be first to point out
familiar instances where these principles are brought to bear, showing that  such
principles exist, second to show how these principles work, then to explain why these
principles form necessary conditions for (our kind of) experience.
I shall follow this strategy in some detail with respect to the first Analogy – the
Principle of Persistence. Hopefully, this will have a bearing also on the understanding of
the following two Analogies, so that these may be dealt with somewhat more briefly. To a
certain degree Kant also follows this strategy, so we shall have occasion to draw upon the
Critique as and when appropriate.
I believe that Kant is right in pointing out that regulative principles are in fact at work in
ordinary as well as scientific experience, and that they do make us believe that material
objects cannot appear or disappear save by way of the matter of which they are
composed being transformed, which entails that matter cannot arise or perish.
I find that at all times not merely the philosopher but even the common understanding has
presupposed this persistence as a substratum of all change in the appearances, and has also
always accepted it as indubitable […] But I nowhere find even the attempt at a proof of th is
so obviously synthetic proposition…386
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This, I think, is completely correct. We do find it impossible to imagine matter
disappearing without a trace or appearing out of nowhere,387 yet it is profoundly puzzling
why we do so. Take the sheet of paper on which this sentence is written. We do not think
it could vanish without a trace, but why? There is no logical reason – no contradiction is
involved in stating that some material thing be annihilated, nor in claiming that it appear
ab annihilo. This is just Kant’s point in remarking on the “obviously synthetic” nature
of “the proposition”. Yet Kant seems to be perfectly right in pointing out that the
principle “Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti”388 is at least psychologically
indubitable. But why?
To bring out our conundrum as clearly as possible, let us invoke a thought-
experiment where to all appearances a material object does disappear, and enquire how a
rational agent would and should react in such circumstances.
Enter Jones and the Mystery of the Missing Apple:
Imagine Jones sitting at his desk, a sheaf of papers in front of him – cup of coffee to his
right and a sweetly tempting ripe red apple to his left. Yielding to his desire to feel the
succulently satisfying flesh between his teeth, he extends his left hand anticipating the
cool touch of Royal Gala; but just as he fixes his gaze upon the object of his desire, there
is a sudden mute “whoosh!” of air rushing in to fill an apple-shaped space, and the
apple is no longer there, the vacant saucer its sole sad memento.
Now, should Jones in such circumstances conclude that an apple had substantially
disappeared from the world?
First, let us try to imagine what Jones’ reaction would be: I venture to suggest that his
first reaction would be to look under the desk for the missing apple, then behind the
chair and, finding no trace of it, to conduct a thorough search of the entire room; and
even after having searched the room thoroughly more than once, he would be reluctant
to believe that the apple would be nowhere to be found. Indeed, we can easily imagine
him increasingly frustrated muttering under his breath: “It must be here somewhere – it
couldn’t just disappear!”
Now, whence this last assertion? Jones has just witnessed the disappearance of an
apple, has he not – why does he not believe his own eyes? Jones belief that the apple
could not just disappear seems to be just the application of the Principle of Persistence to
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an actual case, but whence that principle? The description of the case of Jones and the
missing apple, which could be endlessly varied, was meant to illustrate that as a matter of
fact we do employ something like the Principle of Persistence in our day-to-day dealings
with the world. In a way it seems perfectly appropriate to admonish the child not to give
up that search for the missing marble, because it has to be somewhere, it could not
simply disappear. But saying that we do in fact employ such a principle is not proving
that we are justified in doing so, of course, nor does it explain whence the principle is
derived.
The most immediate way to try to explain the origins of this principle might be to say
that it is derived from experience: Jones has had plenty of experience with apples, and
never has he known any of them to disappear without a trace; and neither has any of his
fellow apple-appreciators, so it seems to be a fair conjecture that as a rule, apples do not
disappear. Therefore, he is reluctant to believe this one unprecedented apparent
exception to the rule. Isn’t that just perfectly straightforward induction? Why assume that
anything more than generalisation from experience is involved?
Well, mainly because experience does not  give us reasons to believe that things do not
just disappear. On the contrary, I am tempted to say, most of us will have ample
experience of things going missing with no known trace. The problem of single
members of pairs of socks disappearing should be a sufficient example. If my
experience is anything to go by, socks show an intrinsic tendency for spontaneous
annihilation, and I have ample anecdotal evidence that this is a tendency of socks in
general, not only of those previously in my possession – yet for some reason I do not
accept this evidence, but think that despite all my fruitless searches, the socks must still be
somewhere. We simply do not accept that material objects can disappear, but always
presuppose that either they can still be found or else they have somehow been
transformed.
But maybe this is just an example of coarse, everyday assumptions to be set aside
against the informed and considered judgements of science?
Kant thinks not. In his view the principle of persistence is no less at play in science
than it is in “the common understanding”. An example is given by Kant himself:
A philosopher was asked: How much does smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from
the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will
have the weight of the smoke. He thus assumed as incontrovertible that even in fire the
matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers a transformation in its form.*
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* Inserted in Kant’s copy of the first edition: “Whence does he know this? Not from
experience.”389
Kant’s point here is that the equation “the philosopher” draws upon to devise a method
of determining the weight of the smoke (namely, the weight of the wood burnt equals the
weight of the ashes plus the weight of the smoke) is not one that could be derived from
nor even verified by experience, because smoke cannot be weighed. This means that the
weight of the smoke has to be calculated, and since one cannot check the calculations
against any actually measurable weight of the smoke, one has to assume some sort of
equivalence or other numerical relationship between those quantities that are measurable
in the phenomenon in question; and the Principle of Persistence is just such an
assumption.
As with any concrete example, many interpretations are possible, and such examples as
noted above do by no means constitute conclusive proof that a pure regulative principle
of the persistence of substance is operative in experience, but I believe that the examples
are sufficiently common and recognisable to at least make it plausible that such a
principle may be at work. At the very least we have mentioned a puzzling fact about
human beliefs, namely that most of us do believe in the face of overwhelming evidence
that material objects could not simply disappear. Since the existence of a pure, regulative
principle may at least explain the origin of this belief, I believe we are fully justified in
pursuing Kant’s line of thought, and I shall turn now to the issue of how precisely, the
regulative principle operates.
b) Implementation of the regulative principle
I shall claim that the regulative Principle of Persistence operates at three reasonably
clearly distinguishable levels. These three implementations could be termed “The Never-
Ending Task”, “The Balancing of Books” and “The Conceptual Ascent”. The two
former ones are quite explicitly indicated by Kant, while the third one seems to be
strongly implied.
Let us deal with them in turn.
“The Never-Ending Task” was meant to be exemplified by Jones’ refusal to accept the
disappearance of the apple and by my conviction that my socks must still be somewhere:
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The Principle of Persistence in effect tells us that nothing can come out of nothing, i.e.,
that everything must come out of something; and that nothing can revert into nothing,
i.e., that there must always be something into which a disappearing thing has turned.
Whenever we come into an apparent counter example to the Principle of Persistence,
where for instance nothing is found into which the missing article could have turned, we
are compelled to conclude only that we have not found the “something” yet, we are not
entitled to the conclusion that it could never be found. Thus the Principle of Persistence
tells us to keep looking. Finding that which persists through any change, remains as an
uncompleted task.
Though Kant is quite brief in explaining the Analogies as regulative principles, he
elaborates the notion of a regulative principle considerably in his later treatment of “The
Antinomies of Pure Reason”. Here, he is considering a regulative principle of pure
reason rather than one of pure understanding (which latter is what the Analogies are), but
the idea that a regulative principle presents us with a task – a problem – is illuminating
also in the present context:
The regulative principle of pure reason in regard to the cosmological ideas.
Since through the cosmological principle of totality no maximum in the series of
conditions in a world of sense, as a thing in itself, is given, but rather this maximum can
merely be given as a problem in the regress of this series, the principle of pure reason
we are thinking of retains its genuine validity only in a corrected significance: not indeed
as an axiom for thinking the totality in the ob ject as real, but as a problem for the
understanding, …
Thus the principle of reason is only a rule, prescribing a regress in the series of
conditions for given appearances…390
With the First Analogy, in contrast to the quoted passage, the problem – the task – is not
to complete a series of conditions, but to find the persistent in experience. The regulative
principles tells us how to perform this task, and faced with apparent counter examples, it
instructs us: “Keep looking!”
Now to the second implementation, “The Balancing of Books”, which concerns cases
where we assign a numerical value to a mass of matter, i.e., when we make use of the
scientific notion of mass.
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The quantity of matter – the mass – of a particular object is never directly observable
by itself. We have to make some kind of measurement – perform some kind of practical
test, e.g. by weighing the object in question. This will involve either comparing the object
with certain standard objects (as when weighing on a balance) or observing the joint
effects of several quantifiable forces (e.g. the force of local gravity and the resistance of
a spring as when weighing on a spring scale). In each case there must be more than one
quantity involved, and I believe that the relations between the quantities is such that
ultimately we may devise a system of measurement only by making constitutive
stipulations about at least one quantity. Such stipulations will be necessarily true because
they serve as the foundation for obtaining values for the quantities of the system.391 Now,
the Principle of Persistence tells us that what is conceived of as substance must be
conceived of as unchanging and unchangeable in experience. Further, insofar as matter
is conceived of as substance, and insofar as ‘mass’ is the concept of the quantity of
matter, this implies that we should set up our measurement system by keeping mass
constant throughout all calculations. We should balance our books so as to satisfy the
Principle of Persistence.
The third, and most important implementation is “The Conceptual Ascent”, which is
largely just implied by Kant.
The explanation of this implementation of the principle relies on the discussion in
section 7.5 where we went in search for that which can be thought as subject only never
as mere predicate. We started out with noting that in every transformational judgement
the subject concept will represent the object of the judgement as persisting through an
alternation of mutually incompatible determinations. We further saw that the persisting
conception – the concept representing that which persists through the transformation –
of one judgement could serve as the alternating conception of another; and from this it
seems clear that persistence must be relative to conception.
This idea will turn out to be important in what follows, so I shall expand on it by way
of a few examples. Take a fresh pork chop at your local delicatessen – insofar as it is
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conceived of – thought of, described – as a fresh pork chop it is highly transitory;
conceived of as a lump of meat it may be quite persistent; and conceived of just as a mass
of matter it is, so it seems, totally persistent.392 As for that thing “in itself”, independent
of our conception of it, asking whether it is persistent seems to make very little sense.
Now, the First Analogy states the principle that Substance is persistent throughout
experience. Let us go back to what Kant said about the Analogies in general, which was
discussed in section 6.4a). There it was claimed that whereas an analogy in mathematics
gives us a way of accurately determining “the fourth member”, in philosophy, the
analogy gives us only “a rule for seeking it in experience and a mark for discovering it
there”. But what is it that we have a mark for discovering and a rule for seeking?
The subject of the Analogy as it is stated seems to be “Substance”, so presumably
this is what we have a rule for seeking and a mark for discovering. But the Analogy states
that Substance is always persistent, yet I just claimed that the notion of persistence is only
meaningful relative to some conception. How then can it be claimed that substance is
always persistent? The resolution of this difficulty lies in recalling that we shouldn’t
think of the seeking of “Substance” as a quest for a particular kind of entity, but rather
as a quest for a particular concept,393 namely a concept such that relative to being
thought of by way of that concept, an object is thought of as totally persistent.
To sum up: in virtue of the First Analogy of Experience we have a rule for seeking
the substance-concept in experience; namely to look for the highest concept, i.e., that
concept the extension of which will persist through a maximum number of kinds of
possible transformations; and we have a mark for discovering it, namely that if we find a
concept such that the arising or perishing of its extension is inconceivable, then that  is
the substance-concept in our experience. Now, purely as a matter of fact it turns out that
‘matter’ plays the role of substance in our conceptual scheme, but there is no claim that
this is necessary, only that some concept must play this role.
This leads us to note that there is more to concept acquisition than mere looking
around for suitable candidates among a pre-given number of existing concepts. It is an
important part of Kant’s doctrine that concepts fall within the range of human
spontaneity. We are to a large extent free to devise concepts. We can, within limits, form
concepts to suit our needs.
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Thus, if it should turn out that no concept can be found within our current
experience which answers to the demands of the First Analogy, then that principle tells us
to try to devise such a concept – to try to find some conception such that its extension
persists through all possible transformation.394
Now, we can finally begin to see how it could be the case that the Principle of
Persistence should be valid for all possible experience: If persistence is relative to
conception, and the formation of concepts is within our authority, then we can in a sense
make the Principle of Persistence come out true, by devising a concept such that relative
to it there is something that always persists in experience. Note how this fits in with
Kant’s claims about how the Principle of Persistence must be proved:
In fact the proposition that substance persists is tautological. For only this persistence is
the ground for our application of the category of substance to appearance, and one should
have proved that in all appearances there is something that persists, of which that which
changes is nothing but the determination of its existence.395
So, this implementation of the principle tells us how to look for a concept of the
persistent in experience, and if we find no such concept, it instructs us: “Devise one!”
Yet, there is one lingering doubt: How can we be certain that our attempt at devising such
a concept will always be successful? Is it not possible that things may be sufficiently
strange that no substance-concept could be devised? Surely we have no guarantee that
the world will always conform to our desires.
This is the topic of the final section on the regulativity of the Principle of Persistence.
c) The need for the regulative principle
If the arguments of the preceding discussion are granted, we will by now have reason to
believe that our empirical investigations of the world are guided by non-empirical, hence
pure principles in such a way as to make us attempt to meet the demands of the Principle
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of Persistence to the best of our abilities. We will attempt to devise concepts and
measurement systems such that something will be cognised as persisting throughout all
possible experience. We will try to fit all alternation of appearances into the schema of a
transformation, whereby the alternation is conceived of as a transformation of something
which persists. And in such  apprehensions of alternations of appearances, substance
cannot be perceived of as being increased or decreased. But the First Analogy claims
more, namely that in all alternation of appearances, not merely in those alternations of
appearances which are describable as transformations of some persisting thing, substance
persists. This seems to imply in a sense that we are always successful in meeting the
demands of the Principle of Persistence, not merely that we are always compelled to
attempt to meet it.
In the First Analogy Kant explicitly claims that in all alternations of appearances the
substance persists, and that if this were not so, then we would not be able to have the kind
of knowledge of temporal relations that we do claim to have. This strong claim is
reinforced in the summing-up of the First Analogy which is found in the beginning of
the proof of the second:
That all appearances of the temporal sequence are collectively only transformations,
i.e., a successive being and not-being of the determinations of the substance that persists
there, consequently that the being of the substance itself, which succeeds its not-being, or
its not-being which succeeds its being, in other words, that the arising or perishing of the
substance does not occur, the previous principle has shown.396
Kant’s argument for this stronger claim is basically that the Analogies are necessary
conditions for experience: only by satisfying the demands of the regulative principle can
we have (certain kinds of) experience. More precisely it is the knowledge of time, of
temporal relations, that is said to be dependent on the satisfaction of the Analogies. But
let us return briefly to Jones and the Mystery of the Missing Apple. Assume for the sake
of argument that a miracle took place and the apple really substantially disappeared from
the world. If we take the First Analogy at its word, Jones should not be able to experience
this substantial alternation as a temporal sequence. But surely Jones would be able to
experience that the apple was there one moment, and the next moment was nowhere to be
found; consequently he would surely experience an alternation of appearances, even if
he would forever be trying in vain to comprehend it as a transformation of something
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persistent. Why does Kant think that knowledge of temporal sequences prohibits the
apprehension of substantial alternation?
It is in order to solve this final puzzle that I believe we need to bring in the distinction
between occasional and typical time-relations, and what is involved in knowledge of
these.
The first point to note is that for knowledge of temporal relations concepts are obviously
required: Though I believe, and have argued, that concepts are necessarily involved also
in intuition, that view may be contested; however when it comes to “thick” experience,
and knowledge of temporal relations we need to combine intuitions. No single intuition
can constitute cognition of time, and the only way we can combine single intuitions is by
further subsuming them under concepts in judgements.
This, then, imposes a certain form on empirical knowledge, inasmuch as concepts
have a certain logical form, namely that of generality:
…the concept is a general … or reflected representation… Concept is opposed to
intuition, for it is a general representation or a representation of what is common to
several objects…397
This is basically to note that when we pass judgement on objects, we do so by referring to
them by some concept, which is to say that we refer to them and describe them as being
objects of a certain kind; and there is no way we can refer to, pass judgement on or
describe objects or events without classifying them as members of a kind.398 This is the
vital key to a proper understanding of the Analogies:
When we cognise objects, we cognise them as being of a certain kind. Likewise, when
we connect representations of objects in judging time-relations, we connect
representations of objects as being of a certain kind. What the Analogies are all about is
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explaining principles for connecting representations according to kind – i.e. typical
connections of objects of experience. This is a simplified statement of Kant’s explication
of “the general principle of all three analogies”: “the law that all empirical time-
determinations must stand under rules of general time-determinations”399
In order to have cognitions of objects we must subsume them under concepts in
simple observations, and in order to cognise temporal relations we must further subsume
them under more complex event-concepts. This is in essence just what we do when we
make transformational judgements. When we judge that the apple ripened, we judge that
the alternating non-ripeness and ripeness of the apple are respectively the initial and final
state of the event of the apple ripening. The apple is the object undergoing the event of
ripening. Now, the first Analogy specifies the form of our event-concepts. To fit apparent
alternations into transformational schemata is to subsume them under event-concepts.
And, as we have seen, if nothing can be found to persist throughout the apparent
alternation, then that alternation cannot be subsumed under an event-concept of the
requisite form. This, I think, provides us with an illuminating gloss on Kant’s concluding
remark on the First Analogy:
Persistence is accordingly a necessary condition under which alone appearances, as things
or objects, are [temporally] determinable [as partaking in events] in a possible
experience.400
Still we are left with that persistent (!) question: Why must we subsume occasional
successions of appearances under just these kinds of typical time-relations – why must
our event-concepts have just this form?
But to fully answer that question we, just like Kant, need to bring in considerations
connected to the following two Analogies:
As to the empirical criterion of this necessary persistence and with it of the substantiality
of appearances, however, what follows will give us the opportunity to note what is
necessary.401
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However, in order not to be kept unendurably in suspense, we may note that the
requirements of the regulative principles of the Analogies are necessary conditions for
our idea of nature as a law-governed whole. But more of this in due course.
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C h a p t e r 8 – T h e 2 n d  A n a l o g y – S u c c e s s i o n a n d C a u s a t i o n 
In the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant seeks to justify the principle of causality –
that every event has a cause. The principle of causality thus takes the form of a universal
claim concerning events. Since Kant equates necessity with strict universality, this will for
Kant amount to a refutation of Hume’s claims that we can have no knowledge of
necessity in causal connections. (Whether Hume would accept the equation between
necessity and strict universality and thus concede a refutation even if Kant’s arguments
go through, is of course an open question.)
8.1 Hypothetical Judgements
The starting-point of the second Analogy is the practice of making hypothetical
judgements, such as
(21) If it starts raining, then the streets get wet
Note that this judgement relates two individual judgements, namely
(21)a It starts raining
and
(21)b The streets get wet
hence Kant’s classification of the hypothetical judgement as a relational judgement.
We shall see that the observable fact that we do make such judgements provides
reason to believe that a pure concept of cause–effect and a metaphysical principle of
causality are applied in our empirical investigations.
Note that (at least a large sub-set of) hypothetical judgements are inferentially related
to causal judgements. Suppose that the truth of (21) is known – it really is the case that if
it starts raining, then the streets get wet. Suppose further that I know that it is starting to
rain. This will warrant me in drawing the conclusion that the streets will get wet, and I can
truthfully express this by stating:
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(21)' The streets will get wet because it is starting to rain.
or, in retrospect
(21)'' The streets got wet because it started to rain.
This exemplifies the close relation between a hypothetical judgement and the notion of a
cause.
Clearly, in these cases we are asserting something more than the mere fact that it
started raining, and the streets got wet. Hume famously analysed the causal claim as
involving spatio-temporal contact, constant conjunction and necessity,402 and then
dismissed the claim of necessity as being unfounded and empty.
We are clearly able to distinguish between the mere contingency of my going outside
and it starting to rain, and the necessity of the streets getting wet when it started to rain.
Yet in both cases, when regarding only our particular experience of them, all we have is a
succession of experiences of events. Whence the necessity in the latter case?
Our task is to see whether a justification to the element of necessity in a causal claim
might not be validated in similar fashion to the justification of other pure concepts.
8.2 The Causal Principle
The second Analogy itself is Kant’s reformulation and justification of the traditional
philosophical doctrine of the principle of sufficient reason, but reinterpreted as being a
principle pertaining to knowable nature. Kant states the Analogy thus in the 2nd edition:
Second Analogy.
Principle of temporal sequence according to the law of causality.
Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in
accordance with a rule. 403
And, in the 1st edition:
All transformations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and
effect.404
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Note that the 1st edition formulation makes it explicit that the Analogy pertains to
transformations, hence as I read it, to events. The “principle” does not concern the
temporal order in an event though, which was treated in the first Analogy, but rather the
temporal order of events in a causal connection, i.e. the “connection of cause and
effect”. In essence this states the principle that every event has a cause, which I shall refer
to as the Causal Principle.
Now, in making a completely universal claim about all events; past, present or future;
experienced by me or anyone else or not; the Causal Principle clearly goes beyond
experience, even beyond the collective experience of all of mankind. Since the Principle
is not analytic – there is no contradiction involved in the idea of an uncaused event – the
principle must, if true, be synthetic, and in being universal, it must be a priori; which is to
say that the Causal Principle, if true, is paradigmatically metaphysical.
We need, however, to distinguish the Causal Principle from knowledge of any
particular causal law, such as
(22) If a moving billiard ball hits a stationary one, the latter is thereby brought into
motion
Note that Kant does not claim that our knowledge of particular causal laws is a priori (if
that  was true, we should hardly need experiments in physics). Knowledge of particular
causal laws can only come from experience, and indeed experimentation, but the form
that a causal law must have, or more precisely: the form a judgement must have for it to
qualify as a possible judgement of a causal law, is not derivable solely from experience
and must therefore have its origin a priori. Kant makes this point towards the end of his
treatment of the second Analogy:
[H]ow in general anything can be transformed, how it is possible that upon a state in one
point of time an opposite one could follow in the next – of these we have a priori not the
least concept. For this acquaintance with actual forces is required, which can only be given
empirically, e.g., acquaintance with moving forces, or, what comes to the same thing,
with certain successive appearances (as motions) which indicate such forces.405
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8.3 Causal Laws
We shall look a little closer at the distinction between the two different experiences of
successions of events briefly alluded to in the previous sections. We imagine that one day,
I go outside, and then it starts raining, and shortly thereafter the streets get wet.
This gives us two successions of events: First my going out is followed by the rain
starting; second the rain starting is followed by the streets getting wet.
Now, my beliefs concerning these two successions of events are clearly markedly
different. In the first case, I do not believe there to be any causal connection between my
going out and it starting to rain, while in the second case I believe that the streets got wet
because of the rain starting. In other words: It is possible that I go out, and it doesn’t
start to rain, but ceteris paribus it is not possible that it starts to rain and the streets do not
get wet; which is just to say that there is a necessary relation between it raining and the
streets getting wet, but merely a contingent one between my getting out and it starting to
rain. But whence my knowledge of this necessity – whence my ability to distinguish
between causation and mere succession?
As with the distinction between experiences of objects and of events, we might by now
expect that the knowledge of necessity is connected with regularity – conforming to
rules, and this is exactly what Kant claims:
Thus if I perceive that something happens, then the first thing contained in this
representation is that something precedes, for it is just in relation to this that the
appearance acquires its temporal relation, that, namely, of existing after a preceding time
in which it did not. But it can only acquire its determinate temporal position in this
relation through something being presupposed in the preceding state    on       which     it      always
follows,   i.e.,   follows   in     accordance     with     a   rule   […]406
This rule for determining something with respect to its temporal sequence, however, is
that in what precedes, the condition is to be encountered under which the occurrence always
(i.e., necessarily) follows.407
As we have seen, rule-governedness – regularity – implies repeatability, so causal laws
must involve event-types rather than just particular events. When judging that a particular
event caused another event, I am asserting that they instantiate a relation holding between
the event-types of which the two events are tokens, and the relation in question is this:
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That when an event of the former type occurs, then an event of the latter type always
occur. There is thus a universal temporal relation between the two event-types, namely:
An event of the former type is always followed by an event of the latter type.408 This then
is the general form of the rule to which two events must conform, if they be correctly
judged to stand in a causal relation: that an event of the former kind is always followed
by an event of the latter kind. In Kant’s words “in what precedes, the condition is to be
encountered under which the occurrence always, (i.e., necessarily) follows.”
So far, the discussion of the Causal Principle has been analytic. What Kant has tried
to establish is what is in fact implied  in our causal judgements – what is “contained in”
the concept of causation. In this, his analysis differs little from Hume’s.
Kant’s next step is to enquire into how we are able to make these judgements, with
their implied claims to necessity. How can we judge beyond experience?
Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it
could not be otherwise.409
It is all well and good to know that two events are causally related if they belong to kinds
of events that are related in such a way as to conform to the specification of the Causal
Principle, namely such that the one kind is always succeeded by the other kind, but how
are we to determine whether they are in fact related in this way?
Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative
universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yet
perceived, there is no exception to this rule. 410
Since we must derive our acquaintance with instances of particular causal laws from
experience, and thus clearly know them a posteriori, not a priori, how can we validly
claim any necessity of them?
But here we must recall that it is not the individual causal laws that are claimed to be
knowable a priori, but rather the Causal Principle. Of any particular causal law, we can
indeed only say that “so far as we have yet perceived, there is no exception to this rule”,
and they will in principle always only have a kind of “candidate status” as expressions
of true causal laws. Yet, their hitherto conforming to the Causal Principle is what bestows
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on them their very candidate status, and it is this – the Causal Principle itself – which is
claimed to be knowable a priori, universally true, and a necessary condition for the
experience of certain temporal relations.
This then leaves us with three unresolved questions:
– How do we determine whether an experienced phenomenon conforms to a rule
whose claims go beyond experience?
– How do we justify the universal validity of the Causal Principle?
– Why is the truth of the Causal Principle a necessary condition for experience of
(some) temporal relations?
We shall see that the answer to all these questions turn on considerations of our capacity
for spontaneity, as opposed to the essentially passive faculty of sensibility.
8.4 The test for Causality
Having observed the succession of two events, say the rain starting and the streets getting
wet last Thursday, I have grounds for determining the occasional time-order of these two
events. Furthermore, I may have occasion to enquire into whether this occasional time-
order corresponds to a typical time-order between events of these kinds, which then
amounts to an enquiry into whether there is a causal connection between the rain starting
and the streets getting wet.
The first step is clearly to collate this experience with the rest of my experience, and
find out whether the time-order of events instantiated in my Thursday experience is
invariably instantiated, i.e. to try to establish whether I have ever experienced it starting to
rain, without the streets getting wet (ceteris paribus), and this comparison with my
previous experience could of course easily be extended to the experience of others, by
verbal communication. If the occasional time-order of the events is thus found to
correspond to a strict, typical time-order, I am justified in judging that a necessary time-
order indeed obtains, and the relation between rain starting and the streets getting wet is
elevated to candidate causal law status. If there is an objective causal relation between the
rain starting and the streets getting wet, then these events must be universally related in
experience, hence I take the fact that they have so far always been correlated as an
empirical criterion for subsuming them under the concept of an objective causal relation.
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So, as was the case with the validation of the notion of the object of experience,
considerations of generality – of universality – are brought in to justify judgements of
objectivity.
However, all we have so far is a candidate for a causal law. This first test does not
distinguish events related as of cause and effect from events related as joint, but
temporally successive effects of a common cause or events which reciprocally cause one
another, nor does it give any means for deciding whether a lack of counter examples
which would disprove the universality of the time-order is due simply to a scarcity of
experienced cases or to a true objective universality of the relation.
The key instrument for deciding these kinds of cases turn on our capacity for
practical activity, and as it happens, we have in favourable cases ways of distinguishing
cause-and-effect-relationships from joint-effects-of-a-common-cause and reciprocal-
causation relationships, but though we can progressively strengthen the candidature of
any putative causal law, we have no means of conclusively elevating it from the status of
candidate to proven causal law.
a) The Practice of Experimentation
An essential aspect of our practice of causal enquiry is the performing of experiments.
The underlying idea is that we can make things happen, and by utilising this ability, we
can test the relationships between kinds of events. Say I have repeatedly observed the
melting of an ice-cube after it has been removed from the ice-box. Suppose I have led
such a sheltered existence that I have very little experience of the causal properties of ice-
cubes save for their tendency to be included in the drinks so diligently brought to me by
my butler,411 and as mentioned their intriguing metamorphosis in the silver ice-bucket.
Overcome by an uncharacteristic naturalist urge I resolve to determine the true causal
facts obtaining to this “melting” as I have heard it termed.
Initially I have two hypotheses concerning the melting of the ice-cubes:
i) it is caused by the increase in surrounding air temperature, or
ii) it is caused by increased altitude (I gather that the ice-box is situated somewhere in
the cellars).
First I resolve to decide between the two hypotheses by closely watching the activities of
my butler as he procures the requisite specimens. However, I quickly realise that this will
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be of no avail, as of course in each and every case both of the candidate causes of the
melting of the ice are present, and indeed on each occasion the ice-cubes obligingly
melt. This gives me no grounds for deciding between the hypotheses, so I am no further
in my investigations.
Then, illuminated by a sudden insight, I make the crucial intellectual leap and resolve
to take practical action. Though unfamiliar at first, this soon facilitates considerable
progress: I realise that by manipulating the practical situations, I can actually test the two
hypotheses. I decide to test the latter hypothesis first. Now, in order to provide a test
situation between the two, I need to bring it about that only one of the putative cause
event-types occur, and then observe whether the effect event-type occurs. This, I realise,
can easily be achieved if the ice-box be brought upstairs to my study, so I have my butler
carry it into the study and then I eagerly await the result, peering only occasionally into
the ice-box, so as not to make the temperature increase inside and invalidate the
experiment. Finding that no melting takes place as a result of the increased altitude, I
continue to my second experiment, which involves heating the ice-cubes at their original
place in the cellars. To cut a long story a short, I eventually conclude that it is the
increase in surrounding temperature that cause the ice-cube to melt and not the increase
in altitude.
The point of the story is to illustrate that by using our ability to interact with the
world, we can actually test causal hypotheses, and though over-simplified, the story
illustrates the basic features of experiment. In investigating nature – investigating causal
laws – we need not and do not rely solely on our passive faculties of receptivity. We do
not merely wait around for perceptions to occur, and then inwardly sift and sort them
looking for correlations. We can actually make things happen, bring it about that certain
states of affairs obtain, certain events occur, and this active ability makes it possible in
many cases to test causal hypotheses, and thus to adjudicate between rival candidate
causal laws. 412
The emphasis on concrete experiments is brought out explicitly in Kant’s account of
how we determine the causal order of concurrent processes. Kant’s examples are a stove
causing a room to heat, a leaden ball causing a dent on the surface of a cushion and a
narrow glass causing a concave surface on the water contained in it. Especially his
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explication of the latter two cases seem to me to refer explicitly to concrete, practical
experiment.
[I]f I lay the ball on the pillow the dent follows its previously smooth shape; but if (for
whatever reason) the pillow has a dent, a leaden ball does not follow it…
[A]s soon as I draw the water into the glass from a larger vessel, something follows,
namely the transformation of the horizontal state which the water had there into a concave
state that it assumes in the glass.413
By virtue of our active ability to cause events to occur in the world we are able to
distinguish cases of true causation from cases of joint-effects-of-a-common-cause. Say
that we want to find out whether an event of type A truly are caused by an event of type
B or whether they are both caused by an event of type C. If we are able to bring about
the occurrence an event of type B, without an event of type C occurring, we can conclude
that our actions caused event B and therefore, event C did not. If, further, every time and
in every way we do this – bring about the occurrence of event B, event A always occur,
then we are justified in holding that events of type B cause events of type A, thus we are
justified in making the judgement
If B, then A
In this way, we are able to put our candidate causal laws to the test of purposely planned
interventionist experience in the form of experiments, breaking into the causal chains of
the phenomena under investigation; and the more tests a candidate causal law passes, the
stronger its candidature.414
A passage from the introduction to the 2nd edition of the Critique is highly
illuminating of Kant’s emphasis on active experimentation, and also illustrates his interest
in investigating the foundations not only of any experience in general, but also of
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scientific, law-like knowledge in particular, as instantiated paradigmatically by Newtonian
physics (though that work is not mentioned explicitly here):
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when
Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a
known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed metals into calx and then
changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and then putting it back
again, a light dawned on all those who study nature. They comprehended that reason has
insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the
lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to
answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as
it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no
previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what
reason seeks and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature
with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among
appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in
accordance with these principles – yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil,
who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who
compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them.415
This active intervention in the natural order now gives us an explanation of how we go
from a passive observation of generalities towards a judgement of universal laws, though
our putative statement of laws will never attain full certainty, but only a comparatively
strengthened candidature.
So, we have answered the first question on p. 229, how we judge that an experienced
phenomenon conforms to a rule that goes beyond experience, namely by utilising our
active ability to intervene in nature. Still, even if we have a means of determining whether
a certain correlation of event-types has a stronger candidature for causal law-status, thus a
way of approaching a comprehensive set of causal laws, we seem to have no guarantee
that our experiments will always uncover true causal laws. We may know how to look, but
that does not guarantee that we shall always find. In other words, we have as yet no
justification for the universality of the Causal Principle, only a justification for the
instances of it that we do claim to know. Which consideration brings us to the next
question, concerning what justification we have for holding the universal applicability of
the Causal Principle.
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8.5 The Universality of the Causal Principle
So far, we have investigated how candidate causal laws have their candidature
strengthened as we gain progressively stronger grounds for asserting their conformance
to the form of causal laws as specified in the Causal Principle. This gives us reasons to
believe that strong candidate causal laws hold universally of the event-types specified in
the individual law-statements. If the causal judgement “If A then B” is true, then that
judgement holds universally of all events of type A. So we have a justification for the
universality of all particular causal laws insofar as they are known, but this falls short of a
justification of the universality of the Causal Principle itself, which principle states that
every event occurs in accordance with some causal law. Since all causal laws fall under the
Causal Principle, all events that fall under a causal law ipso facto  falls under the Principle.
But then the question is: do all events fall under a causal law? If the Causal Principle is to
be universally valid, it seems that they must, but what justification could we have for
believing that all events – past, present or future – fall under some causal law?
The key to answering this question is to remember that the Causal Principle is
supposed to be a regulative principle (see p. 211). A characteristic of regulative
principles is that we are required to make them come out true in cases where the
empirical evidence leaves it undetermined how to conceive of, how to describe, a state of
affairs. But this needs some elaboration:
a) The generality of events
When we investigate the truth of a candidate causal law, say “If A then B”, we want to
determine whether whenever an event of type A occurs it is followed by an event of type
B. Clearly, then, it is relevant to enquire how we determine the type of an event in the first
place. Roughly a causal law says that whenever you have the same kind of event as this,
then the same kind of event as that follows. What then is to count as the same kind of
event?
Let us go back to our example of a particular causal law:
(22) If a moving billiard ball hits a stationary one, the latter is thereby brought into
motion
We want to know whether whenever an event of the kind here described as a moving
billiard ball hitting a stationary one occurs, the event described as the latter billiard ball
Kant and the Epistemology of Metaphysics Eilert Sundt-Ohlsen
– 234 –
being brought into motion also occurs. But what is to count as an event of the same kind
as the former one? How alike must two events be to count as being of the same kind?
Clearly it is absurd to demand that the events be alike in every detail – a moving
billiard ball may hit a stationary one in any manner of different ways, from different
angles and with different speeds; and it would still be a true case of a moving billiard ball
hitting a stationary one. In other words, it would be an instance of this general kind of
event; though if we were to give a more specific description of the events – say of a
moving billiard ball hitting a stationary one of equal mass with a specific force F – then
we might have to hold the events to be of different kinds. Indeed, the question of
sameness of kind of events seems quite meaningless without specifying what kind is in
question. Given the question “Is this the same as that?” with no further specification
given verbally or by context, the only appropriate response seems to be “The same
what?”.
It seems that only relative to a description, relative to conception, can sameness of
kind, or typical identity be evaluated. Being of the same kind is equivalent to being
correctly subsumed under the same concept, so clearly the notion becomes meaningless
when no concept is specified.416
Now, we can note an interesting parallel: Just as the sameness in kind of events is relative
to description, so is the generality of a correlation of events. Take (22) again. As
described, that judgement has a quite high general validity, it really is the case most of
the time that when a moving billiard ball hits a stationary one, the latter is brought into
motion; but there are exceptions: The stationary ball might be glued to the table, it might
be brittle and shatter on impact and so on and so forth. So to arrive at a formulation with
a stronger candidature as a causal law, we should sharpen the formulation of (22) to
something like
(22)'If a moving, non-brittle billiard ball hits a stationary unimpeded non-brittle
one…
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which formulation has considerably higher general validity than the original one.
Similarly, we can imagine true descriptions of the two initial events, the general
correlation of which is very low, such as:
(22)'' If a moving red object hits a stationary white object …
A description using these event-concepts would still amount to a true description of the
initially observed state of affairs (“a moving red object hit a stationary white object and
the latter started moving”), but it would cite no general, much less a universal
correlation of the event-types in question, and could not be transformed into a true
causal judgement. We could plausibly utter truly: “The white object started moving
because it was hit by the red object”, but only on the implicit understanding that we
could cite some correlation other than between the events as described here – it is plainly
false that every time a red object hits a white one, the white one starts moving. (Think of
a ripe strawberry hitting a fridge.)
It seems then that the possible extent of our success in fitting our knowledge of the
world into causal judgements, our success in subsuming events under the Causal
Principle, is relative to our concepts – our system of classification. This echoes precisely
the considerations noted in the discussion of the 1st Analogy, concerning the concept of
substance (see p. 218).
Since the choice of concepts often does not influence the possibility of a correct
description of particular events – thus of straightforward empirical truth – the choice of
concepts is not directly determined by, cannot be read off of, experience alone. Only by
reference to the possibility of subsumption under an all-pervasive system of causal laws is
the choice of concepts further restricted by the Causal Principle. As was the case with the
1st Analogy, we should note that we have a certain faculty of spontaneity and creativity of
concepts. The regulative Causal Principle tells us to choose and, if necessary, develop
concepts that make possible an all-pervasive true system of causal judgements.
Given a finite set of event-concepts, we could in principle test every possible
combination of them and thus discover the complete set of causal laws. But it is quite
clear that a crucial part of scientific enquiry consists of devising new concepts – new
ways of describing the world and the objects and events in it. So long as there is no
reason to believe that the number of possible concepts is anything but indefinite, there is
no way to refute the Causal Principle – no way to prove that there is no set of concepts
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relative to which any given phenomenon is subsumable under concepts that enter into
true causal law statements.
Add to the irrefutability of the Causal Principle its regulative nature which instructs us
to actively favour and develop such concepts as make possible a true causal description
of the world, and the possibility (if not perhaps the practical necessity or utility) of
ensuring its universal validity is explained.
To paraphrase Kant, the Causal Principle is given as a task. It is as it were a dictate of
reason, informing and restricting our practice of concept-formation. “Devise concepts
such that the Causal Principle comes out true!”.
8.6 The Utility of the Causal Principle
The discussion above has provided some arguments for how the truth of the Causal
Principle could be enforced – how its universality is ensured, but we have not yet
explained why we employ it. Why favour concepts that enable a causal description of the
world when true descriptions need not be causal?417
Again, Kant’s general explanation is that the regulative principles of the Analogies
make possible the knowledge of temporal relations, and in the case of the 2nd Analogy,
knowledge of the temporal relation of succession  is supposed to be made possible by the
employment of the Causal Principle.
This claim, however, is not altogether easy to justify as it stands. It would seem that at
any point of time in human history, we have acquaintance with and knowledge of a vast
range of phenomena whose complete causal relations we do not yet know. For instance,
we do not know why a certain caesium atom decays at the particular time that it does.
Indeed, modern physics holds that there is no particular cause for it decaying at a
particular time, merely a certain average probability for any caesium atom to decay
sometime during a given period. Nevertheless we seem perfectly able to determine at
precisely what time a certain caesium atom did decay and whether this event preceded or
succeeded other related or unrelated events, which means that we do  in fact have
knowledge of temporal relations that such an event enters into, even if we are presently
unable to subsume the event under any true causal law statements, hence unable to
subsume it under the Causal Principle.
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Why then does Kant think that the employment of the regulative principles of the
Analogies are necessary conditions for the knowledge of temporal relations when we
manifestly have such knowledge in cases where we do not successfully employ these
regulative principles, and why should we believe it?
There is no clear-cut solution to this riddle in Kant’s text, but I think the key again lies in
recalling the clue noted on p. 161 concerning the distinction between typical and
occasional time-relations. Note that in the case of the decaying caesium atom, we can
only have knowledge of the occasional time-relations that each particular decay-event
enters into, given that according to modern physics there is no strict regularity of events
with regards to the precise occurrence of the decay – there are no causal laws governing
the precise moment a caesium atom decays. To know the causal laws that govern a
phenomenon just is to know the strict typical temporally successive relations that obtain
of the events involved. Since the a priori deployment of the Causal Principle is a
necessary condition for knowledge of causal laws, it is ipso facto also a condition for the
knowledge of temporal relations, specifically typical temporal relations, which is just what
we wanted to determine.
So, applying the Causal Principle is a necessary condition for having knowledge of
certain typical time-relations, namely those of succession. Applying the Causal Principle
enables us to know what kind of events typically succeed one another. The next natural
question then is: Why favour this causal knowledge?
The virtue of causal knowledge is that it enables us in addition to merely correctly
describing the world, also to predict  and in retrospect to explain the events of the world.
If I truly know that the rain causes the streets to get wet and I observe that it is starting to
rain, I can confidently predict  that the streets will get wet; which prediction could turn out
to be highly useful, for instance occasioning me to change into more appropriate
footwear. Similarly I would be able post facto to explain why the streets got wet, namely
because it started to rain.
Finally now, we can answer the persisting question from the treatment of the 1st
Analogy: Why must we subsume experiences under event-concepts of the form that we
actually do? – which by implication is to ask why we cannot allow of substantial creation
or annihilation. The answer is that doing so would make impossible further subsumption
under causal laws, and hence would make impossible predicting or explaining such
occurrences. Suppose we want to know of any given experienced event what kind of
event always succeeds it, which is another way of saying that we want to know which
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typical temporary successive relation that particular event enters into, which is to say that
we want to know which causal laws it is subject to, which again is to say that we want to
know what caused it and what its effects are. This, we have seen, is only possible by
implementing the regulative Principle of Causality; but the Principle of Causality in turn,
can only be applied and implemented if the observed phenomenon is subsumable under
an event-concept in the first place. Since the Causal Principle tells us how to organise
cognised events under causal law judgements, the subsumption of observed phenomena
under event-concepts is a necessary condition for the subsequent subsumption under
causal law statements.
Let us assume a kind of happening such that it would have to be regarded as creation
ab annihilo. The only way it could be in principle impossible to subsume this happening
under an event-concept amenable to the principle of persistence is if there were no
correlation between this miraculous happening and prior events, which is to say that this
happening would not enter into any typical relations of succession, which again is to say
that it could not be causally explained nor predicted.
So, to conclude: both the Principle of Persistence and the Causal Principle are
necessary for any possibly true conception of the world as a predictable, law-governed
whole, and the realisation of this description is the goal of natural science. It is the
prospect of the completeness of physics – the total theory.
Given this reading of the Analogies, the conclusion to the discussion so far, would be that
any kind of mathematically expressed science of nature – any physics – which aspires to
completeness must have some kind of conservation law as a fundamental, constitutive
principle.
A final word about this aspiration to completeness: We might grant that as a matter of
fact physics has completeness as its ideal, and that any scientific inquiry is directed
towards this goal, but surely that is no guarantee that we will even get close to achieving
it? Could we not simply find that at the end of the day we must simply conclude that at
some fundamental level, the world really is capricious – that there are no laws?
The deep, Kantian point is that we cannot in principle distinguish between not having
a complete causal description of the world because no comprehensive causal description
could be found, or because we simply haven’t found it yet, and the presumption that we
can ever approach more closely such a comprehensive causal description remains a
necessary presupposition of certain aspects of natural science. Thus, the Causal Principle
is in a very precise sense an ideal of natural science.
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I have found it necessary to include these observations concerning the Analogies in
general before proceeding to the 3rd Analogy, as the interpretation of and justification
for the 2nd Analogy essentially feeds into the understanding of the 1st. However, now
that the first two Analogies are treated, making sense of the 3rd Analogy is comparatively
simpler.
– 240 –
C h a p t e r 9 – T h e 3 r d  A n a l o g y – S i m u l t a n e i t y 
Like the first two, the third Analogy proper takes the form of a regulative principle. It is
stated thus in the second edition:
Third Analogy.
Principle of simultaneity,
according to the law of interaction, or community
All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in
thoroughgoing interaction.418
And in the first:
Principle of community
All substances, insofar as they are simultaneous, stand in thoroughgoing community
(i.e., interaction with one another).419
When it comes to the details of the third Analogy, I find that I have to part company with
Kant. Kant presents the third Analogy as an epistemic principle, specifying the basis on
which we make judgments of occasional simultaneity. This principle, I shall claim, can
only be regarded as untenable. Further, it seems impossible to relate the third Analogy to
the corresponding “disjunctive” form of judgement from the table of judgements.
However, it is possible to construct an argument concerning judgements of typical
simultaneity that fits into the Kantian scheme, and also to relate this to a form of
judgements that is missing from Kant’s original table.
9.1 The Principle of Simultaneity
According to Kant, the Principle of Simultaneity seems to state that there are causal
connections between all perceptible objects in the knowable universe. (“All substances,
insofar as they are simultaneous, stand in thoroughgoing … interaction with one
another”).
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This is, so to speak, fine as far as it goes. Given that perception takes place via causal
influence of the objects of perception upon our sense organs, any object which I can
perceive is indeed directly causally connected to me. Now, I can only know objects either
directly by perception, or indirectly through their causal influence on other perceived
objects. Hence every object which I can know, is causally connected to me; therefore all
knowable objects are causally connected through the knowing subject. Let us call this the
thesis of Universal Causal Connection. This thesis is true enough, but it is trivial – it has
no rich consequences. Further, it is analytic in being directly derivable from our
concepts of perception and knowledge, and it has very little to do with simultaneity.
Instead a principle of simultaneity, which we can call the Principle of Arbitrary
Perception, seems to appear in the Proof:
Things are simultaneous insofar as they exist at one and the same time. But how does one
cognize that they exist at one and the same time? If the order in the synthesis of the
apprehension of this manifold is indifferent, i.e., if it can proceed from A through B, C, and
D to E, but also conversely from E to A.420
So, here we seem to have a real principle of simultaneity, read as an epistemological
principle telling us what criteria we have for judging simultaneity: We judge things to
exist simultaneously if we can perceive them in arbitrary order. Presumably we test for
simultaneity by shifting our perception at will from one to the other and back again, and
if none of the things in question disappear in the process, we deem them to exist
simultaneously. This then is a principle to determine whether any set of objects are
occasionally simultaneous. This reading seems also to be supported by Kant’s example
in the first paragraph which is added to the Proof in the 2nd edition:
…I can direct my perception first to the moon and subsequently to the earth, or
conversely, first to the earth and then subsequently to the moon, and on this account,
since the perceptions of these objects can follow each other reciprocally, I say that they
exist simultaneously.421
Strawson certainly reads the 3rd Analogy as claiming such an epistemological principle,
which he thinks that “suitably and reasonably interpreted and qualified” does seem to
hold :
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Lack or possession of order-indifference on the part of our perception is, [Kant] seems to
say, our criterion – whether we reflectively realize the fact or not – of objective succession
or co-existence.422
The first problem with this reading is that the principle is simply false. Imagine a wall
with two parallel mirrors, set two meters apart. Now, I can perceive my mirror image in
mirror A, then move to mirror B and perceive my mirror image there too. Whether I
proceed from mirror A to mirror B or vice versa, makes no difference, so we should
conclude according to the principle of simultaneity that the two mirror images exist
simultaneously. Yet, even if I am not in a position to perceive it, my mirror image really
disappears when I leave the mirror (or so I’m told anyway).
Worse still is the problem that Kant’s further explication of this principle is
incompatible with Arbitrary Perception and goes significantly beyond Universal Causal
Connection. Immediately after stating the principle of Arbitrary Perception, he claims
that this can only be known of, i.e. can only be applied to, objects which act on each
other and “receive a reciprocal influence”423 from each other, which is to say that they
stand in a “dynamical community of interaction”. He seems to be saying that for two
objects to be validly judged as simultaneous, they must mutually cause each other, or at
least causally influence each other:
[E]ach … substance must simultaneously contain the causality of certain determinations in
the other and the effects of the causality of the other, i.e., they must stand in dynamical
community (immediately or mediately) if their simultaneity is to be cognized in an
possible experience.424
This is claiming considerably more than what was read into the thesis of Universal Causal
Connection. Let us use the example of the moon and the earth: Even if they stand in
causal connection mediately by both influencing my sense organs, that does not entail
that they influence each other. The problem is that the “causal influx” of perception is
essentially one-way. We are influenced by, but do not in turn significantly influence the
perceived objects. (Considerations of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle are quite
irrelevant on this scale.) Maybe then, the relevant point is that the earth and the moon
stand in immediate causal connection, which they clearly do: they are causally influenced
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by mutual gravitation. And yet this mutual gravitational influence seems to be largely
irrelevant to their simultaneous existence. Indeed one of the theories of the formation of
the moon is that it was once moving independently of the earth and then at some stage
got caught in the earth’s gravitational field and locked into orbit around it. So it is
clearly possible that the moon and the earth be causally independent of each other and
yet exist simultaneously. Nor does the mutual gravitation seem to be essential for two
objects’ being perceived as simultaneous. Imagine being aboard the Mir space station,
looking at two free-floating foam rubber balls. In such a situation there would certainly
not be any perceivable gravitational pull between the balls (and probably not even a
measurable one), yet surely one would have little problem in judging that the balls are
both simultaneously there. For judgements of occasional simultaneity, it seems that
considerations of mutual interaction is quite irrelevant.
So, to sum up where Kant’s statement of the third Analogy leaves us: The thesis of
Universal Causal Connection proves too little, the principle of Arbitrary Perception
claims too much, the proof does not prove the principle and the examples do not
exemplify the claims.
Now, this may be a somewhat unfair dismissal of Kant’s arguments, and perhaps
more sense could be made of his claims on a more sympathetic reading. I shall have to
forego that task here, however, and focus instead on showing how we can make sense of a
principle of simultaneity as a third analogy of experience once we take into account the
distinction between occasional and typical simultaneity.
To do this, we must again hark back to Kant’s conception of knowledge. As
mentioned on p. 221 we can only cognise objects by way of concepts, and hence we can
only know objects as being of a certain kind. As was the case with the first two Analogies,
the third should concern relations of kinds of objects – typical relations. What we are
after is a principle for determining which kinds of phenomena are typically simultaneous
– always occur together; not some principle for judging what things are occasionally
simultaneous – just happen to occur at the same time for once. The third analogy should
thus concern a much narrower class of phenomena than what Kant implies.
9.2 Typical Simultaneity
The principle of simultaneity then, should read:
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All substances, in so far as they can be perceived as typically simultaneous,
stand in thoroughgoing mutual interaction.
Now, being typically simultaneous, or simultaneous as to kind, entails universality or
necessity in that every set of objects of the relevant kinds is temporally co-located. Like
causal connection entails a universal and hence necessary one-way connection,
simultaneity and interaction entails a necessary two-way or reciprocal connection. Recall
that the way we establish the existence of causal connections expressed in causal laws is
by experimentation. If we bring about an event of type A, and an event of type B always
and immediately follows, then A typically causes B. Now, if this dependence works both
ways so that the deliberate positing of event A always and immediately is followed by
event B, and the positing of event B likewise is followed by event A, then the two events
are typically simultaneous. A good example would be the existence of a magnetic field
round a live electrical conductor and the electrical current in the conductor itself. If we
bring about the current, then the field always and immediately appears, and if we induce
the magnetic field, then a current always and immediately appears. Another way of
explaining this is that they really are just two aspects of one and the same phenomenon.
Even if we may recognise the current and the field by different methods, they are just
two characteristics of one and the same kind of event. But this is exactly what Kant says:
…this is a reciprocal influence, i.e., a real community (commercium) of substances;
without which the empirical relation of [typical] simultaneity could not obtain in
experience. Through this commerce  the appearances, insofar as they stand outside one
another and yet in connection, constitute a composite (compositum reale).425
The two kinds of phenomena are conceptually external to each other, that is to say that
we cognise or recognise them by different characteristics – subsume them under non-
cointensional concepts, yet they are really connected, that is connected in reality.
We clearly distinguish between cases of typical simultaneity, such as the example of
the magnetic field and the live conductor, which always occur together; and cases of
occasional simultaneity, such as a cat and a dog running simultaneously past my window.
In the former case we take it that the simultaneity is necessary – these two phenomena
must occur together, while in the latter the simultaneity is purely contingent. The trans-
cendental question is on what basis we make this distinctions. How can we judge that the
magnetic field and the live conductor form a compositum reale?
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9.3 The third Relational Judgement
To complete the reconstruction of the third Analogy, we need to make the connection to
a form of judgement. There are three kinds of typical time-relations, and our knowledge
of instances of each of them is facilitated by the employment of one of three a priori
principles. This is true of all three Analogies. However, the Analogies are also supposed
to be connected to three different kinds of judgements that we find ourselves making.
This, we have seen, can be made sense of in the cases of the First and Second Analogy,
but so far the connection has not been made in the case of the Third Analogy, which it
should be, to make this interpretation complete.
One difficulty in interpreting the Analogies with regard to Kant’s overall project of
deriving the synthetic principles from the table of categories and the table of categories
from the table of judgements is that by the time we get to the discussion of the principles,
i.e. in this case: the Analogies, the forms of judgement have dropped out of the
discussion. I guess there might be many reasons for this. One could be that Kant, rightly
or wrongly, thought that the individual connections between principles, categories and
forms of judgements were just so obvious and simple as to be in need of no further
explanation. Alternatively it could be that Kant at this stage was so caught up in the
general thrust of his project that he forgot to consider and discuss the details of the
connections between the various stages of his arguments. Or again, he may have held that
the general thrust and direction of the arguments was the important thing, and that the
fine details were of less consequence. Either way it would seem not too controversial to
suggest that there may be scope for improvement and corrections with regard to those
aspects of the argument on which Kant remains silent.
I have already argued that the First Analogy is related to transformational judgements
rather than to categorical ones as Kant claims, and now I shall claim that also in the case
of the Third Analogy, we need to modify the original table of judgements. According to
Kant, the form of judgement that corresponds to the third Analogy, and which thus
amounts to a judgement of simultaneity is the disjunctive judgement, but it is hard to see
how this is going to work. For one thing, simultaneity is a temporal relation – whereof
indeed the Analogies are supposed to explain the possibility of our knowledge – but a
disjunctive judgement makes no obvious reference to time. Take the one example Kant
gives, in the discussion following the specification of the table of judgements.
“The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an
external cause.” Each of these propositions occupies one part of the sphere of the possible
cognition about the existence of the world in general, and together they occupy the entire
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sphere. To remove the cognition from one of these spheres means to place it in one of the
others, and to place it in one sphere, on the contrary, means to remove it from the others.
In a disjunctive judgement there is therefore a certain community of cognitions,
consisting in the fact that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine the true
cognition in its entirety, since taken together they constitute the entire content of a
particular given cognition.426
There is certainly no explicit reference to simultaneity here, and it is well nigh impossible
to find any implicit reference to it either. What, to begin with, is it that is supposed to be
simultaneous? Certainly not the possible state of affairs described by each of the
propositions since they mutually exclude each other! Indeed, in this example the entire
judgement seems to be analytic. Nothing could simultaneously satisfy more than one of
the predicates ‘exist through blind chance’, ‘exist through inner necessity’ and ‘exist
through an external cause’, which means that the example judgement is not empirical in
Kant’s sense at all – hence not part of a possible experience.427 But maybe Kant has
merely chosen a bad example, and empirical  disjunctive judgements imply simultaneity?
But no - take an ordinary empirical, disjunctive judgement:
(23) Either Paul is in London or he is in Manchester
This is certainly an empirical claim, which might be true or false, but in no way does it
entail the simultaneity of Paul’s being in London and in Manchester. On the contrary, it
excludes the simultaneity thereof. But then, maybe it is the simultaneous existence of
London and Manchester that is entailed by (23)? But no: Suppose that Paul is in fact in
London and that, unbeknownst to me, Manchester has been utterly destroyed by some
freak cataclysmic event. I would then still be stating a truth if I were to utter (23) though
London and Manchester could no longer be said to exist simultaneously.
In other passages, Kant seems to think that the disjunctive judgement is related to or
exemplary of the part-whole relation. And one might think that the disjunctive
judgement is related to our knowledge of parts coexisting to form a whole, hence to
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some sort of simultaneity; but as we shall see, Kant’s assertions in this regard hold of
conceptual relations, rather than of objective relations and so will do no good as
grounding knowledge of objective simultaneity.
a) The Community of Judgements
In the Logic , Kant gives a slightly fuller discussion of the disjunctive Judgement, and also
provides one more example. From these, it seems quite clear that the notion of
community that Kant attaches to the disjunctive judgement is essentially irrelevant to the
concerns of the Third Analogy.
The example judgement that Kant gives is:
A scholar is either a historian or a rationalist428
Kant clearly takes dichotomy of scholarship into historian and rational to be jointly
exhaustive and mutually exclusive:
I determine that these concepts, as to sphere, are parts of the sphere of the [concept
of] scholar, but not at all parts of each other, and that all taken together are complete.429
But that precisely makes the judgement analytic, hence not one that forms an interesting
part of experience.
The further discussion shows conclusively that Kant is concerned with how several more
specific concepts together can exhaustively subdivide a more general concept such that
anything that falls under the higher concept will fall under exactly one of the lower
concepts. Of such a set of concepts Kant holds that insofar as this is expressed in a
judgement, then the extension of the lower concepts are taken to be related to the
extension of the higher concept as parts to a whole “(complementum ad totum)”430 The
complete listing of the species of a genus would be an example of such a relation of
concepts.
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Now, there is nothing in Kant’s discussion that necessarily limits it to analytic
judgements, but from his admittedly sparse examples, these seem to be what he had in
mind. Now, we can make sense of such judgements being synthetic, yet true, for instance:
(24) Any earthly sapient being is either male or female
This is clearly synthetic – there is no contradiction in supposing that worker bees could
have evolved so as to be sapient – but again, this judgement and the ability to make it has
nothing to do with time, and certainly not to simultaneity. We can indeed say that the
extension of ‘sapient male’ and the extension of ‘sapient female’ together make up the
extension of ‘sapient being’, but there is no need for simultaneity here. If all human
males were suddenly to die, (24) would still be true, and there would still be sapient
beings on earth, but the sapient females would then not exist simultaneously with sapient
males.
9.4 The Compositum Reale
Clearly, to defend the broad thrust of the Kantian project, I need to show that there is a
distinct form of judgement which amounts to an assertion of typical simultaneity in the
same way that transformational judgements amount to assertions of typical persistence,
and hypothetical judgements amount to assertions of typical succession. And indeed, I
believe that such a form of judgement exists, though it has no set of canonical verbal
expressions as is the case with the first two forms of relational judgements.
Now, the causal hypothetical judgement clearly has the form of a conditional
judgement. Since there are also other forms of conditional judgement, e.g. the material
implication, we could term the Kantian “hypothetical” judgements ‘causal
conditionals’. But if there are casual conditionals we should also be able to countenance
causal bi-conditionals – cases where A causes B but where B also causes A. The classic
case of the chickens and the eggs would seem to be an adequate example.
Note how well this fits with Kant’s description of the conditions for knowledge of
simultaneity in the section on the Third Analogy:
[E]ach substance (since it can be a consequence only with regard to its determinations)
must simultaneously contain the causality of certain determinations in the other and the
effect of the causality of the other, i.e., they must stand in dynamical community
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(immediately or mediately) if their simultaneity is to be cognized in any possible
experience.431
This reconstruction has the further benefit of making sense. It seems that the only way
we can be sure that some set of phenomena will always occur together is if they mutually
cause each other, i.e. form a physical system. Natural science seems frequently to be
concerned with determining what phenomena go into physical systems, and the correct
determining of such relationships are important scientific achievements. Examples are
the discovery that electrons, protons and neutrons together form atoms, that procreating
males of any species always and only exist when there are also procreating females of
that species and that magnetic north poles are always attached to magnetic south poles.
This illustrates that, to an even higher degree than in the former two Analogies, the
possibility of systematic, scientific knowledge plays a crucial, yet understated part in
Kant’s arguments.
9.5  Systematic Experience
Having completed the interpretation of the Three Analogies of Experience, we have seen
that the ability to make transformational judgements requires us to organise our concepts
such that we are able to determine the relative persistence of features of our world;
hypothetical judgements to determine recurring successions and bi-conditional
judgements to determine physical systems.
Since it is clearly useful to know e.g. that the ground is likely to be here tomorrow,
that the apples will probably ripen in another fortnight and that if you want more
chickens you should also keep a rooster or two, we can give an evolutional/teleological
explanation of why we should have this kind of a conceptual scheme rather than another,
and we can validate the pure concepts without needing to postulate any knowledge-
transcendent, metaphysical entities.
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C h a p t e r 1 0 – E p i l o g u e 
With this, I have concluded my reconstruction of a Kantian argument for the validity of
Pure Concepts and Principles and thus presented a theory for the origins, validity and
bounds of our knowledge of causal determinacy. In future work I hope to be able to
show how this can be used to provide a resolution to the Antinomy of Freedom and thus
to give the required foundation for Kant’s moral philosophy.
Any reader who has followed the arguments of this thesis through to the end might
have been surprised to discover that in giving an alleged defence of the main lines of
argument in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason I have barely mentioned Transcendental
Idealism. On the other hand, he might also be relieved.
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C h a p t e r 1 1 – A p p e n d i c e s 
11.1 The revised tables
a) The Table Of Judgements
Simple judgements Complex judgements
1. Quantity of Judgements
Singular
Particular
Universal
2. Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Exclusive
3. Relation
Transformational
Conditional
Bi-conditional
4. Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodictic
The revised table of judgements
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b) The Table Of Categories
Mathematical categories Temporal categories
1. Of quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
2. Of quality
Presence
Absence
Exclusion
3. Of relation
Substance and Attribute
Cause and Effect
 Interdependence
4. Of modality
Possibility – Impossibility
Existence – Nonexistence
Necessity – Contingency
The revised table of categories
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11.3 Specimen judgements
(1) That apple is green 22
(2) That apple is ripe 87
(3) *That ripe is tasty 89
(4) *Some rounds are yellow 89
(5) That animal is tall 90
(6) That animal is a horse 90
(7) The sun is hot 128
(8) The smell of diesel makes me think of the sea 128
(9) *The diesel smells of sea-water 128
(10) The soul is immortal 135
(11) That apple is fresh 136
(12) That apple is a tasty fruit 140
(13) That tasty fruit is an apple 140
(14) That horse is white 140
(15) There’s a white horse! 141
(16) That cup of coffee has cooled 191
(17) Those flowers wilted 199
(18) Those buds have blossomed 200
(19) That part of the plant grew from bud into flower 201
(20) That mass of matter was transformed from soil into a part of the plant 201
(21) If it starts raining, then the streets get wet 224
(22) If a moving billiard ball hits a stationary one, the latter is thereby brought into motion 226
(23) Either Paul is in London or he is in Manchester 247
(24) Any earthly sapient being is either male or female 249
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